


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JPRS-UMA-85-066

10 December 1985

# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS



USSR JPRS-UMA-85-066

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10 December 1985

## USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

### CONTENTS

#### MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Discussion With Col Gen Lizichev (Aleksey Dmitriyevich Lizichev Interview; SOVETSKIY VOIN, No 14, Jul 85) .....	1
Col Gen Novikov on Democratic Centralism, Combat Readiness (V. Novikov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 14, Jul 85) .	7
Recalling Lenin's 'Two Tactics of Social-Democracy' (V. Larin; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 14, Jul 85) ...	16
Training Article: 'Armed Forces at the Contemporary Stage' (V. Izmaylov, Yu. Topchiy; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 14, Jul 85) .....	24
Communists Must Play Leading Role in Training, Service (Editorial; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Aug 85) .....	36
Command Responsibility for Subordinates' Breaches of Discipline (A. Shevchenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Aug 85) .....	39
Kazakh Education Ministry Decreased Pre-Draft Training Time (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Aug 85) .....	43
Army Gen Yazov: Command Responsibility for Discipline (D. Yazov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 15, Aug 85) ...	45
Col Gen Popkov on Activities of Staff Party Organizations (M. Popkov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 15, Aug 85) ..	54

#### ARMED FORCES

Maj Gen Glazunov Recalls Creation of Rank of MSU (Glazunov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Sep 85) .....	63
--	----

Thrift in Training Exercises (S. Kochetkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Sep 85) .....	65
Explaining Underuse of Trainers (Yu. Vdovtsev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Sep 85) .....	67
Letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, Responses (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates) .....	68
Defective Housing Construction	68
Survey of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Mail	69
Action Taken Against Officers	70
Complaints Voiced, Some Improvements Cited, by I. Denisov	71
Officer Shuffled From Position to Position, by A. Sonko	74
Son Becomes New Man in Army	75
Officers Punished for Misconduct	76
Officer Improperly Arrested, by A. Rybitskiy	76
Physical Training Achievements Exaggerated	78
Bickering Deprives Servicemen of Heat, by A. Andryushkov, S. Kalinayev	78
Fuel Wasted, Disappears, by M. Lisovskiy	81
Physical Training Deficiencies, by O. Vikhrev	82
Draft Notice Problem	85
GROUND FORCES	
RPO, RPO-A Flamethrowers (M. Prokhorov; ZNAMENOSETS, No 6, Jun 85) .....	86
Major General Tishchenko on Tank Night-Fire Training (V. Tishchenko; ZNAMENOSETS, No 7, Jul 85) .....	90
Fire Control Via Sound (V. Lavrenyuk; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Sep 85) .....	95
Briefs Improved BMP Trainer	97
AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES	
Applying Computer Mathematical Modeling to Military Aviation (S. Belotserkovskiy, V. Khalipov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 14, Jul 85) .....	98
PVO Radar System Operates Successfully Against Jamming (S. Korneev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 Aug 85) .....	107
Air Defense Troops Aid in Harvest (P. Studenikin; PRAVDA, 16 Sep 85) .....	110
Flight Safety Vs. Combat Readiness (V. Dudin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Sep 85) .....	114



## NAVAL FORCES

### Briefs

Port Visit to Ireland 118

## REAR SERVICES/DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

Interview With MSU Kurkotkin, Chief of Rear Services  
(S. K. Kurkotkin Interview; SOVETSKIY VOIN, No 14, Jul 85) 119

## FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Critique of 'Japanese Militarism'  
(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Sep 85) ..... 125

Military Expenditures Examined 125

Review: Japanese Armed Forces, by L. Vnotchenko 126

S. Africa's Military Industry, Ties to West  
(M. Belyayev, O. Trofimova; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Sep 85) .. 128

## AFGHANISTAN

Rebel Ammunition Captured  
(Mikhail Leshchinskiy; Moscow Television Service, 14 Oct 85) 131

### Briefs

Military Delegation From DRA 133

## MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

### DISCUSSION WITH COL GEN LIZICHEV

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 14, Jul 85 pp 21-28

[Interview with Colonel General Aleksey Dmitriyevich Lizichev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate for the Soviet Army and Navy, conducted by Colonel A. Danilov, special SOVETSKIY VOIN correspondent: "Always On Combat Patrol"]

[Text] While this material was being prepared for publication, Colonel General Aleksey Dmitriyevich Lizichev was appointed Chief of the Main Political Directorate for the Soviet Army and Navy

We met with Colonel General Lizichev, member of the Military Council and Chief of the Political Administration for the Group Of Soviet Forces in Germany, in his office. He had just returned from training. Aleksey Dmitriyevich is sharing his impressions and relating how soldiers, sergeants and warrant and commissioned officers live and study military affairs.

The Colonel General leisurely began his story. "The people are in an elevated, military mood. They are working with inspiration and creative energy. And this is certainly not by accident. We are serving outside the borders of our native country and we are therefore aware of the greatness of our Motherland and its mighty strength and authority.

Preparations for the upcoming 27th CPSU Congress have had an effect on all our service and work. Soviet people in all corners of our immense country and naturally in its Armed Forces want to meet it in a worthy manner. An unprecedented patriotic upsurge reigns supreme in the units and subunits in our group."

Aleksey Dmitriyevich continues, "I recently visited the troops. Regardless of what soldier you talk with, you experience enormous satisfaction. They are deeply aware that their military labor is necessary for their Motherland. This labor is honored and important, just as are the labors of workers, collective farmers, engineers, scientists...

I was recently with some missile men and this is what I observed. Crew members were working alongside a launcher in a friendly manner. By observing

how they operated and carried out their duties one could determine which of them had already undergone army tempering and become masters of their business and which had just made the initial steps along the difficult soldier's path. But they all worked energetically, with real fervor and vigor.

During a break I asked a soldier who had wiped his flushed, damp face, 'How's it going?'

He answered honestly, "I have to work hard. The equipment requires a lot of knowledge." The soldier motioned toward the missile after taking his place in the formation.

'Do you like the equipment?'

"What can I say. It's high quality, formidable and powerful," he said. And then, after thinking for a second he added, 'It is both an honor and a responsibility to command such a weapon and such equipment.'

I listened to the young soldier and thought about how much spiritual growth our Soviet soldier had undergone, how correctly and wisely he talked about his honored mission and how he approached the evaluation of his labor in an official manner. You could feel that concerns for the safety of his Motherland really troubled him."

Colonel General Lizichev stresses, "Our soldiers serve under special circumstances. They are beyond the frontier markers, on the boundary of two worlds. Service in the army requires a lot of effort and high military and moral qualities from a man, especially when he is outside his borders. One really has to keep his powder dry here. Soldiers in the group really understand the entirety of the responsibility that has been entrusted to them and are proud of the fact that they have the honor of representing our people and our army on German soil.

Forty years have passed since the Great Patriotic War ended. And for all these years the issues of constant combat readiness and unremitting vigilance have been of paramount importance for soldiers in the GSVG [GSFG], as they have for all personnel in the Army and Navy. These issues are the pivotal line for all our work even now.

Soldiers of the group thoroughly realize that they are on the most forward defensive edge of socialism's conquests. In fact, despite the will of the people and with the complicity of its NATO partners, the US has deployed its first-strike nuclear missiles nearby in the territory of the FRG and also in England and Italy. Armies of the North Atlantic Treaty countries are rearming with the most modern tanks, multi-purpose airplanes and helicopters, artillery and missile complexes.

Personnel from the Group of Forces are vigilantly and alertly following the imperialists' aggressive intrigues and are constantly increasing their combat readiness and improving their military skills. Soldiers are trying to master their equipment and weapons more thoroughly and are trying to become real experts in their combat employment.

During exercises in classrooms and in the field, at training, drill and on flights they study those things which necessary in modern battle: how to destroy targets at maximum range with the first shot, volley or pass, day or night, under any weather conditions.

We are grateful to the party Central Committee and the Soviet government for their constant concern for soldiers in the Group. Our people have given everything we need to set up our training and our life. We have first class military equipment and weapons: modern tanks, supersonic airplanes, infantry weapons, electronics equipment and computers.

We have a good training base -- ranges, tank training areas, firing ranges, training areas and classrooms. And life is well organized. Soldiers and officers have wonderful living conditions. They have officers' clubs, service clubs, libraries, coffee houses and dining facilities to serve them.

And also worthy people come to us, people with good general educational training who are politically skillful and physically strong. Their circles of interests are unusually wide. They are smart and inquisitive, have a high feeling of responsibility and are able to stand up for themselves and for the honor of their subunit and unit.

Commanders and staffs, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations are directing the efforts of personnel at completing military and political training plans and programs, at further strengthening regulatory order and at increasing vigilance and combat readiness. Socialist competition is playing an ever increasing role in resolving these tasks. It has become a real means for mobilizing soldiers toward successfully completing the tasks that the Communist Party has assigned to the Armed Forces.

Soldiers in the Guards Tank Regiment imeni Marshal of Armored Forces M. Ye. Katukov are completing all their training tasks with great enthusiasm and spiritual inspiration. The majority of the soldiers in the unit skillfully drive combat vehicles, destroy targets without error and maintain their equipment and weapons in exemplary condition. Many soldiers have been named outstanding in military and political training, increased their military classification, become experts in military affairs and there is complete interchangeability in the overwhelming majority of the crews. Everyone, from the regimental commander to the individual soldier, is lovingly studying the equipment entrusted to them. Every field exercise is conducted with a purpose and under complicated conditions. There is exemplary internal order here and it is supported by all personnel.

Competition has become an integral part of the entire training and educational process in this regiment and the spirit of healthy competition among soldiers is supported in every way. When results are reviewed, the names of those personnel selected as outstanding are not simply given. The secret of their successes are revealed. And those who have worse results are not passed over in silence. The reasons for their lack of success are analyzed in a business-like manner and they are given advice and recommendations to help eliminate their shortcomings.

The excellent results in military and political training that have been attained by Lieutenant Colonel N. Orlov, Major N. Ivanov, Captain S. Sviridov, Senior Lieutenant N. Manakhov and many others gladdens us. The number of people selected as outstanding in training, the number of class specialists and officially rated sportsmen have doubled in the units and subunits where these officers serve.

There is strong discipline and a high level of organization here, as well as in other military collectives and communists and Komsomol members, the initiators of all glorious affairs, are a leading force. Their personnel example is the force that raises personnel to inspired labor in the name of strengthening the combat readiness of units and subunits. Communists remember the wise party commandment 'A party member has only one privilege -- to be always in the forefront, at the place where it is more difficult' and they put this into practice.

The successes of the Second Petrograd Battery, commanded by Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Lyutov, brings us joy. This is the same battery that was created in 1917 on the personnel order of Vladimir Ilich Lenin. Its weapons were in the combat formations that stormed the Winter Palace and its battery personnel were among the first to open fire on Berlin in triumphal 1945. And now they are in first place in everything, in service, training ...

We must confess that formalism in organizing competition has not been eliminated everywhere. There are subunits where people seldom remember the obligations that they accepted. At times the spirit of rivalry in the soldier against soldier, squad against squad and platoon against platoon competition is not felt. And at times this happens. A company or battalion goes out on tactical exercises, but some commanders and political workers are not anxious to develop specific commitments to help subordinates. Also no initiative is noted during the exercises themselves and the reasons for the failures of individual soldiers are not uncovered.

The fraternal ties between personnel in the Group of Forces and soldiers from the National Peoples' Army of the German Democratic Republic are really promoting the improvement of military skills. Joint exercises, tactical training, various meetings, thematic evenings and sporting competition are held. Soviet and German soldiers exchange experiences in military and political training and in the organization of socialist competition.

A few days ago our tankers visited with tankers from the GDR National Peoples' Army. This visit took place at a tank training area. Our German comrades asked the regimental commander to allow the best Soviet driver-mechanic to take his combat vehicle through the obstacle course.

The command 'Ready number 55!' resounded through the communications system.

Junior Sergeant Gennadiy Orlov moved toward his vehicle at a rapid gait. He had certainly never been so nervous in his life as he was then. Not only his honor, but that of his company, battalion, regiment and entire army was at stake.

The roar of the engine shook the tank training area. The vehicle smoothly and easily started up and gathered speed.

Junior Sergeant Orlov had not experienced such inspiration for a long time. There he was behind a crater. The passage over an anti-tank ditch was rushing to meet him. The track broke down and he had to peer at both. This is where young, inexperienced tankers skid their vehicle. But Orlov was attentive and he quickly and skillfully overcame this obstacle as well. The driver-mechanic took small slopes on the move.

'An expert, an expert!' resounded the approving cries of German friends.

Junior Sergeant Orlov was driving his vehicle at high speeds and he skillfully crossed one "trap" after another. The tank training range lane was almost completed and there remained one of the most difficult barriers, a deep crater filled with water. Orlov caught sight of it in time.

'You can't get through in second gear,' someone said.

The driver-mechanic had a total of 15 seconds to get oriented. And he decided to cross in first gear.

'That was an obvious mistake,' shouted one of the tankers. Now he will lose a lot of time shifting to high gear.'

But the crater was close and the wind was making the water in it choppy. Gennadiy Orlov understood it all. With a single glance he caught the hollow and used it as a run-out. He put on the throttle and then shifted to another gear and the vehicle swiftly darted forward.

When the tank crossed the finish line the clock showed that his time was better than that needed for an expert driver rating.

Junior Sergeant Orlov had hardly returned to the starting line when German soldiers were around him. They literally inundated Gennadiy with questions. How had he become an expert, what was the best way to cross one barrier or another? The Soviet tanker gladly answered and shared his experience. This friendly conversation lasted a long time. German soldiers listened to the advice of their brother-in-arms and watched his training on the tank simulator with interest.

After the exercise the unit commander presented Junior Sergeant Gennadiy Orlov with the GDR National People's Army Badge of Excellence in a solemn setting.

Soldiers of the Group have rich military traditions. The Group has reknown subunits and units that trod the heroic path of battle and victory during both the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars. The regiment from whose armored car Vladimir Ilich Lenin called for the socialist revolution in Russia is a member of the Group of Forces. Many of our units bear the honored title of Guards. They defended Moscow and Leningrad, participated in the battles at Kursk and the Oder and stormed Berlin.

The Combat Banner of the Proskurovsko-Berlin Guards Tank Regiment imeni G. I. Kotovskiy has the Orders of Lenin, the Red Banner and Kutuzov. The services of the Berdichev Guards Tank Regiment imeni Sukhe-Bator were recognized with six Soviet and two Mongolian orders. The soldiers and commanders of the illustrious Ural Guards Volunteer Tank Corps which was later transformed into a Guards Tank Division carried out legendary feats in battle.

Now the sons and grandsons of the front line heroes serve in GSFG. Heirs of the older generation of patriot-internationalists, they are continuing the old tradition with honor and dignity."

General Lizichev's time is scheduled to the minute. I ask him to give advice to those who will serve in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and to those who have already served.

"No matter how difficult our service is, I do not regret, nor will I every regret that I devoted my life to the Army and that I linked my fate with it. Because there is no higher honor and duty than serving the Motherland and defending the peaceful labors of its people. And this is not just a duty, but also great fortune!"

Our Soviet Army is an excellent school that indoctrinates these excellent qualities in a man. It is a powerful institute for training and educating. It has become a rule that young people receive extremely diverse specialties in the army, specialties that help them set up their lives as civilians and that expand their circles of knowledge. And nothing need be said about physical and spiritual tempering. How many round-shouldered sons has the army straightened out and how many timid or, on the other hand, mixed up sons has it straightened out! It is not without reason that our people love our Army and not without reason that they honor it and call it the school of life.

People who have undergone army training are more than good soldiers. As a rule, they are also active builders of communism. People in any institute, technical school, new project, factory and kolkhoz gladly take into their ranks people who have passed through the army school.

The Motherland and the party have entrusted us with a special post --that of honored service outside the borders of the Country of Soviets and of guard at the forward edge. And we must justify this high faith with irreproachable service, excellent training, high combat readiness and strong discipline. This will be our gift to the 27th Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

COL GEN NOVIKOV ON DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM, COMBAT READINESS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 14, Jul 85 (signed to press 4 Jul 85) pp 17-23

[Article by Col Gen V. Novikov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Baltic Military District: "The Same for all the Communists"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The role and prestige of every communist, his place in the formation and his contribution to the common success, and the strengthening of party influence with respect to further enhancing combat readiness and strengthening military discipline are becoming increasingly pressing and significant in the process of preparations underway in the army party organizations for the 17th CPSU Congress. Experience has shown that the resolution of this matter is inseparably linked to consistent implementation of the principle of democratic centralism, of which strict party discipline is a component. This is what I would like to discuss.

We know that V.I. Lenin thoroughly substantiated the need for firm discipline, solidarity and organization in the party ranks. "In principle, we have already defined our view on the importance of discipline and the concept of discipline in party work more than once," Vladimir Ilich stated. /"Unity of action, freedom of discussion and criticism/--this is our definition. Only this kind of discipline is worthy of a democratic party of the advanced class." Party discipline unites the ranks of the communists and makes the party a militant and organized detachment. V.I. Lenin constantly stressed the fact that "the basis for unity lies in class discipline, in recognition of the will of the majority, in harmonious work in the ranks and in step with that majority."

Party discipline is the same for all the communists. Regardless of rank or position. But this is not a new issue, one might think. We have discussed it a great deal, and is there any point in repeating ourselves? We need to talk about it not just every day, but every hour. The most important thing, however, is to do everything possible to strengthen discipline.

The political organs and party organizations of our district do a great deal to develop activeness, initiative and adherence to principle in the communists,



to increase their responsibility and their vanguard role in the training and the service and in the strengthening of discipline. A considerable amount of work has been carried out in this area. It became even more focused as a result of the study and implementation of decisions coming out the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. It mainly consists in explaining the Communist Party's domestic and foreign policy at the stage of perfecting developed socialism, the essence of the CPSU's ideological and organizational unity and the need to strictly observe the principle of democratic centralism, developing internal party democracy and working to increase the influence of party organizations with respect to the accomplishment of combat training tasks and the performance of service duty. The stress is on developing ideologically convinced communists, aware fighters of the party, ardent champions of state, labor and military discipline, communist ethics and morality.

Many of our political organs and party organizations have acquired experience in developing a high level of aware discipline in the communists. I would cite the political section of the Guards motorized rifle division in which Lieutenant Colonel V. Kovalchuk serves as an example of the work performed in this area. The political organ's work shows an increasingly clear-cut trend toward increasing the responsibility of those in charge at all levels for the areas entrusted to them and for their irreproachable fulfillment of their party and service duties. This year the political section has studied the work performed by a number of party organizations to motivate the fightingmen to master the equipment and weapons, to improve their fire training and to strengthen discipline and order. Typically, the officers in the political section began in every case by studying the personal example of party members and candidate members, by assessing the personal contribution made by the communists in charge to the training and indoctrination of subordinates.

How does a specific comrade handle the job? What does he do to improve his professional skill? How much initiative does he exhibit in the resolution of urgent combat training matters? With what kind of determination does he combat shortcomings? Is he active in the collective's public life? How does he conduct himself among his colleagues and in his personal life? A thorough study of all these questions and subsequent discussion of the results of the work performed by members of the political section at meetings of the party committees and party bureaus help to enhance the responsibility of the communists for the irreproachable fulfillment of requirements contained in the CPSU Charter and the strengthening of party discipline.

Political section officers recently worked in the party organization headed by Major V. Burov, for example. In general, the situation in the military collective was good, and there appeared to be no cause for concern. The political section workers arrived at the conclusion, however, that the party organization had relaxed its influence upon the training and service of the fightingmen. Certain communists in charge were not demanding with respect to the organization of classes and drills, did not strive to see that they were of good quality. In some cases, company and platoon commanders were indulgent, but this was not given a proper party assessment. As a result, even though only a short time had gone by since the beginning of the summer training period, certain subunits were spinning their wheels, figuratively

speaking. More than that, some of them were beginning to lose what they had achieved. The political section workers were particularly alarmed by notes of complacency in statements by the political worker and the secretary of the party organization. And they should have been among the first to sound the alarm.

Such a state of affairs could clearly not be accepted. The political section got the party bureau to be more demanding of the communists and to hear reports from those whose sense of responsibility for fulfilling their party duty had dulled. A discussion based on principle was also held in the political organ, which the deputy commander for political affairs and the secretary of the party organization were invited to attend. They were reminded that communists-and-supervisors must set the tone in the observance of party discipline. Vested with great trust, they are expected to set an example in the fulfillment of party decisions, orders and instructions and party duties.

The demandingness of the political section, the specific assistance provided by its workers in arranging the organizational and the ideological and indoctrinational work fulfilled their function. The activeness and adherence to principle of the unit party organization increased markedly. And things are now becoming well organized there.

Experience has shown that firm party discipline is achieved when it is established from top to bottom, at all the levels of our work. This is why the political directorate keeps a constant eye on the strengthening of discipline. At assemblies of chiefs of political organs, their deputies and senior instructors for party organizational work and at seminars, secretaries of regimental party committees and party bureaus regularly study decrees passed by the CPSU Central Committee and other general party documents aimed at enhancing party demandingness. The political directorate regularly briefs the political organs and party organizations on the most important issues of party-political work and on progressive experience, and acquaints them with its plans. Extensive use is also made of the practice of distributing special literature, surveys and memoranda to the political organs, party committees and party bureaus, which report on the experience of party organizations in strengthening party discipline, analyze the causes of the most typical deficiencies in this work and provide recommendations for correcting them.

The main thing we strive for is to further improve the work at all levels of leadership, to firmly and uncompromisingly implement the course taken toward increasing strictness and demandingness. And today we can confidently state that the work performed by the political directorate and the political organs in this area is producing good results.

Recently, for example, we analyzed the state of the work performed to enhance the public-political and service activeness of party members and candidate members in most of the party collectives. What did these studies show? Many party organizations concern themselves constantly with shaping good party qualities--efficiency and adherence to principle--in the communists and with assuring that the party members and candidate members take a vanguard role. Take the party organization in the Guards motorized rifle regiment in which

Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Sadykov is secretary of the party bureau, for example. Matters which greatly determine the level of discipline of party members and candidate members are regularly discussed at meetings there: "The Communist--Ideological Fighter of the Party," "The Communist's Responsibility for the Fulfillment of Party Duty," "On the Avant-garde Role of Party Members and Candidate Members in the Combat and Political Training" and others. The party organization strictly assesses the contribution made by each party member to the overall success, his participation in public life and his fulfillment of party assignments, and holds strictly accountable those comrades who deviate in some way from the requirements contained in the CPSU Charter. Party members and candidate members report at meetings of party bureaus and at party meetings on how they are striving to be exemplary in the training and the service and how they observe party discipline.

At a recent session of the party bureau, for example, Guards Major I. Varfolomeyev reported on his contribution to the enhancement of organization and the strengthening of discipline. Prior to this the activists had thoroughly studied the party member's work. This is why the discussion at the party bureau session was earnest and specific. It was also instructive for the other communists. It prompted them to be more demanding in assessing their own work and to combat even the slightest deviation from regulation order. A system of individual talks with comrades against whom the subunit party organizations have complaints has developed and is having a positive effect.

All of this effectively influences the attitude of the communists toward the training and the service and toward the fulfillment of their party duty. They make an important contribution to the overall success. And this can be seen. The regiment has been one of the best in the district for several years now.

In the work we are discussing, however, we also encountered cases which showed that certain party organizations are not being properly demanding of the communists with respect to their fulfillment of the CPSU member's statutory duties and their observance of party discipline. This was precisely the situation in the party collective in which CPSU member S. Sakalauskas is registered. Things were being overly simplified in the combat training through the fault of the communists. Wanting to make themselves look good, some of them were hushing up errors and miscalculations in the organization of the combat training and reconciling themselves to indulgences in the training and indoctrinational process. And the party organization was not assessing this abnormal situation from a standpoint of principle. For example, it was doing little to see that every officer-and-communist was profoundly aware of his personal responsibility for maintaining a high level of combat readiness in view of the exacerbated international situation, that he persistently studied military affairs himself and taught his subordinates to take full advantage of the capabilities of the weapons and combat equipment.

Some comrades--and we encountered this as well--limit their role and place in the accomplishment of tasks facing the party organization to participation in their discussion and voting on resolutions. This is unquestionably important. However, party discipline compels the communist to take an active part also in the organizational work for accomplishing what is planned and to demonstrate

initiative. It demands that he fulfill his service duty conscientiously and serve as a model for those around him in the training, in his conduct and in the collective's public affairs. And the criterion is the party member's personal contribution to enhancing the combat readiness of the subunit and unit, to maintaining firm regulation order, perfecting the combat training of the personnel and developing aware armed defenders devoted to the homeland.

The results of the work performed by officers in the political directorate were thoroughly discussed at party meetings and sessions of the party committees and party bureaus. An assembly of secretaries of party committees and party bureaus and of secretaries of party commissions in the political organs also discussed forms and methods of developing a sense of responsibility in party members and candidate members for the irreproachable fulfillment of their party duty. And time has demonstrated that this is bearing fruit. Specifically, we are gratified by the fact that the role of elective organs in the strengthening of party discipline is increasing. They are looking more thoroughly into the performance of each communist and assessing his attitude toward his service and party duty from a standpoint of principle.

The principle that the communists are always out front has become established in the CPSU. They have only one privilege: to be there where it is most difficult, there where the difficult and responsible tasks set by the party are being carried out. This is why we direct the political organs and party organizations to be demanding of those comrades who violate party and military discipline, who perform the assigned job with indifference and do not fulfill their socialist commitments. We can also not reconcile ourselves to a situation in which a party member or candidate member relaxes the intensity of the training or conducts himself in an unfitting manner.

Unfortunately, we still have cases in which party organizations compromise with comrades who deviate from the requirements contained in the CPSU Charter and do not assess this from a standpoint of principle. This is precisely what happened in the battalion party organization in which Major V. Sakharov is secretary. Errors were made in the organization of the training and indoctrination process in the subunit through the fault of certain officers-and-communists and the party organization reconciled itself to this. The situation in that party collective was rectified with the help of workers from the superior political organ, of course. But how could fail to recall the recommendation adopted at the 6th All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations to the effect that we must thoroughly analyze and assess from a standpoint of principle every communist's fulfillment of his party and service duties and his personal contribution to the enhancement of combat readiness in the subunit and unit. It follows from this that we must also further strengthen party influence upon all of the multifaceted work involved in developing a sense of responsibility in every communist. It is particularly important to bear this in mind now, when intensive summer training is underway, when a persistent campaign has been launched in the military collectives to fulfill the socialist commitments accepted in honor of the 27th CPSU Congress.

Experience has convinced us that party discipline is assured in great part by the ability of the elective organs and the party aktiv to create an atmosphere of earnestness, efficiency and principle in the collective, a climate which rules out any deviations from the requirements contained in the CPSU Charter. And the development of criticism and self-criticism is one of the absolute requisites for this. They are a powerful weapon in the battle against negative occurrences. The directive from the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that all of our work be given a critical focus and that a spirit of self-criticality and intolerance of shortcomings be created in all of the party organizations is serving as a reliable guideline for the district political organs and party organizations.

We assign a large role in the district to party meetings. Their preparation, the atmosphere of the discussion, democratism and earnestness all help to develop in the party members and candidate members adherence to principle, discipline and respect for the opinions of comrades, and makes them want to actively carry out the decisions which are adopted. At seminars for secretaries of party committees and party bureaus and during our work in the party organizations we teach the party aktiv how to prepare and conduct meetings, how to raise at the meetings pressing problems pertaining to the training and service of the personnel, strengthening of discipline and the improvement of ideological-indoctrinational work and internal party life. We give special attention to improving the quality of the reports and to the need to involve a broad range of party activists and competent specialists in their preparation. We strive to see that there is no place in either the reports or the talks for eulogizing, complacent reports or attempts to cover up the actual state of affairs with generalities.

Speaking of reports, I would like to point out what we believe to be a positive trend, intensification of the critical analysis of the state of affairs. Previously, the party organizations frequently discussed shortcomings which were visible to the naked eye, so to speak, which lay at the surface. Now, however, the party committees and party bureaus try to get to the bottom of why infractions were committed, down to their sources, their roots. Who was to blame? Who should be held strictly accountable? We plan to continue developing the trend. All the more, since the period of report-and-election party meetings and conferences is approaching. The current report-and-election campaign will be a special, pre-congress campaign. And it is very important for the meetings and conferences to be held in a serious manner, in an atmosphere of criticism, self-criticism and Bolshevik candor.

Improving organization and verifying performance, monitoring the fulfillment of party decisions and increasing demandingness of every communist and accountability for the state of affairs in the assigned section are absolute requirements for the observance and the strengthening of party discipline. V.I. Lenin stressed the fact that after the objectives and the tasks had been defined, decisions adopted and the personnel distributed, the focus of party leadership is shifted to organizing the work for those who are to perform it and to monitoring the results of their work.

As we improve the system of monitoring and verification of performance, the political directorate focuses its attention on the work performed in this area

by the political organs of formations and by the unit party committees and party bureaus. We attempt to introduce the experience of some of them into the praxis of all the political organs. Take the political section in which Lieutenant Colonel N. Maksimov is senior instructor for party organizational work, for example. Workers in the political section look deeply into the style and methods of the work performed by party committees and party bureaus to see that the combat training tasks are successfully carried out. This year, for example, the political section analyzed the effectiveness of party influence with respect to improving the fire training in the units in which shortcomings had previously been detected, and provided the party aktiv with direct practical assistance. What did it consist of? Comrades from the political section conducted talks with the communists who are leading specialists, set increased demands for them, conducted a seminar for the activists, told them how the outstanding units and subunits work to increase party influence upon the combat training of the fightingmen and told them how important it is to make an exacting assessment of the contribution made by each party member and candidate member to the improvement of the training process.

Typically, the political section returned to this matter some time later. Reports were made in the political organ by the party bureau secretaries on how the elective organs are implementing the recommendations made to them and increasing the responsibility of the communists for the fulfillment of their service and party duty. The group of measures carried out produced good results.

In connection with this problem, we believe that the indoctrination of secretaries of party organizations belongs on the agenda. We know, after all, that the establishment of a climate of great demandingness and discipline in the collective depends in great part upon this party leader. He sets the tone. He is a sort of conductor. Seminars and meetings of the party aktiv are regularly held in the political directorate and in the formation political organs, at which the secretaries are familiarized with the CPSU's demand for increased party discipline and are taught forms and methods of work, particularly for working with the young communists. They also present reports in the political organs on how the party committee and the party bureau develop in the communists a sense of responsibility for the fulfillment of their service and party duty. Frankly speaking, however, with respect to training secretaries the activists prefer vital communication with them on the part of officers in the political directorate and senior instructors for party organizational work in the political sections. This makes it possible both to be demanding of the individual in the party manner and to teach him a great deal. I feel that we do not make adequate use of this method. This is sometimes due to incompetence on the part of certain officers in the political organs, to their inability correctly to assess the situation in the collective and make precise and specific recommendations.

Primarily the methods of conviction are used for strengthening party discipline. At the same time, however, the observance of party discipline also calls for a resolute and uncompromising battle against violators of the CPSU Charter and various abuses, against greed, window dressing and drunkenness. We cannot tolerate, as an example, individual party members, including the communists

in charge, using their service position for mercenary purposes. We uncovered several cases of abuse in the construction of dachas and garages, the sale of motor vehicles and the distribution of apartments and passes to sanatoria. Last year, for example, Colonel G. Ocheretyanko was expelled from the CPSU for malfeasance. Harsh action, but just.

Every case like this should be looked into by the party organization. After all, a discussion based on principle in the party collective prompts all of the communists to derive the correct conclusions and intensifies their sense of responsibility for the fulfillment of party duties. We still have cases, however, in which attempts are made not to consider an infringement by a communist in charge in his own party collective, but to turn it over to a party commission in the political organ. One of the party commissions, for example, bypassing the primary party organization, considered the personal case of Major V. Ivanov, CPSU member and unit chief of staff, and gave him a penalty. It was explained that the comrades were motivated by a desire "to prevent the prestige of the communist-and-leader from being undermined," "not to evoke unneeded talk about him." This is precisely what produced false rumors, however, particularly since the party commission did not even inform the party organization of its decision.

I do not believe that such an approach to the consideration of cases of infringements by a communist can be called correct. After all, the higher party organ is shielding the guilty party, as it were, from being accountable to other comrades who know better than anyone else where and how their colleague went astray and why he violated party discipline, for which those around him might perhaps also bear some guilt as a result of not forestalling the individual's improper action.

Primarily those communists who hold positions of leadership and those elected to party committees and bureaus and to party commissions should set the tone in the observance of party discipline. The political directorate, the political organs and primary party organizations see their task as one of continuing to actively influence the selection and indoctrination of cadres, increasing demandingness of them with respect to advancement in the service and taking fuller advantage of the right to issue party references which thoroughly assess the qualities of the communist and his attitude toward the service for this purpose.

Party commissions have a large role in the strengthening of party discipline. The political organs are increasingly actively drawing upon them to monitor how party members and candidate members are fulfilling their party duties. In most cases the party commissions assess the performance of the communists from a standpoint of principle and work constantly to prevent infringements by them. We do everything possible to support the work of those party commissions which systematically brief the party organizations on their findings from the review of personal cases and on the conclusions coming out of it, how to eliminate infractions of discipline by party members and candidate members, what sort of indoctrinational work to conduct in connection with this and how to help comrades with party penalties to correct their errors.

We must evaluate the communists on the basis of their deeds and actions, their attitude toward the fulfillment of party duty. We must increase our demandingness of every party member with respect to the honorable and pure image of the party member. Directives issued by the party Central Committee orient us toward the all-around strengthening of party discipline and the strict observance of standards of party life.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

RECALLING LENIN'S 'TWO TACTICS OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 14, Jul 85 (signed to press 4 Jul 85) pp 29-35

[Article by Col V. Larin, candidate of historical sciences, docent, and Col N. Kvitchenko, candidate of historical sciences, docent: "A Model of the Creative Development of Marxism: On the 80th Anniversary of V.I. Lenin's Work 'Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution'"]

[Text] It was the summer of 1905. Russia was engulfed in the flames of revolution, the first popular revolution of the imperialist era. Vast masses of workers and peasants and other segments of the population were awakened to political life, and all of the nation's parties had become active. By decision of the 3rd Congress of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks)], the Bolsheviks were taking the course of further developing the national struggle against the autocracy, a course of armed uprising.

During the revolution an extremely acute struggle developed between the two lines--the Bolshevik, consistently revolutionary line and the Menshevik, reformist line. To unite the Bolshevik organizations on the basis of decisions of the 3rd RSDRP Congress, to make its line the nucleus guiding the militant actions of the proletariat, to get all of the consistently revolutionary forces united round it, which would mean also rebuffing the ideological and theoretical and the practical aims of the Mensheviks and the West European reformists, which were disastrous for the revolution--this was the task of the day. It was accomplished by V.I. Lenin himself as he worked on the book "Dve taktiki sotsial-demokratii v demokraticheskoy revolyutsii" [Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution].

"Thoughts and comments on decisions of the 3rd RSDRP Congress" is how Vladimir Ilich described the subject of his work. "Thoughts and comments" developed into a classic work, which enriched Marxist science in matters of revolutionary strategy and tactics. In an uncompromising battle with revisionism and opportunism V.I. Lenin defended and creatively developed Marxism as applicable to the new historical circumstances and spoke as the perspicacious and wise leader of the party of the new type and of the popular masses. "Lenin's ideas on the specific features of the bourgeois democratic revolution in the imperialist era, on its driving forces and ways of development into a socialist revolution... marked a new stage in the development of Marxist doctrine," states the decree

passed by the CPSU Central Committee: "On the 80th Anniversary of the 1905-1907 Revolution in Russia." "These ideas permitted the Bolshevik Party to work out scientifically based strategy and tactics and to define the immediate and long-range tasks of the workers' struggle."

Lenin's book "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution" was published by the RSDRP Central Committee in the summer of 1905 in Geneva. It was then reissued twice that same year in Russia and illegally disseminated throughout the nation: in Petersburg, Moscow, Kazan, Tiflis, Baku and many other cities. The content of this brilliant work relates specifically to the year 1905. It reads today, however, as though it deals with events which have developed before our eyes.

The central theme running through V.I. Lenin's entire work is the idea of the proletariat's hegemony in the bourgeois democratic revolution.

The conditions for the revolutionary struggle were fundamentally altered when capitalism entered the era of imperialism. World development placed the proletariat at the center of this era. The bourgeoisie as a class was turned from a progressive force into a reactionary one. "We have unquestionably entered a new era," V.I. Lenin wrote. "A period of political upheavals and revolutions has begun. In the period which Russia is experiencing it is inadmissible to limit ourselves to the old routine pattern" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Volume 11, page 18).

The entire course of the nation's social development prepared the proletariat for its historic mission as an uncompromising fighter against exploitation and oppression, as the political leader of Russia's entire laboring and exploited people. It had over 8 million people in industry, trade and transport by the beginning of the 20th century. Its high level of concentration was an important qualitative feature of the Russian proletariat. More than half of the industrial workers were concentrated at large enterprises with more than 500 workers. Russia's cruelly exploited working class, Lenin stressed in his work, was vitally interested in the achievement of bourgeois democratic transformations not through reform but by means of a revolution, which would resolutely free the development of the productive forces from the chains of the relics of serfdom, destroy land-ownership by the large landowners and overthrow the czarist autocracy. If the bourgeois democratic revolution were victorious, it would permit the proletariat to achieve democratic liberties, to strengthen its organizations, acquire experience and skills in leading the working masses and lead the struggle to achieve political power.

The peasantry, also interested in a decisive victory over the autocracy, was the proletariat's ally. The common basic economic and political interests of the workers and peasants in combatting czarism and the landowners was the objective basis for the establishment of their revolutionary alliance. In his book "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution," V.I. Lenin therefore not only thoroughly substantiated the need for such an alliance, but also demonstrated that it was an absolute condition for a victory of the popular revolution itself. Lenin's conclusion on the proletariat's hegemony and the need for an alliance of the working class and the peasantry established a

clearly defined boundary between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, between Marxist and opportunistic tactics in the revolution.

Finally, by the beginning of the first Russian revolution Russia's proletariat already had its own Marxist party in the Bolsheviks, a party armed with advanced theory and a specific program which 'scientifically defined the objectives and the tasks of the working class' struggle. The Marxist party was an independent political force with precisely developed strategy and tactics. Relying solidly upon the workers, it indoctrinated and strengthened them politically in the course of class battles and united them round the proletariat. All of this foreordained the role of the working class as the leader of the popular masses in the struggle against the czarist autocracy.

With respect to the Russian liberal bourgeoisie, it feared the revolution and attempted to preserve the reactionary regime as a shield against the revolutionary people. V.I. Lenin stated that "it was more advantageous for the bourgeoisie to have the necessary transformations in the bourgeois democratic direction occur more slowly, more gradually, more cautiously, less decisively, through reform and not revolution" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Volume 11, page 38). This is why the bourgeoisie's position in the democratic revolution was inconsistent, cowardly, self-seeking and in the final analysis, counterrevolutionary.

This does not mean, however, that the bourgeoisie voluntarily abandoned its attempt to subordinate its revolutionary masses to its influence. On the contrary, Vladimir Ilich cautioned, it is attempting to seize leadership of the revolutionary movement in order to put an end to it by making a deal with reaction "whereby most of the power would go to it, the bourgeoisie, and the least would go to the revolutionary people, the proletariat and the peasantry" (Ibid., page 9).

The tenets worked out by V.I. Lenin on the hegemony of the proletariat, on its alliance with the peasantry in the bourgeois democratic revolution and on the party's guiding role completely shattered the tactical line of the Mensheviks, who maintained that the revolution was advantageous only to the bourgeoisie. The Mensheviks opposed the hegemony of the proletariat, denied the revolutionary role of the peasantry and imposed the liberal bourgeoisie upon the proletariat as an ally. The leader of our party subjected these arguments of the Mensheviks to convincing and devastating criticism, exposed their dogmatism and their lack of understanding of the fact that the revolution in Russia had developed under different historical conditions and that the question of its driving forces could not be determined in the old way. This was an outstanding contribution to the development of party strategy and tactics. The Revolution of 1905-1907 went down in history as a new type of bourgeois revolution. Bourgeois democratic in social and economic substance, it was proletarian in its means and forms of struggle.

The idea of the proletariat's hegemony in all forms of revolutionary struggle by the masses, which V.I. Lenin considered to be the first and most important buttress of Marxist theory, stands out in all of his theoretical legacy. It is of enormous importance to the world communist movement in the struggle for

peace, democracy and social reforms at the contemporary stage. Documents from conferences of representatives of communist and workers' parties state that the working class is still the main revolutionary force behind the world revolutionary process. Furthermore, the contemporary phase of the proletariat's class struggle is distinguished by the growth and intensification of the strike movement's political orientation. These shifts can be seen in the dynamics of the following figures: while around 282 million people took part in class and socio-political conflicts in the developed capitalist nations between 1975 and 1979, according to estimated and far from complete data the number increased to 317 million in the subsequent five-year period (1980-1984). Furthermore, the number of participants in political demonstrations grew more rapidly than the number striking for economic reasons.

Socialism's emergence beyond the borders of one nation, its transition into a world system, the scope and significance of the tasks carried out by the proletariat in a situation of intensified struggle for peace, democracy and social progress--all of this is enlarging the objective prerequisites for continuous growth of the leading role of the working class and the Marxist-Leninist parties in the life of society. This was underscored with new force at a formal meeting in Moscow commemorating the 150th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth. "The international working class, which Lenin defined as 'rousing itself for victory'," it was stated at the meeting, "is at the center of the contemporary era. Suffice it to say that its numbers have increased almost 10-fold since the beginning of the century and now approaches 700 million. There are now communist parties in 95 nations, and the number of their members exceeds 80 million. These are the ruling parties in states occupying a third of the territory on the globe."

Lenin's book thoroughly substantiates the proletarian forms and means of struggle, which assure victory for the revolution. For the first time after K. Marx and F. Engels, V.I. Lenin advanced the organization of an armed uprising as a practical task to which all of the proletarian party's work should be subordinated at a certain time. Valdimir Ilich astutely established the fact that since the exploiters would not peacefully relinquish power to the proletariat and would certainly defend their privileges by force, Russia's working class had no option other than armed struggle.

In his book "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution" and other works of that period, V.I. Lenin not only subjected the approach of the Mensheviks to the theoretical and practical problems of the proletariat's armed struggle to devastating criticism, but also exposed their attempt to prevent the spread of revolutionary propaganda among the soldiers and sailors at any cost. At the same time, he himself devoted a great deal of attention to the formation of revolutionary army detachments, the military and combat work of RSDRP organizations, the establishment of workers' volunteer squads, the organization of street, barricade and partisan warfare and actions by the soldiers and sailors against czarism.

While the Mensheviks were continuing their attempts to demonstrate the need to arm the proletariat only "with the burning need for self-armament," the Bolsheviks were following Lenin's example, implementing his ideas and taking

active steps to see that the workers were truly armed: that they acquired as many rifles, revolvers, grenades and hunting weapons and as much ammunition as possible; that they had storage and repair depots and shops; and that locations be sought and equipped for training the workers in military matters. The Bolsheviks devoted a great deal of attention to organizing combat detachments, helping their members to thoroughly grasp means and forms of street and partisan warfare. That is, they did not just say that they were preparing a revolutionary army, but were actually doing so, preparing it seriously for an armed uprising.

Directing the military and combat work of the Bolsheviks, V.I. Lenin demanded that the party members thoroughly study military affairs and that the experience of the West European proletariat in armed struggle, as well as that acquired by the Russians during the first Russian revolution, be thoroughly summarized and disseminated. These instructions from Lenin are still valid today.

The Revolution of 1905-1907 enriched the masses also with extensive political experience and roused them for aware, historic creative action. The workers were the first to use the All-Russian political strike, a powerful weapon, and were the first to participate in the establishment of a revolutionary army. The December Armed Uprising in Moscow was the pinnacle of the revolution, its culmination. The people underwent their baptism of fire. They were tempered in the uprising. "Without a 'dress rehearsal' such as that of 1905," V.I. Lenin stated, "the revolution of 1917, both the February bourgeois and the October proletarian revolution, would have been impossible" (Poln. sobr. soch., Volume 38, page 306).

We should stress the fact, however, that Vladimir Ilich always absolutely opposed making specific forms and means of struggle an absolute, but selected them on the basis of the specific situation. Considering the peaceful development of the revolution to be the most desirable route, he pointed out that specific objective and subjective conditions are needed for its realization. These did not exist in 1905. They developed and lasted for some time after the February Revolution of 1917. Today, these conclusions and theses of Lenin's constitute a death sentence for those who slander the communists, describing them as enemies of democracy.

Creatively developing Lenin's ideas on forms of class struggle for the proletariat and taking into account the fundamental changes which have occurred in the balance of class forces in the contemporary world and the many years of experience of the workers in fighting for democracy and socialism, the CPSU and other fraternal parties have concluded that possibilities have grown for the peaceful transition of individual nations from capitalism to socialism. This conclusion is based on the fact that real socialism, as documents from the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties states, relying upon its constantly growing economic and defensive strength, is containing imperialism and limiting its possibilities for exporting counterrevolution. Fulfilling their international duty, the socialist commonwealth nations are providing ever increasing assistance to peoples fighting for freedom and independence, and strengthening peace and international security.

The question of state power is the most important question for any revolution, of course. Which class holds power ultimately determines the outcome of the revolution.

Exposing the opportunistic aims of the Mensheviks, V.I. Lenin demonstrated in his work that there could only be a victorious bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia if it led to a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, and not to the establishment of a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie as was the case in past bourgeois revolutions.

This dictatorship could not affect capitalism's foundations without a large number of intermediate stages of revolutionary development, however. "Such a victory," Vladimir Ilich wrote, "will certainly not make a socialist revolution out of our bourgeois revolution. A democratic overthrow will not emerge directly from bourgeois socioeconomic relations. Nonetheless, the importance of such a victory will be enormous for the future development of both Russia and the entire world" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Volume 11, page 45). V.I. Lenin thereby reformulated the question of what kind of power should be established as a result of the triumph of the democratic revolution.

The Bolsheviks believed that a provisional revolutionary government relying upon an armed people could be the political organ of a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, and this was clearly stated in decisions of the 3rd party congress. Considering the question of participation by the Social Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government, Lenin stated that this was essential if conditions were favorable. The Mensheviks' rejection of this important tactical tenet, like their rejection of the slogan of a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, was leading to the proletariat being turned into an accomplice of the bourgeoisie, to an indeterminate outcome for the revolution. Participation by the social democrats in a provisional revolutionary government, on the other hand, would create conditions conducive to a relentless battle with counterrevolution, the upholding of the proletariat's independent interests and continued development of the revolution. This idea of Lenin's about the need to combine revolutionary actions "from the bottom" and "from the top" disclosed an extremely important pattern of the revolutionary process, one which has been confirmed by the entire course of class battles in the 20th century. It is still completely discrediting fashionable opportunistic concepts which would have us believe that for the proletariat and its party gaining control of the levels of power should be only a special, concluding act, the result of some national referendum, of the precisely "ascertained will" of the nation's majority.

One of the main lines of opportunism has always consisted in and still consists in depicting the situation as though the party of the proletariat should not have its own political position in the general democratic movement. In 1905 the Russian Mensheviks, in an attempt to limit the revolutionary activity of the RSDRP, called upon its members for "moderation," for leadership of a "cultured" struggle by the proletariat which would not affect the bourgeoisie's power. Only then, they asserted, would the party be able to retain its class independence in the bourgeois democratic revolution and not frighten the bourgeoisie away from the struggle. Contemporary opportunist-compromisers, on the

other hand, do not concern themselves with the independence of the proletarian party even verbally, and this is demonstrated by numerous facts. Their goal is to have it dissolve into an ideologically amorphous organization, into any kind of "revolutionary" alliance created by the formula "unity for the sake of unity."

In the situation today, Lenin's concept of revolutionary democratic power has been taken up by communist and workers' parties of many capitalist nations. These parties consider the immediate task of the revolutionary movement to be that of fighting the imperialist monopolies, fighting to establish a democracy conforming to the interests of the main strata of the people. Democratic forces can come to power if victory is achieved over imperialist reaction. They will create a government in which communists, socialists, left-wing radicals and other democratic parties can collaborate.

Having thoroughly studied the historical conditions under which the bourgeois democratic revolution occurred in Russia and relying upon K. Marx's tenets on continuous revolution, V.I. Lenin developed the theory of the bourgeois democratic revolution's development into a socialist revolution. Considering bourgeois democratic and socialist revolutions as two links in the same chain, he defined the objective and subjective conditions for the development of one stage of revolution into the other.

The objective conditions are the level of the nation's social and economic development, the acuteness of the class struggle and the distribution of class forces. V.I. Lenin considered the subjective conditions to be the degree of awareness and organization of the broad masses of the proletariat, the level of development of its class struggle and the maturity of a Marxist party capable of rousing the proletariat to fight for democracy and socialism.

The existence of these objective and subjective conditions permitted Lenin to conclude the following: "We shall immediately begin the transition from a democratic revolution and exactly to the extent of our strength, the strength of an aware and organized proletariat, we shall begin the transition to a socialist revolution. We are for continuous revolution. We shall not stop halfway" (Poln. sobr. soch., Volume 11, page 222).

These brilliant theoretical tenets of V.I. Lenin's refuted the harmful opportunistic dogmas of the Mensheviks and leaders of the 2nd International, who maintained that bourgeois democratic and socialist revolutions signified two historical eras in the development of each nation and believed that a socialist revolution was impossible until the proletariat became a majority in the nation, since it would be opposing the bourgeoisie alone, without allies. Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" was also refuted. He rejected the idea that the working class was capable of drawing the peasant masses behind it and, not trusting the latter, rejected the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Trotsky's adventurist slogan, "without a czar, but with a workers' government," meant skipping the bourgeois democratic phase of the revolution, isolated the proletariat from large masses of the peasantry and ultimately led to the revolution's failure.

Armed with Lenin's political strategy and tactics, the Bolshevik Party combined into one revolutionary stream the working class' struggle for socialism, the peasantry's struggle for land, the general democratic movement for peace and the national liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples and directed these forces against capitalism in October 1917. After gaining victory, the socialist revolution rapidly accomplished also the unfinished tasks of the democratic stage.

Contemporary bourgeois falsifiers and revisionists attempt to refute Lenin's tenets, which comprise the main content of the book. Their attempts are in vain, however. Lenin's conclusions have been totally confirmed and have been enriched with the experience of the revolutionary movement in a number of European and Asian nations and then in Cuba. The revolutionary process in each of them had its own specific features but at the same time confirmed the general patterns of its development revealed by V.I. Lenin.

The book "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution" is among Lenin's most important works written on the eve of and during the first Russian revolution. It still provides the basis on which communists of the entire world analyze transitional revolutionary processes on the way to socialism, ways and forms for leading the masses toward socialist revolution and its victorious realization in the era of mankind's worldwide transition from capitalism to socialism.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

TRAINING ARTICLE: 'ARMED FORCES AT THE CONTEMPORARY STAGE'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 14, Jul 85 (Signed to press 4 Jul 85) pp 79-85

[Article by Col V. Izmaylov, professor, and Col Yu. Topchiy, candidate of historical sciences, docent, under the rubric "For Instructors of Political Training Groups": "The Soviet Armed Forces at the Contemporary Stage"]

[Text] The study of this subject should help the students to thoroughly understand the main directions in the work performed by the CPSU and the Soviet State to further strengthen the nation's defense capability and improve the Soviet Armed Forces in the contemporary situation. It is important to give the personnel an even greater awareness of their tasks with respect to maintaining a high level of vigilance and a constant state of combat readiness and to reliably protecting socialism's historic achievements.

It is recommended that the class be conducted in the form of lectures and seminars. A total of 8 hours is allocated for studying the subject. This time should be broken down in the following manner: 2 hours for lectures, 2 hours for independent preparation by the students and 4 hours for seminars.

The following topics should be covered in the lecture: 1. The Soviet Army and Navy in the Situation of Transition from War to Peace; 2. The Armed Forces of the USSR at the Stage of Developed Socialism; 3. The Tasks of Soviet Fighting-men With Respect to Further Enhancing Vigilance and Strengthening the Combat Readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces at the Contemporary Stage.

A brief introduction should stress the fact that the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, conducting a consistent peace-loving Lenin foreign policy and relying upon the large economic, scientific and technological capability created in our nation, are successfully accomplishing the defense tasks, which are constantly growing more complicated, and strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces. "In the complex international situation," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, underscored, "it is important as never before to maintain our homeland's defense capability at a level which lets potential aggressors understand well that an encroachment upon the security of the Soviet Nation and its allies, upon the peaceful life of the Soviet people, will be met with a devastating retaliatory strike. Our glorious Armed Forces will continue to have at their disposal everything necessary for this."

The fruits of our Victory in the Great Patriotic War, a victory of worldwide historic importance whose 40th anniversary was recently triumphantly commemorated by all progressive mankind, live in the homeland's grand achievements. They are embodied in the Soviet way of life and in the successes of the developed socialist society. And everything created by the heroic labor of Soviet man, everything gained by him, is reliably guarded by the Soviet Armed Forces.

#### 1. The Soviet Army and Navy in the Situation of Transition From War to Peace

The Great Patriotic War graphically confirmed V.I. Lenin's perspicacious statement that "our situation is solid, that any sort of attempts to invade Russia, any military undertakings against Russia... all such attempts will crumble" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Volume 41, page 356).

The first years after the end of the war were difficult for our people. The Hitlerite invaders had caused enormous damage to our homeland. During the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory, the party reminded us once again of the terrible scene presented by our land mutilated by the enemy. Almost 1700 cities and settlements and 70,000 towns and villages lay in ruins. Around 25 million people were left without a roof over their heads. The industrial and agricultural enterprises put out of operation numbered in the tens of thousands. The flames of war had consumed almost a third of the national wealth created with the people's labor. And there will never be any way to measure the most terrible, irreplaceable loss, the lives of millions of Soviet people.

The imperialists believed that the enormous damage done to the socialist economy would remove the USSR from the ranks of great powers for a long time, that the Soviet State would require many decades to restore its former strength, that it would not withstand the postwar competition with capitalism and would be forced to capitulate.

These expectations of our foes were in vain, however. The USSR found the forces and capabilities to rapidly restore the national economy devastated by the war and to constantly increase its economic and defensive strength. The moral and political unity of the society and the friendship and fraternity of our nation's peoples were consolidated, the Soviet State's international prestige grew, and its influence in the world increased.

The inexhaustible possibilities and advantages of the socialist system, the solidarity of the party and the people and the party's ability to mobilize and direct the efforts and means of the entire nation, of all the republics, to accomplish the tasks which were set were the crucial conditions for surmounting the difficulties of the postwar period. The Soviet people, who had turned to peaceful labor inspired by the great victory, were prepared to struggle selflessly for the restoration and a new blossoming of their socialist homeland.

Under the Communist Party's leadership, the Soviet people successfully accomplished the tasks involved in restoring the areas of the nation which had suffered and had basically completed the reorganization of the economy on a peacetime basis by the end of 1946. Industrial output volume in the USSR surpassed the prewar level in 1948. The prewar level of agricultural output had basically been restored by the end of the 4th Five-Year Plan, the first postwar plan.

The "Law on the Demobilization of Older Personnel from the Active Army," passed in June 1945 at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, was of enormous political and economic importance. Millions of kolkhoz and other workers and large numbers of specialists returned to the national economy. They became an active force in uplifting and further developing the economy. As a result of the demobilization carried out in the first postwar years, the numerical strength of the Armed Forces was reduced from 11,365,000 to 2,874,000. More than 2.6 million former soliders-and-communists merged into the territorial party organizations. Most of them were sent into industry, construction or agrigultural, and many were advanced to leading party, soviet and management work.

The reduction of the army was carried out in a manner which would not weaken the nation's defense capability and would retain the combat nucleus of the Armed Forces. Increased international tensions made this task important. Soon after the war, as we know, the USA, which had a temporary monopoly on nuclear weapons, set out on a path of blackmail and threats against the USSR, its recent ally in the anti-Hitlerite coalition, for purposes of strengthening its own political and strategic military influence in the world. Ruling circles of the USA and England began hatching up monstrous and treacherous fabrications against the USSR. As early as 1949 the USA had worked out a plan, code-named "Dropshot" (quick strike), for war against our nation, under which it was planned to drop 300 atomic bombs and 250,000 tons of conventional bombs on the Soviet Union. That same year the imperialists established the aggressive NATO military bloc. They established a network of military bases around the Soviet Union. In that situation the USSR was forced to take responsive steps.

The party followed V.I. Lenin's well-known statement that the sources of a state's military strength lie in the economy. The prerequisites for qualitative changes in the material base of the Armed Forces were created precisely as a result of the party's economic policy, the heroic labor of the Soviet people and the successful development of all sectors of the national economy, particularly heavy industry. The CPSU countered the imperialist policy of operating "from a position of strength" with the growing defensive power of the USSR, which has become a reliable shield for the socialist camp and the forces of peace throughout the world.

Since ruling circles in the USA rejected the Soviet proposal on the banning of nuclear weapons, the party Central Committee took the necessary steps to provide the Armed Forces of the USSR with them. The first atomic bomb test was conducted in the Soviet Union in August 1949, and in September TASS reported that the production of nuclear weapons had been mastered in our nation. Theoretical and experimental work was simultaneously begun to develop a hydrogen bomb, since such a weapon was being developed in the USA.

Another extremely important technical military problem, the development of means of delivering nuclear ammunition to the target, was successfully resolved along with the development of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union. These included powerful, multistage intercontinental ballistic missiles.

And so, as a result of the enormous organizational work performed by the party and the efforts of scientists, designers, engineers and workers, a qualitatively

new material and technical base was created for the rearmament and corresponding reorganization of the Armed Forces. The establishment of a new branch of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, was announced at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in January 1960. The organizational development of this branch of the Armed Forces was basically completed in June 1960 with the establishment of the Military Council of the Strategic Rocket Forces. They have rightly occupied a leading place in the homeland's defense system.

Important changes also occurred in the organizational structure of the Armed Forces. The system of control was restructured. The State Defense Committee was abolished on 4 September 1945 by an ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Headquarters, Supreme High Command, also ceased to function. The People's Commissariats of Defense and of the Navy were reorganized in February 1946. Direction of the army, aviation and navy was concentrated in one People's Commissariat of the Armed Forces (USSR Ministry of Defense since March 1953). Control of all branches of the Armed Forces was assigned to the corresponding commanders in chief and headquarters.

The single Main Political Directorate was established with the status of a department of the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee by a decision adopted by the Politburo of the party Central Committee at the end of February 1946, and a political directorate was established in the branches of the Armed Forces. The work of army and navy party organizations was reorganized.

The military control apparatus was reduced, as was the number of military districts. Units and formations located outside our homeland were combined into groups of forces. The organizational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces was thus improved.

The officer training system was reorganized at the same time. Certification was introduced in 1947. Training periods for students and cadets at a number of military educational institutions were not only restored, but were increased as a result of the increased complexity of the combat equipment and weapons. Just during the first 7 or 8 years after the war ended, the party reorganized higher and secondary educational institutions in the army and navy and took steps to improve the quality of the training. A total of 32 higher military educational institutions and department, including four academies, opened during the period 1946-1953.

Weapons were being improved on a broad scale. The Soviet Army and Navy were being outfitted with the latest weapons and combat equipment. The field, naval and air training of Soviet fightingmen began to approach an actual modern combat situation. Party-political work in the forces was improved.

New military regulations and a new oath adopted in 1946-1947, the establishment of the ranks of rated specialists and outstanding fightingmen in the combat and political training, and the introduction of regulations governing the awarding of badges to soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers played a large role in the training and indoctrination of personnel in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

And so, all of the most important steps involved in converting the army and navy to a peacetime footing had been completed by the beginning of the 50's. The party had laid the foundation for further improving the Armed Forces and enhancing their combat readiness.

The fact should then be stressed that in the situation in which the imperialist nations have established and consolidated aggressive military blocs, the Soviet Union and fraternal socialist nations could not fail to take responsive steps. The Pact of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the European Socialist States was signed in Warsaw in May 1955. Its 30th anniversary was commemorated this year. The Warsaw Pact was based on the principles of equality, respect for state sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of one another. Unlike NATO, it was established for purely defensive purposes, and any state which demonstrates good will and a desire to unite efforts for purposes of peace can join it.

The extension of the Warsaw Pact, the political and defensive foundation of our fraternal alliance, for another 20 years in April of this year was an important event.

When the instructor completes his presentation of the first topic, he must stress the fact that by surmounting the postwar difficulties, our nation made it possible to concentrate all its forces and means on accomplishing the main task, further development and improvement of the socialist society. The Communist Party has implemented important political and economic measures aimed at further improving the national economy, enhancing the material and cultural standard of living of the Soviet people, strengthening the Soviet public and state structure and developing Soviet democracy.

During the period 1952-1961 the party implemented a number of important social and economic measures. Under its guidance, the Soviet people achieve perceptible results in the development of industry, agriculture and culture. The well-being of the workers improved. The use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the launching of artificial earth satellites and space flights by Soviet people, the first in history, attested to the outstanding achievements of Soviet science and technology and opened up a new era in our knowledge of the universe.

The Soviet Union's development of nuclear missiles increased its defensive strength, created a reliable defense shield for the entire socialist commonwealth and was of great importance for assuring universal peace.

## 2. The Armed Forces of the USSR at the Stage of Developed Socialism

In the nation's internal life the 60's were marked by the building of a developed socialist society in the USSR. The CPSU's guiding role has grown under developed socialism. The Communist Party has constantly increased its demandingness of party organizations, of party cadres, of all the communists, developed their activeness and improved their style and methods of work in the masses.

The facts should be stressed that party documents, decisions adopted at its congresses, state enactments and decrees contain basic, fundamental theoretical

conclusions on the purpose of the army and navy in the contemporary situation. It is important to get the students to thoroughly understand that the developed socialist society is an extremely complex social organism with a high degree of maturity and unity of economic, sociopolitical, scientific, technological and spiritual processes. This description of developed socialism makes it possible to get a clear picture of the sources of development of the Soviet State's Armed Forces and of their most important features and characteristics. What do they consist of?

In the first place, the Armed Forces of the USSR have now become an organ of the state of all the people. At the same time, they are still the means of protecting the socialist homeland, the basic interests of the working class and of all the workers, and serve as a bulwark of peace. The army and navy have been and continue to be based on an inviolable alliance of the working class, the peasantry and the Soviet intelligentsia. The Communist Party's leadership is the very basis of their organizational development and their functioning.

In the second place, our army is the offspring of the Soviet people. The unity of the army and the people is an extremely important source of the power and invincibility of our Armed Forces. The people regard them with love. People send into their ranks replenishments with good ideological and political tempering, intellectual and physical development.

In the third place, the Soviet Armed Forces are a school of combat skill, of ideological and physical conditioning, discipline and organization. The people rightly call our army and navy a school of courage, industriousness and good morality. After serving in the army, young people perform their peaceful labor with excellence. At numerous construction sites, in plant shops and in agriculture, they set an example of good organization and industriousness, civic spirit and activeness.

In the fourth place, the Soviet State's Armed Forces are the living embodiment of socialist internationalism. Fightingmen of all our country's nations and ethnic groups serve in their combat ranks. The unshakable ideological and political unity, a community of tasks and goals, military comradeship, friendship and solidarity characterize the multinational army and navy collectives and are a graphic reflection of the fraternity of peoples of the USSR as a whole.

The internationalism of the Soviet Armed Forces is also manifested in the fact that they vigilantly guard the security of the Warsaw Pact nations in close unity with their class brothers, their brothers in arms--fightingmen of the armies of the other socialist states.

When the contemporary level of development of the Soviet Armed Forces is discussed, the characteristics of each branch must be discussed in detail.

The Strategic Rocket Forces comprise the basis of the combat strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Equipped with automated missile systems with intercontinental and medium-range missiles, they are capable of delivering warheads of enormous destructive force to the target with great accuracy. These forces

constantly stand combat watch and are always prepared to carry out an immediate retaliatory strike against an aggressor.

The Ground Forces, the branch of the Armed Forces which is numerically the largest and is the most diverse with respect to fighting strength, have been radically changed. Operational and tactical missiles capable of destroying targets from tens to hundreds of kilometers away and whose power has recently increased drastically, now comprise their main destructive force. The tank troops have now been organized into powerful mobile and highly maneuverable units and formations equipped with first-class tanks. The motorized rifle troops have been completely motorized.

The achievements of our economy, science and technology have opened up a new page in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, the organizational development of which receives constant attention from the CPSU. They are equipped with supersonic aircraft with automatic systems of weapons and flight control, mighty power plants, diverse missiles and bombs.

The Air Defense Forces have reliable air warning facilities, antiaircraft missile systems capable of destroying targets over a broad range of altitudes and first-class interceptors. The modern Air Defense Forces are in a constant state of combat readiness and capable of immediately beginning responsive combat missions to protect the population, the nation's administrative-political and economic centers, and groupings of the Armed Forces against enemy air attacks.

The Navy has acquired new combat qualities. It has become truly ocean-going. The Soviet Nation's Navy conforms to the USSR's status as a great naval power and is an important factor for stabilizing the situation in different areas of the world and in restraining the aggressive plans of the imperialist states. Nuclear-powered submarines equipped with missiles launched from under water and with great range form the backbone of the Navy. The Navy now has modern missile and ASW ships capable of carrying out the most diverse missions, missile-carrying naval aviation with great range, coastal missile and artillery units and naval infantry.

The rearmament and reorganization of the Armed Forces carried out by the Communist Party and the Soviet State resulted in profound qualitative changes in them, in a gigantic increase in their striking power and firepower. They are capable of conducting active operations at a rapid pace, to great depth and in various situations, with or without the employment of nuclear weapons, and of successfully executing operational-tactical and strategic missions on any scale.

The Communist Party's ceaseless concern with steadily increasing the fighting strength of the Soviet Armed Forces is not an end in itself. The international situation has become much more complex at the end of the 70's and the beginning of the 80's through the fault of imperialism's reactionary forces. The planet is already over-saturated with weapons of mass destruction. Their build-up continues, however. Covering itself with the myth of a "Soviet military threat," the U.S. Administration has openly set the goal of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and altering the balance of power in the world in its

favor. The USA plans to spend 1.5 trillion dollars for military purposes during the period 1982-1986--that is, as much as it has spent to militarize the nation over the past 12 years.

In this situation, it is a forced, vital necessity for the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations to maintain military parity between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Without preventing the military parity to be disturbed, the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states have done and are doing everything possible to achieve agreement with the West on the halting of the arms race, the development of reliable measures of trust, the lowering of the danger of war and total elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

"We are forced to invest the necessary funds in the nation's defense," it was stated at a conference in the CPSU Central Committee on the acceleration of scientific and technological progress. "The Soviet Union will continue to make a maximum effort to halt the arms race, but we cannot permit imperialism to gain military superiority over us in view of its aggressive policy and threats."

Party measures to further enhance the militancy of army and navy party organization has had a crucial role in the continued enhancement of the combat strength and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. Today they are truly the political nucleus, the solidifying force in the military collectives. Their ideological and organizational work, their vital word and their example of irreproachable fulfillment of their military duties are effective factors behind the party's influence upon the masses of fightingmen. The communists enjoy exceptionally great prestige in the army and navy.

The Komsomol organizations are the reliable and loyal assistants of party organizations in the Armed Forces. They make a worthy contribution to the shaping of young fightingmen who come to the army and navy from the plant machine tools, the kolkhoz fields or straight from the secondary or high school. The attitude of the young fightingmen toward the service and the mastery of military affairs and their desire to surpass the achievements of their predecessors depend in great part upon the activeness and militancy of the subunit, unit and ship Komsomol organizations.

The All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations, held in May 1984, was a sort of accounting by the army and navy Komsomol to the Communist Party and the Soviet people on the successes they have achieved in the combat and political training and in the communist indoctrination of the homeland's defenders. It noted, among other things, the fact that the army and navy Komsomol has demonstrated over and over again with its practical deeds the fact that it is the party's loyal assistant in enhancing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. Every third Komsomol member is an excellent fightingman and every second one is a specialist with a higher rating. The conference participants and all Komsomol members greeted with great enthusiasm the announcement that the Komsomol organization of the Soviet Army and Navy was being awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

During the class the instructor must cite examples of the work performed by party and Komsomol organizations of the students' own subunit, unit or ship



and illustrate their role in the communist indoctrination of the personnel, the uniting of the military collectives and the accomplishment of combat and political training tasks.

As he concludes the second topic, the instructor must stress the fact that the Communist Party's guiding role is constantly growing under developed socialism. The CPSU strictly implements the Leninist principles for Soviet military organizational development and defines the tasks of the army and navy and the paths of their development at every specific moment. It directs the work of state and economic agencies with respect to the material and technical equipment of the Armed Forces. The party has the decisive role in the development of basic directions in the area of military science, military doctrine and strategy and in defining the content, the forms and methods for training and indoctrinating personnel of the Armed Forces.

### 3. The Tasks of Soviet Fightingmen With Respect to Further Enhancing the Vigilance and Strengthening the Combat Readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces at the Contemporary Stage

When the third topic is begun, it is essential to remind the students that the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent plenums of the party Central Committee especially stressed the danger originating with imperialism, primarily American. Ruling circles of the USA and its NATO allies are attempting to achieve superiority over the socialist commonwealth nations in nuclear weapons and conventional armaments, no matter what. The aggressive course is accompanied by frenzied anti-Soviet and anticommunist propaganda.

The increased danger of war and the appearance of new types of weapons have complicated the problem of maintaining the forces at a high level of combat readiness. A modern war, should one be unleashed by the imperialists, would make incomparably greater demands of the fightingmen than all previous ones. It would demand skillful actions on the battlefield in a situation involving the use of weapons of mass destruction and other powerful fire weapons by the enemy, the ability to withstand enormous emotional and physical stress, great psychological stability and a level of combat training which would make it possible to decisively defeat the enemy.

Thorough mastery of the weapons and equipment is the main direction in the struggle for combat readiness. That which the scientists and designers put into the equipment is carried into effect on the battlefield. In the combat training process the personnel not only acquire essential knowledge and skills, but are also united even more solidly into a combat family in which a high degree of interchangeability is achieved and where a spirit of responsibility and mutual assistance reigns. Combat operations employing the modern equipment are collective operations. They demand enormous joint efforts from all services of the Armed Forces and branches of troops, from fightingmen with diverse specialties. Lack of precision in any element or even an error by a single specialist can cause the combat mission to fail.

It is also important to stress the fact that in the concepts adopted by the imperialist states for conducting war, they stress the surprise execution of

a "preventive" strike with a view to seizing the strategic initiative. It follows from this that an aggressor's attempt to attack unexpectedly must be countered not only with the appropriate means and methods of defense, but also by having our Armed Forces at a high level of combat readiness, capable of repelling enemy strikes and routing the enemy in any situation. We say with good reason that combat readiness is the consummation of the skill of fightingmen in the army and navy in peacetime and the key to victory in a war, the ability of the troops and naval forces to carry out combat missions immediately and successfully. The preparedness of the Armed Forces to repel a possible attack and route any aggressor in any situation is the main criterion in the contemporary situation. For this purpose the party concerns itself with the all-around enhancement of the quality and effectiveness of training and indoctrination for the fightingmen and strives to see that they are highly disciplined and organized.

The CPSU orients all army and navy personnel toward focusing their main attention on improving the quality of the field, air and naval training, the operational, combat and political preparation, on the vigilant performance of alert duty and continued strengthening of military discipline. The level of combat readiness of a unit or ship is directly dependent upon the maintenance of regulation order. The precisely organized combat and political training, the firmness of training schedules and the daily regimen, and the entire structure of life in the unit and on the ship develop in the personnel a spirit of efficient performance and help to make the military service a good school of discipline and organization.

When the importance of firm military discipline is explained, it is important to cite specific examples from the life of the subunit or unit to illustrate how essential discipline and vigilance are in the performance of alert and guard duty and internal service.

It is the fightingman's duty to gain a confident mastery of the modern weapons and equipment entrusted to him by the people for protecting the homeland, to learn to destroy targets in difficult situations with the first missile, the first torpedo or the first shell, to raise his training up to a new and higher level. The force of socialist competition initiated this training year with the slogan "For the 40th Anniversary of the Great Victory and the 27th CPSU Congress--Our Selfless Military Labor!" should be extensively utilized for the successful accomplishment of these tasks. Commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations are expected to implement the Leninist principles of competition actively and persistently: publicity, comparability of results, the possibility of repeating progressive experience and comradely mutual assistance. It is very important to organize competition by task and norm, to eliminate simplifications and indulgences in the combat training, to assess what has been achieved from a standpoint of principle, in the party manner, with demandingness.

It is desirable for the instructor to cite specific examples of the fulfillment of combat and political training plans and socialist commitment by the students' own unit, ship and subunit. It is important to discuss in detail the practical tasks involved in further raising the level of combat and political training, strengthening military discipline, increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of the fightingmen during the summer training period.

It is important to point out to the students in conclusion the fact that there are no minor details with respect to maintaining combat readiness and that any error, miscalculation or delay in a combat situation is ordinarily paid for in blood. Placidity and complacency are intolerable in matters of combat readiness.

When we assess the development of the Armed Forces of the USSR and their morale, we note with pride that Soviet fightingmen are the loyal sons of their people. They experience its concerns and joys. United closely round their own Lenin party, they fervently and unanimously approve of its wise domestic and foreign policy. Recalling the price at which our people gained their freedom and independence, the fightingmen understand well that the greater our readiness to frustrate all of imperialism's aggressive intentions, the less likely it is that imperialism will decide on a nuclear adventure and the more reliable will be the Soviet State's security.

In order to help the students to acquire a fuller grasp of the subject, it is recommended that the following feature films and historical documentaries be shown just before the classes: "In a Zone of Special Attention," "The Subduing of Fire," "People of Military Glory," "I Serve the Soviet Union" and "From Sky to Earth Into Battle."

It is recommended that the following topics be discussed in the seminar:

1. What were the main steps taken by the CPSU and the Soviet Government to strengthen the army and navy during the first postwar years?
2. What made it necessary to develop Soviet nuclear missiles?
3. What is a characteristic feature of each of the services of the Armed Forces of the USSR at the contemporary stage?
4. What are the main directions in the CPSU's work to strengthen the Soviet Armed Forces under developed socialism?
5. How is the aggressive nature of contemporary imperialism and of all international reaction manifested?
6. What are the main missions of the unit or ship and the subunit during the summer training period?
7. What demands do modern combat make of the soldier and the sailor?
8. What does being in a constant state of combat readiness mean to the soldier or sailor?

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CSO: 1801/13

## MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

### COMMUNISTS MUST PLAY LEADING ROLE IN TRAINING, SERVICE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Aug 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The Communist's Leading Role"]

[Text] The tank regiment commanded by Lt Col Yu. Kurmatov (Baltic Military District) is notable for consistently high indicators in combat and political training. The commander and political organization teach people to have a deep awareness of their duties and hold them strictly accountable. An item of special concern is ensuring the leading role of communists in training and service. Ask who in the regiment are the best at firing? Among others, they will name you communists Lt Col V. Semenov and Maj L. Chikin. Who drives combat vehicles best of all? Again, communists--Capt V. Mishin and Sr Lt V. Chudinov. To whom do they go for advice on technical matters? Of course, to communist Lt Col S. Kuchukh, deputy regiment commander for armament. Communists are a cementing force of the military collective and a reliable support for the commander in solving all combat training problems.

The Communist Party constantly sees to it that all its members justify in deed the high title of political fighter and take the lead in the nation-wide struggle for building communism. The present stage of the country's development, linked with preparation for the 27th Party Congress, and the novelty and magnitude of the tasks arising before the society are making special demands on the political and business-like qualities of communists and their moral make-up. They are called upon to be equal to the responsibility placed on them and on a level with the great tasks dictated by the times.

The demands on a communist's political, business-like and moral qualities are reflected in the CPSU Program and Charter. These basic party documents specifically oblige every party member to serve as an example of a communist attitude towards labor, to act as a pioneer of everything new and progressive, to master equipment and to improve his qualifications. For communists of the army and navy to fulfill a leading role means to be an active champion of CPSU policy and a model in service, and by personal example inspire and lead people in the struggle to increase further the combat readiness of subunits (podrazdeleniya), units (chasti) and ships and strengthen discipline, organization and order.

The ideological maturity of communists, their organizational capabilities and the ability to influence the masses and lead them--all these qualities do not emerge by themselves. They are cultivated and developed in the course of practical work. Political organs, party committees, party bureaus and secretaries of army and fleet party organizations are called upon to play a leading role in this cultivation. Their most important task is to foster in communists ideological conviction and a sense of personal responsibility for the state of combat readiness, strengthening military discipline, improving the quality of training and effective use of every hour of training. The way to this is increasing party exactingness. As was emphasized at the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, it is necessary to increase the accountability of every party member for the attitude towards public duty, for fulfilling party decisions and for an honest and pure make-up of the party member. An important role in completing these tasks belongs to party commissions of political organs.

Unfortunately, we are still not making use of all potentialities here. In some party organizations they have gotten used to shortcomings and do not hold strictly accountable those who are not concerned about increasing their professional training and are satisfied with modest results in military labor. Inertness of thought, a non-critical attitude towards what has been done and a tendency to exaggerate achieved results prevent communists, especially communist-leaders, from bringing about a change in work, moving a subunit, unit or ship from among the ranks of those lagging behind to those in the lead and raising military discipline to the proper level. Such things cannot be tolerated. We must try to see that communists are constantly directed forward and know not only what must be done, but also how to do it and be able to implement the policy of the party and the decisions of their party organization.

Work on ensuring a leading role of communists and developing in them high party qualities is a many-sided process. Self-education plays a great role in this. At the same time, it is necessary to make more effective use of the mechanism of party influence on a communist, including monitoring and verifying execution, criticism and self-criticism. To point out a communist's miscue opportunely and warn him against incorrect actions, without worrying about "spoiling relations"--means in fact to display adherence to party principles and concern about improving things in the collective.

Often, unfortunately, they forget about these requirements. Not long ago, a commander of a military construction detachment, Lt Col F. Robotko, was expelled from the party and later transferred to the reserve. His downfall began with something small. One day he brushed aside an invitation from Komsomol members to attend their meeting. Later on he avoided a party assignment. Then he started to ignore educational work altogether. The more he shunned people, the more often he began to exhibit rudeness and arrogance in his behavior. Soon some of his subordinates began to follow his example. Improper relationships increasingly took root in the practice of the officials. Impunity gave rise to general permissiveness. In violation of the law, Robotko obtained a four-room apartment in exchange for a comfortable three-room apartment. The ending to this unattractive story is known.

It could not be otherwise. Today in all sections of our society questions of moral order and social justice are being raised increasingly more sharply and persistently. The Soviet people are becoming increasingly intolerant towards abuses, violations of the law, rudeness, caddishness, drunkenness and other negative phenomena. Communists are called upon to give the lead in fighting violations of lawfulness and moral norms and to display constant concern for keeping the lofty title of party member clean. This must be keenly addressed at the forthcoming reporting-electoral party meetings. The results of work must be made public so that everyone knows who did what and how each party member and candidate-member in deed fulfilled his leading role.

To carry out party duties properly means to be responsible not only for yourself, but also for the state of affairs in your section and see to it that the tasks facing the collective in which you serve and work, the party and the state are completed successfully. For the communist-fighter today, there is an urgent task to strive for successful completion of the training year and complete fulfillment of the commitments in socialist competition for a fitting welcome to the 27th CPSU Congress.

Our party has a firmly established principle: a communist has one privilege--always to take the lead. To increase the leading role of communists of the army and navy means to intensify the activeness of party organizations and multiply their contribution to the struggle for the high combat readiness of troops and naval forces.

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CSO: 1801/314

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUBORDINATES' BREACHES OF DISCIPLINE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Shevchenko: "A Break in the Chain"]

[Text] Everyone advocates strengthening discipline. Why is it that in practice intention not always backed up by deed? Why is a commander sometimes forced to act cautiously?

One time I had occasion to assume command of a small antisubmarine ship. Checking into the situation on crew, I encountered some things I did not expect--it turned out that educational work and organization of duty was not at the proper level. Certain shortcomings and breaches of military discipline were not being reported by order of my predecessor.

In a word, I had to start by putting things in order and make a strict and uncompromising demand of those who did not want to serve properly. The young political worker Lt V. Rozhnenko and I began to take decisive measures. I must say, they soon produced the desired effect. Having felt the firmness of command, the offenders calmed down. The rest also straightened out. But an unexpected surprise was in store for Rozhnenko and me. The increased number of punishments imposed and the more frequent reports on breaches of regulations (you see, we reported on everything to higher headquarters, not hiding anything) disturbed superiors, and inspectors started coming to the ship. Unfortunately, not all of them tried to grasp the true situation. Some, limiting themselves to formal statistics of identified breaches of discipline, concluded that it was as if discipline was worsening. Ultimately, talk even turned to the fact that the commander and political worker were not handling their duties well.

It is hard to say how this story would have ended if not for the fundamental stand of the unit (chast) commander Capt 2d Rank G. Sovan. "Do not interfere with the commander and political worker in bringing about prescribed order; they are on the right track," he declared to those fond of hasty conclusions. Such support helped us to finish what we had started. Several months later you would not have recognized the crew. It was no longer necessary to resort to drastic disciplinary measures. There was a healthy moral climate on the ship, and an atmosphere of prescribed exactingness and irreconcilability with shortcomings. Naturally, this also had an effect on successes in combat



training and competition. By the end of the year, the ship was among the leaders, and in 6 months it had earned the title of outstanding.

The story, as we see, had a happy ending. However, this frankly is not always the case by any means. Unfortunately, commanders striving to strengthen discipline on their crews and in subunits (podrazdeleniya) sometimes do not encounter the same support as Rozhnenko and I did. In my days as a commander I have also had occasion to see capable, exacting commanders, running into hasty, unfair appraisals of their activities to bring about firm prescribed order, become flustered.

One of my former fellow ship commanders, then Capt Lt V. Smirnov, having taken over a new crew and looked into the situation, concluded that he had to take strict measures to set things in order, especially with regard to habitual offenders. However unpleasant it was to start with this, with respect to one subordinate, supported by the requirements of the regulations and the law, the officer acted as duty and conscience directed him: he prosecuted the individual. In this situation the measure was necessary. The offender's impunity was adversely affecting the mood of the crew. There was even the opinion that command authorities supposedly did not want to foul their nest since they were afraid of personal troubles.

The actions of the new commander in such a situation were badly in need of support. However, superiors thought differently: the commander himself was punished "for poor knowledge of the situation." Thus, as they say, measures were taken at all levels. And the fact that an honest ship commander, a man of principle, suffered from this apparently did not bother anyone. Moreover,

he was reminded for a long time that he had "brought a conviction" to the collective.

In due course the crew turned around, discipline and order became noticeably stronger. Nevertheless, the ship was invariably ranked among those lagging behind: after all, it had a previous conviction! Is it surprising that the officer, "grown wise" with this bitter experience, lost a little of his determination in the struggle for discipline and order? At times he even fell to looking for clever ways to hide deviations from regulation requirements from command authorities.

Perhaps you would not call this case typical, but it makes one think. There is hardly a commander or political worker in the army or navy who does not understand that the struggle for strengthening discipline is a complex matter. That is also why we use the word "struggle," which assumes strenuous, comprehensive work in which quite a few difficulties, problems and conflicts, naturally, are encountered and individual failures are even possible (one must look at things realistically). Moreover, no matter how capable and energetic a commander may be, he still needs help and active support in asserting his authority in a collective.

I know from experience that one can expect substantial progress in military discipline about 6 months after assignment of a new commander. After 1 year you already have good reason to judge a commander's competence.

Needless to say, by no means am I implying that a commander who shows inactivity from the very beginning of his stay in the position is guaranteed 1 trouble-free year. The point is something else altogether--that commanders sincerely striving to set things in order, but encountering natural difficulties in this matter, can count on the support and understanding of superiors.

Every unit (chast, soyedineniye) commander and staff officer undoubtedly wants improvements in military discipline to come about more quickly on ships. However, this good aspiration must not lead to voluntarism and losing touch with reality and those realities which exist on crews. Thoughtful, planned work to strengthen prescribed order, based on improving ideological and educational activities, on intensifying the influence of party and Komsomol organizations on personnel, and on increasing exactingness at all levels, must not be merely replaced by thoughtless pressure on commanders of ships and subunits and by "beating" them for subordinates' breaches of regulations. Such an approach inevitably leads to a breakdown of the entire chain of measures being directed at increasing military discipline.

Today, when the party is waging an active struggle to raise all ideological and educational work to a qualitatively new level, it seems to me, is also the time to take a new look at the many problems of work to strengthen discipline. Take, let's say, the reaction to breaches of regulations. Generally speaking, what should it be? Ask any officer, and he will answer that it of course must be sharp and uncompromising. This is correct. But it is no secret that all the sharpness of our reactions sometimes boils down to creating an unnecessary stir and nervousness regarding the offender and handing out numerous punishments. You see, often it is more beneficial to use a businesslike approach and look into the reasons for the violations and probe more deeply into the psychology of the interrelation of people and the processes taking place in the collective.

Needless to say, it is also necessary to hold people strictly accountable. But where should the cutting edge of it be directed? Common sense prompts us that it should be towards the one who violates regulations and breaches discipline.

Unfortunately, it sometimes happens differently. For example, fairly recently I had occasion to encounter the following situation. On a ship, due to the negligence of a poorly trained and undisciplined specialist recently assigned, an important mechanism malfunctioned. As usual, an investigation followed, and after that--organizational conclusions. What disproportion: the main perpetrator was given minor punishment, which he soon put out of his head; his immediate supervisors were also given a generally slight scare. But a good commander, who truly agonized over his ship, was denied promotion for nearly a year.

I foresee the age-old argument: in any offense of a subordinate the commander is at fault. Yes, this is true. By no means do I advocate making commanders less accountable. No, party directives today are aimed precisely at

increasing demands on leadership. But the increase in exactingness is not at all proportionate to the number and severity of punishments imposed.

Not mechanical, formal punishments by commanders for subordinates' offenses, but holding them accountable for the effectiveness of daily educational work and for the conformity of their work style to the requirements of the time--this is the path we must take if we want to achieve a really high responsibility of command personnel for discipline and order. Now if commanders are to be held accountable, it should be for personal neglect--for being isolated from subordinates, for indifference towards their needs and interests, for displaying self-conceit and rudeness, and on the contrary--for liberalism and spinelessness towards offenders.

In general, it seems that the present system of holding people accountable needs to be improved. In working on boards of survey in various units and becoming familiar, in particular, with disciplinary practice of ship commanders, I have noticed time and again what would seem to be a strange circumstance: At times it is advantageous for commanders to conceal subordinates' breaches of regulations. In some places such cases of concealment are assessed the same as other much less serious derelictions of duty. It turns out that an officer who takes this route, of course, risks being punished in the future, but in return he is spared having constantly to listen to admonitions and be punished for daily flaws, or more precisely, difficulties in putting things in order. I am convinced that we must put an end to this situation. Cases of concealing offenses must be evaluated much more strictly than other commander "transgressions."

I would even suggest such a quite unusual measure. It is no secret that a commander who has turned over position of ship commander to his replacement bears material responsibility for some time. If it is suddenly discovered that during his command there was a squandering of material resources, he will have to answer for it. But why is it that we often look through our fingers at instances where failures in discipline occur after the ship commander's departure which were obviously caused by his permissive attitude towards the offenders? Why shouldn't such commanders who leave behind a bad situation on ships also be made answerable? Institute official and party proceedings.

I realize that some of the opinions stated are by no means indisputable. But what is absolutely indisputable is the fact that we must increase the responsibility of ship and ship subunit commanders not in words, but in deed. Also, we must create around them such a situation, such a moral climate which would be favorable to honest, exacting commanders who agonize over their job and over order and provide a reliable shield against those who advocate a pretense that all is well.

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CSO: 1801/314

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

KAZAKH EDUCATION MINISTRY DECREASED PRE-DRAFT TRAINING TIME

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Aug 85 p 2

[Response to letter to the editor under the rubric "After the KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Article": "But the Cause Suffers"]

[Text] The letter "But the Cause Suffers" from Lt Col B. Mukhin was published on 26 July. We will remind the readers what it about. A commission of the USSR Ministry of Defense identified serious shortcomings in organizing initial military training at the Chimkent Automotive Tekhnikum. In checking the students, only 16 percent of those questioned received good and excellent marks, considerably more received unsatisfactory ones. Roughly the same results were shown in a number of other specialized secondary educational institutions of Chimkent Oblast and in the tekhnikum of agriculture mechanization and the agricultural tekhnikum of the city of Talgar of Alma-Ata Oblast.

Among the reasons given in the article for the low quality of training was the following: The Kazakhstan Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education directed that the time allotted by the training plan for initial military training for second-year students be reduced by 10 percent, which gave the leadership of the tekhnikum grounds to handle the training program for this subject freely. Thus, at the Chimkent tekhnikum this training plan was only 54 percent fulfilled by the middle of May.

The editorial staff received a response to the article signed by Kazakhstan Deputy Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education B. Usenbayev. Admitting the "shortcomings actually taking place" and casually mentioning that "appropriate measures are being taken" concerning them and that "specific directions have been given" to eliminate them, comrade Usenbayev then shifts the fire of criticism to the newspaper article. He is bewildered by the assertion, he writes, that the republic's ministry directed that the time allotted to initial military training be reduced by 10 percent. The ministry organized fulfillment of the corresponding instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers from 1956 and USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education (Minvuz) Order No 568 dated 30 July 1984 relating to involving students and instructors of educational institutions in agricultural work. "It appears," the deputy minister remarks in his response, "that there would

not have been a really free handling of the facts by the author of the article if he had inquired about this matter at the USSR Minvuz."

The editorial staff took advantage of the advice. It was reaffirmed that the reproach directed against the Kazakhstan Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education was legitimate since the USSR Minvuz order referred to in the letter received from the editorial staff did not give cause to revise the program for initial military training. The only paragraph where it says that "reduction of the number of classes on disciplines (discipline units), the material of which can be mastered by students independently, is permitted" does not at all pertain to initial military training. This fact, as they informed us at the USSR Minvuz, has been explained repeatedly to the workers of republic ministries. As for the reference to instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers, which are almost 30 years old, this also is unfounded since at that time such a subject as initial military training did not even exist.

As we see, the republic ministry took liberty with "free handling of the facts," or more precisely, the provisions of governing documents. Why? The editorial staff hopes to receive a precise and detailed answer to precisely this question and, at the same time, specific explanations which are hidden in the ministry's official response behind the smooth, but, alas, meaningless phrases like "appropriate measures are being taken," "specific directions have been given" and so forth. In short, we are waiting for an answer to the point.

12567

CSO: 1801/314

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

ARMY GEN YAZOV: COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISCIPLINE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 15, Aug 85 (Signed to press 18 Jul 85) pp 17-24

[Article by Army Gen D. Yazov, commander of the Red Banner Far East Military District: "Personally Responsible for Discipline and Order"]

[Text] Decisions coming out of the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and subsequent party documents have precisely defined both the main directions in the organizational, ideological and mass political work to prepare for the 27th congress and the tasks on which the efforts of party organizations, leading cadres and the entire Soviet people must be focused.

One of these tasks is to further enhance organization, order and discipline. "The matter of strengthening order and discipline," M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed in his report at the plenum, "is particularly urgent today. It is a pressing demand of the day...."

The district military council, commanders, staffs, political organs and party organizations are at work implementing the party's directions. The increased requirements made of the vigilance and the combat readiness of the troops, necessitated by the dangerous course taken by aggressive imperialist circles attempting to achieve military superiority over the USSR and its allies, are making it essential to work even more persistently to establish efficiency, regulation order and discipline--the basis of their combat readiness--in the units and subunits. And this requires from each of us truly vigorous, intense and systematic work embracing all areas of the life and work of the military collectives.

Organizational and administrative work, in which the commander is the central figure, plays an extremely important role in the strengthening of discipline. This is why the main stress in the district is placed on increasing the responsibility of those in charge for the assigned job. The leaders of the collectives, the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out, bear personal responsibility for discipline. This is extensive and multifaceted responsibility. It is manifested, first of all, in the personal example set by the commander or chief, in his personal contribution to the strengthening of discipline and regulation order. In my opinion, these are the main factors which our commanders use to achieve success. I shall cite a specific example.

Major General V. Mayorov has proved himself to be a chief with a good knowledge of the situation in subordinate subunits and capable of maintaining regulation order at the proper level and demonstrating a high level of demandingness. First of all, however, this leader is demanding of himself both in service matters and in his conduct and his personal life. Always neat, proper and conforming to the rules in things large and small, he sets an example of great efficiency, modesty, simplicity and accessibility in dealing with subordinates. His great demandingness and intolerance of shortcomings are organically combined with sensitivity and concern for people.

What are the most significant things one could identify in General Mayorov's work to strengthen discipline? A firm will, pedagogical tact, an excellent knowledge of the guiding documents, the ability to rely upon the community, the political organ and the party organization, painstaking indoctrinational work with subordinates and the imparting of his knowledge, skills and practical ability to them on a daily basis. He not only demands that subordinate officers maintain strict regulation order, but teaches them individually just how to achieve this and provides them with advanced know-how.

This is illustrated by the following example. Lieutenant Colonel N. Kasyanchuk was appointed to a higher position. Some time later Comrade Mayorov arrived in the unit in which the officer serves. A study of the situation and a thorough talk with Kasyanchuk showed that he had not been entirely successful in matters of maintaining regulation order. He relied little on the party and Komsomol organizations and did not devote adequate attention to the training and indoctrination of the company and platoon commanders. On his first visit and all his subsequent visits, Valentin Nikolayevich persistently and patiently taught Lieutenant Colonel Kasyanchuk and the other officers the correct way to strengthen discipline. Such features as efficiency, specificity and a desire to be close to the men and see the indoctrinational effect of their instructions increasingly took root in their work. A considerable amount of time has passed since then. This is now one of the outstanding collectives. This is in great part a result of General Mayorov's personal influence. He set himself the goal of developing in the commanders solid skills in working to strengthen discipline, and he achieved this by operating with party responsibility and persistence.

There are many commanders and chiefs in our district who are achieving the proper level of organization and discipline with their personal example and with skillful indoctrinational and organizational work. Their success is based on a sense of great responsibility for the assigned job and an understanding of the party's increased demands with respect to the workstyle and the moral image of leading cadres. Leading and directing the struggle for firm discipline, organization and order, they remember well V.I. Lenin's precept: "...if we are to conscientiously teach discipline to the workers and peasants, then we must begin with ourselves." The leader of the proletarian revolution never stopped reminding us that party members "must be ahead of everyone else in labor discipline and vigor."

Only the morally irreproachable leader has the moral right to make great demands of subordinates. Demandingness, after all, is one of the cornerstones in the process of ensuring discipline in the personnel. And the commander's personal example, his irreproachable conduct, is of inestimable importance.

He has been given a lot, including the great right to lead men into battle. The measure of demandingness of himself and his constant concern for setting a good personal example is also great. This is why it is important in the selection and advancement of cadres and for studying their political, working and moral qualities, to give special attention to revealing how the officers being advanced conduct themselves in the service and in their personal lives, whether they have modesty and whether these comrades are capable of being principled and uncompromising with respect to those who violate our laws, communist moral standards and the requirements contained in the military regulations. And the district military council attempts to follow this line.

Demandingness is not merely an inseparable professional feature of the commander. It is also a sort of art, a complex art. A broad ideological perspective, moral maturity and a sense of tactfulness are needed for mastering it. Far from everyone has mastered it completely. We still have cases of a distorted interpretation of demandingness. Some people are inclined to equate it sometimes to rudeness, to leadership exercised through loudness. Lieutenant Colonel I. Kovalev, a unit commander--now a former commander, unfortunately--took this route, for example. Three years ago he was promoted from chief of staff to regimental commander. He had everything necessary to successfully carry out his duties: the necessary level of training and considerable experience in various positions. He lacked demandingness of himself, however, lacked the understanding that the higher service position made it incumbent upon him to work harder and demanded greater effort, self-control, determination, restraint and the ability to rely upon his deputies, the staff, the party and Komsomol organizations.

All-out, last-minute efforts and the dressing-down of subordinates predominated in Lieutenant Colonel Kovalev's workstyle. This inhibited other people in charge from demonstrating initiative. Numerous disciplinary penalties and various kinds of unproductive conferences were substituted for painstaking individual work with subordinates. Nor was the commander able to organize a precisely functioning system for monitoring the combat training and the state of the indoctrinational work. There was only the appearance of demandingness on his part. There was actually no real, rigid demandingness based on personal example backed up by efficiency or the ability to organize the work, to mobilize the people calmly and without yelling to accomplish the assigned tasks, however. What was the result? The results of the combat and political training fell in the regiment, and the state of military discipline deteriorated in certain subunits. One could not fail to see behind all of this, of course, also deficiencies in the work of leaders at the battalion level who had permitted such a situation to develop. The main cause unquestionably lay in the defective workstyle of the unit commander himself, however. He was not capable of controlling the situation which had developed.

When I think about the workstyle used by commanders for strengthening discipline, I frequently recall the frontline officers, truly demanding leaders, under whom I served. One of them was Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Colonel I. Shapshayev. In the last phase of the war he commanded a regiment in the famous Panfilov Division. A company commander at that time, I received



lessons in being demanding of myself and of subordinates from the regimental commander on a daily basis, as did the other unit officers.

Lieutenant Colonel Shapshayev regarded demandingness as one of the commander's most valuable qualities and he considered reacting sharply to an infraction to be its starting point. "The men must be indoctrinated to regard any violation of the regulations as an unusual occurrence," he said.

And this was the way he operated. He accustomed others to doing the same. The more "minor" the incident brought up for extensive discussion, the more clearly the men could see the results of the strict demandingness.

With all of his conduct and with his workstyle, Lieutenant Colonel Shapshayev confirmed the immutable truth that a high level of demandingness is manifested not in such things as yelling at people, dressing them down and punishing them, but in profoundly aware and calculated, acute reaction to infractions, a thoroughly conceived system of steps to prevent them and a position of principle on the part of the commander in assessing a specific occurrence which is against regulations.

A commander's demandingness is manifested not only and not so much in his words, however. It is also demonstrated in his ability to organize the life of subordinates in strict accordance with regulations. This is one of the crucial conditions for further enhancing organization and order in the forces. We try to see that at the regular assemblies of unit commanders they receive substantive answers not just to the question of what needs to be done in order to maintain proper regulation order, but also how to do it. The experience and the work methods of commanders who have achieved the best results with respect to strengthening discipline are studied at the assemblies. We arrange for demonstration classes to be conducted with the best units. How the training day should be organized, from reveille to the evening roll call, was demonstrated in one such class in an outstanding regiment, for example.

Such "demonstration" days have become a normal procedure for this regiment. Precise organization of the combat training and undeviating adherence to the daily schedule serve as extremely important disciplinary and indoctrinational factors there. Military ceremonies "work" effectively toward the same purpose. These include such things as the posting of the daily fatigue detail and release of the men for classes, which conclude with a pass in review, for example. They also have an exciting external aspect: the brass band glitters, the trumpets play a rousing tune and the servicemen parade by in a dashing manner. Each ceremony has an internal essence, however. It sets the correct tone for and gives preciseness to all of the work of the daily duty detail.

Military ceremonies are one of the effective means used by district commanders and political personnel to strengthen military discipline in the forces. We have also worked out appropriate recommendations for the extensive use of the entire diverse range of Soviet military ceremonies, which embrace all areas of army life. They are always conducted formally and unhurriedly, so that the people experience all of their beauty. The work has no indoctrinational influence and is not effective without this.

The neatness and sharpness of the serviceman is an important element in the establishment of order and discipline. People judge more than just the soldier from his appearance. He personifies the regiment, personifies our army. Regulation appearance indicates a high level of military refinement and habitual neatness--in short, discipline. We strive to see that the personnel strictly observes the regulations governing the wearing of the uniform and saluting, that all of those in charge, including garrison commanders and commandants, give their attention to this matter.

Success in this matter has its basis in the company. A great deal depends upon the commander, his deputy for political affairs and the party and Komsomol activists. By setting an example of neatness and sharpness for the soldiers and NCOs, on the one hand, and developing these qualities and careful and loving treatment of the uniform in them, on the other, they contribute to the cultural development of the servicemen and impart to the latter intolerance of laxity and sloppiness, of lack of discipline in general. Personnel in the company commanded by Captain V. Kudryavtsev, for example, are always neat and strictly in uniform. How was this achieved? With a combination of indoctrinational work and strict demandingness. The company commander, Lieutenant V. Zherevchuk, his deputy for political affairs and the party and Komsomol organizations do not deal leniently with those who are inclined to consider being out of uniform or sloppiness to be minor matters unworthy of attention. Their names are mentioned from the speaker's platforms at party and Komsomol meetings, and they are forced to listen to impartial statements by their comrades, the communists and Komsomol members, at bureau sessions. Nor are those who set an example of neatness and sharpness, who observe the rules of military courtesy ignored there. They are discussed at Komsomol meetings, at special evening and morning meetings on special subjects and during meetings with veterans. All of this produces good results. There is unquestionably a most direct linkage between the exemplary appearance of the soldiers in the company and the fact that this subunit is one of the best in the regiment with respect to discipline.

Communists on the staffs and in the directorates and the chiefs of branches of troops and services bear particular responsibility for strengthening military discipline. The party Charter requires that every communist set an example of discipline and do everything possible to promote the strengthening of organization and order. Success is assured where the party members take this position. In unit "X," for example, personnel directly subordinate to Major A. Chernysh, chief of the armored service, have had no infractions of military discipline for a long time now. This is in great part a result of the fact that Communist Chernysh performs indoctrinational work constantly and skillfully. He teaches methods for maintaining order to subordinate officers, regularly addresses the fightingmen on political and other subjects and engages in painstaking individual indoctrination. Many other chiefs of services and branches of troops in the formations and units work with the same party sense of responsibility. I would mention Majors I. Abramovskiy, N. Mukhin and V. Yagodkin. They maintain proper order and organization in the assigned section.

There are also cases of a different kind, however. Infractions of discipline, including nonregulation relations, were permitted to occur in a repair subunit

in one of the units, for example. What did an investigation of the occurrence show? The unit commander, staff, political workers, party and Komsomol committees had devoted less attention to that subunit than to the others. Majors V. Kuvarov and V. Yurchenko, service chiefs, whose subordinates were members of the repair subunit, performed practically no indoctrinational work. When they were criticized, they sought to justify themselves by saying that was what the commander was for, that the equipment was their job.

One does not always hear the "principle" followed by communists in charge for not working to strengthen discipline defined with such candor, of course. There are quite a few other similar examples, however, including some at higher headquarters. The district military council puts it this way: Every chief bears full responsibility for the state of discipline in the assigned section and is required to make a personal contribution to the strengthening of discipline. Every officer must consider it one of his most important duties to systematically analyze the state of discipline, sum up the results of the work performed and define specific steps to eliminate shortcomings. We have a definite system: The state of discipline is analyzed once a quarter for the district, once a month in the units and at the end of each week in companies, batteries and equivalent subunits. This makes it possible promptly to detect positive and negative trends and react appropriately to them.

We try to see that the ability to maintain regulation order and discipline is always reflected in the officer's certification. We establish the following approach for assessing the work of the cadres: The ability to organize life in accordance with regulations and to maintain discipline and order is one of the main qualities which must be taken into account for determining whether to advance an officer in the service.

This approach is based on the regulation requirement that every commander and chief bears personal responsibility for discipline, order and the moral climate in the collective. Can a commander among whose subordinates non-regulation relations occur expect to be advanced in the service, for example? No, he must first learn how to work with people, to establish a rapport with them and develop in the collective a healthy moral climate which precludes infractions. The district military council demands that commanders, political workers and staff officers resolve the matter in precisely this manner. Among other things, it demands that they systematically give tests on the general service regulations. Officers and warrant officers are tested at the end of the training year, soldiers and NCOs at the end of each training period. Each of them is rated individually. The scores on the tests are analyzed at conferences and at officers' meetings.

I would like to discuss officers' meetings in particular. Unfortunately, some units underestimate this extremely important means of enhancing the service activeness of the officers and assuring that they set an example in discipline and in the observance of communist moral standards. Where these meetings are conducted regularly and efficiently, where shortcomings are assessed with severity and principle, one senses that they actually influence the workstyle and the conduct of the officers and their successful accomplishment of the tasks involved in enhancing combat readiness and strengthening discipline and organization.

The effectiveness of the work performed by leading cadres to maintain order is determined in great part by their knowledge of regulations and guiding documents on these matters. Why is it that the work performed by a number of commanders and chiefs lacks specificity, purposefulness and efficiency? I have seen more than once that one of the causes of this is a superficial, inexact knowledge of the pertinent instructions and recommendations. Here are a few facts which I encountered during a recent visit to division "X." I asked the formation commander and the chief of staff to report on how they fulfilled the requirements set forth in one of the documents under which every official must periodically analyze the state of discipline and outline steps to rectify shortcomings. They answered with generalized statements. There are precise instructions on this matter, however, indicating who is to do what, and when.

It is also not surprising that certain of those in charge in the units of that formation did not have an accurate knowledge of their duties or the requirements contained in guiding documents and did not fulfill them undeviatingly. Officers V. Laskin, G. Orlov and V. Legkota, for example, were asked questions about their immediate service duties, about the schedule for inspecting and testing the equipment and weapons, about daily rations for the personnel and other matters. And almost all of the officers' answers were vague and inexact. A study revealed that their practical work also lacked specificity. And results, of course.

I also encountered the problem of poor monitoring and verification of performance in that formation. There had been significant shortcomings in the service of the troops for a long time in one of the units, for example. Division headquarters had issued numerous instructions on the matter. There was one inspection after another. The situation did not improve, however. This was because the inspections and the control were of a recording and not a constructive nature, if I may put it that way. The people came, saw things and reported on the shortcomings.... And that was the end of it until the next inspection.

The strength of monitoring and verification of performance lies in their being systematic. The result of every inspection is not just a statement of facts, good and bad, but a matter of always moving ahead, reinforcing the best things and eliminating shortcomings. Only in this case will the control system be effective.

The conduct of every serviceman, whether he strictly observes regulation order and conscientiously carries out his service duties, is determined primarily by the individual's awareness. Political training and effective agitation and propaganda work are of prime importance in the shaping and development of this basic quality of the fightingman. Classes conducted within the system of Marxist-Leninist training for the officers, political training for warrant officers and political classes for the soldiers and NCOs, closely linked to the life of the military collectives, provide enormous possibilities for developing in the men profound communist conviction and an understanding of the vital need for discipline and organization. There is a great and diversified arsenal of forms and methods for performing

party-political work. The task is one of making maximum use of it to strengthen discipline and increase the responsibility of the servicemen for the strict observance of regulation order. This is why we persistently follow a course of seeing to it that every activity, whether it be a political class or a lecture, a political briefing or a talk, a Lenin lesson or a morning discussion on a special subject, is aimed at the hearts of the men, figuratively speaking, excites them and forces them to think and to derive the necessary conclusions. This is the only way to achieve, not mechanical and blind performance, but aware performance dictated by the ideological convictions of the fightingmen.

Strengthening discipline and organization and increasing the responsibility of the communists for the state of discipline and organization constitute an extremely important area of party work. The fact that every party organization has great possibilities for this is demonstrated, among other things, by the experience of unit "X," in which Lieutenant Colonel A. Yakovlev is a member of the party committee. This is one of the outstanding regiments in the district, distinguished by a high level of organization and firm discipline. The success has been due in great part to the fact that the commander skillfully relies on the party organization and directs its work toward the improvement of combat readiness and the strengthening of regulation order.

The party committee works purposefully and with initiative. It exerts its influence with respect to strengthening discipline by assuring that the communists set a personal example in the observance of regulations and by holding those who violate them strictly accountable. At its meetings, the party committee regularly analyzes the personal contribution made by the communists to the strengthening of discipline, hears reports from them on this matter and strives persistently to see that all decisions are fully implemented. The guiding party organ always has the necessary information on the state of affairs in the subunits. It performs a great deal of analytical work and reacts promptly and effectively to problems which arise, making essential adjustments in the workstyle of the party organizations. Something which is very important is the fact that every infraction for which a communist is given a service penalty is always assessed from a standpoint of principle by both the party committee and the battalion party bureaus. The regiment has developed an effective system for exerting party influence with respect to influencing discipline and has accumulated considerable experience. We try to extensively publicize this experience.

The Komsomol organizations have a large role in the strengthening of discipline and regulation order. Their work centers around assuring that the Komsomol members set a good personal example in the training and discipline and the observance of moral standards. Komsomol members make up an absolute majority of the personnel, and if we resolve the problem of assuring that they set a good example, we will be ensuring a high level of discipline and organization. Constant attention to the Komsomol organizations on the part of senior comrades is one of the most important conditions for enhancing their militancy and the effectiveness of their work. The decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee on further improving party supervision of the Komsomol provides precise directions for this: Every communist must regard working with the youth as his own vital cause.

It is the primary task of all commanders, political workers and party organizations, of every communist, Marshall of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, USSR minister of defense, stressed at a Komsomol conference in the Red Banner Turkestan Military District, to provide the Komsomol cadres with constant assistance, to teach them patiently and persistently to take a highly responsible and earnest approach to the work and to work to see that its ideological content and effectiveness are on a high level.

The district military council and its political directorate try to keep the matters of increasing party supervision of the Komsomol and enhancing the militancy of the Komsomol organizations constantly at the center of their attention. And we stress working directly in the Komsomol groups and primary organizations and equipping the platoon and company commanders with the ability to rely on the Komsomol organizations and direct their work.

An extremely important part of all the work performed to strengthen discipline and organization consists of establishing sobriety as a mandatory standard of army life in every collective. It is no secret that some officers abuse alcohol, and this has a negative effect upon the level of combat training in the subunits in which they serve and upon the state of order there. We see our task as one of working more persistently and effectively in this area in accordance with the demands set forth in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Measures to Overcome Drunkenness and Alcoholism." The main stress is on applying individual pressure upon people inclined to abuse alcohol and on increasing our demandingness of them. Commanders, political organs, party organizations, the public, cultural and educational institutions and women's councils need to do a great deal in this area.

We have units in which new traditions and modern rites eliminating the use of alcohol have replaced activities involving drinking in the officer collectives and among the servicemen's family members. We regard the universal dissemination of these traditions, improvement of the work of cultural and educational institutions and the development of mass physical culture and sports as a reliable way to eradicate the abuse of alcohol and to establish a sober way of life.

Strengthening discipline and organization is a matter of state importance. And a corresponding approach must be taken to its resolution, of course. Success in the work in every section, in every area of the training, the service and the life of the military collectives depends upon the state of discipline. District commanders, political organs, staffs, party and Komsomol organizations still have a great deal to do. They must strive more persistently to establish strict regulation order and not just appeal for discipline, but actually achieve it with a specific system of organizational and indoctrinational measures. This is an extremely important requirement for the successful accomplishment of those large tasks set for us in connection with preparations for the 27th party congress.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

COL GEN POPKOV ON ACTIVITIES OF STAFF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 15, Aug 85 (Signed to press 18 Jul 85) pp 25-31

[Article by Col Gen M. Popkov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces: "For the Work of Staff Political Organizations--A High Level of Effectiveness"]

[Text] Our present period, when universal preparations are underway for the 27th CPSU Congress, has been called a time of intense and diversified work. Commanders, political organs, staffs and party organizations are persistently enhancing their efficiency, self-critically assessing what has been achieved and activating unutilized reserves. Everything possible is being done to raise the combat readiness of the formations, units and subunits to a new and higher level and to strengthen military discipline.

And whatever issue in the daily life or the combat training of the troops is being considered, we are cognizant of the role played by the staffs with respect to enhancing the combat readiness and improving the training process. As organs of control they help the commanders resolve questions involved in maintaining the combat and mobilizational readiness of the troops at the proper level and maintaining vigilant alert duty, and plan and organize efficient combat training.

The development of the Armed Forces, the nature and substance of the missions assigned to them with respect to maintaining a constantly high level of combat readiness, missions stemming from the complex international military-political situation, have made improvement of the work of the staffs a priority matter on the agenda. This involves improving the level of all the administrative work of the cadres.

Whether the important tasks facing the staffs are fulfilled depends in great part upon how actively and militantly and with what kind of principle the party organizations operate, upon the extent to which the political organs direct their work skillfully and on a daily basis and strive to see that every communist sets a good personal example in the fulfillment of the functional duties with which he is charged. Mature and well trained communists, experienced in the professional sense, are on the roster of the staff party organizations. The end results of the training and indoctrination of the



personnel of the formations, units and subunits and their readiness to perform the combat training tasks in general depend upon their taking a responsible attitude toward the assigned area of the work and upon their ability to summarize and apply positive experience and concentrate efforts on eliminating bottlenecks in that training and indoctrination. This is why I would like to discuss the staffs and the work of their party organizations in this article.

The party and its Central Committee have precisely defined the place, the role and the specific tasks of the staff and directorate party organizations with respect to maintaining the troops at a high level of combat and mobilizational readiness. The Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy state, among other things, that party organizations of the directorates of military districts, groups of forces and fleets and of the staffs of formations and institutions must struggle actively for the fulfillment of directives issued by the party and the government and orders issued by the minister of defense, and for the observance of Soviet laws; exert an influence with respect to improving the work of the apparatus and indoctrinating the leading military cadres; persistently implement the demands contained in the CPSU Charter on the strict observance of party and state discipline; and indoctrinate the communists and non-party members in a spirit of great responsibility for the assigned job, discipline, organization and high standards in their work.

Implementation of these demands is the main concern of the political directorate of the Ground Forces and the political directorates of the military districts and groups of forces, as well as of the commanders, political organs, party committees and party bureaus. Regular assemblies conducted for the chiefs of the political sections of the staffs and directorates help. They consider pressing problems in the administrative work, study and disseminate positive experience and define ways and methods for further increasing party influence upon all aspects of the life and work of the administrative bodies. The chiefs of the political organs benefit considerably, for example, from the assemblies conducted on the subject: "On Further Improving the Workstyle of the Political Organs of Staffs and Directorates for Supervising the Primary Party Organizations." This work was summarized, and a collection of material on this subject has been distributed to all of the political sections of the staffs and directorates and of the formations.

The political directorate regularly hears reports from the chiefs of the staff and directorate political organs of the military districts and from the secretaries of the party committees of main directorates of the commander in chief of the Ground Forces on the most important issues in their practical work, works out appropriate recommendations and monitors their implementation. And what is very important is the fact that generals and officers from the political directorate take advantage of every visit to the forces to help the communists on the staffs to resolve the problems facing them. All of this contributes in a most direct manner to the improvement of matters in the staffs and directorates.



Guided by the party's demands, the political directorates of the military districts and groups of forces have begun working more thoroughly to improve supervision of the work of staff and directorate party organizations and to demonstrate vital concern for having them exert an active influence with respect to improving the workstyle and methods of the communists and assess from a standpoint of principle their work in the forces, the level of performance discipline and the quality of the measures carried out. Political briefings of the personnel on highly important issues, the presentation of reports by communists-and-leaders at party meetings in the staffs and directorates, and participation in the implementation of decisions adopted there have developed into a system. As a result, many staff political organs and party organizations are actively influencing various aspects of the work of the directorates, sections and services, and indoctrinating the communists and the non-party members in a spirit of great awareness, creative initiative and responsibility for the fulfillment of duties, for the state of affairs in subordinate units and subunits and for assisting lower levels with training methods.

This is the approach taken by the political section of the staff and the directorates of the Leningrad Military District, which is headed by Colonel V. Kovalchuk. The officers in this political organ constantly study the performance of the primary party organizations with respect to assuring that the communists take an avant-garde role and to improving their workstyle in subordinate military collectives. At one time there were complaints against certain officers in this respect. The political section recommended that the political organizations in which Colonels P. Pazichenko and K. Pozdnyak are secretaries of the party bureaus discuss with the communists questions pertaining to increasing their responsibility for the state of affairs in the assigned sections of the work. The causes of inadequate results from visits to the forces by certain communists and of their poor methodological training were analyzed during preparations for the meetings. A demanding discussion of the duty and responsibilities of the directorate CPSU members and of ways to achieve good end results was conducted at meetings in which political section workers took part. Officers from the political section also participated in the implementation of decisions adopted. Colonel V. Kovalchuk, for example, talked with the directorate chiefs about improving their work with subordinates and with communists sent into the forces. Sometime later Officers Pazichenko and Pozdnyak, secretaries of party organizations, presented reports in the political section on the fulfillment of decisions adopted at the meetings. At a seminar for secretaries of party organizations there was an exchange of opinions on ways to increase party influence with respect to improving the workstyle of the staff and directorate communists in the forces. A decision adopted at a meeting of the party aktiv also focused on the fulfillment of this task.

The political section and party organizations of the staff and of the directorates are increasing their demandingness of the communists, conducting individual talks with them and holding to strict account those who do not exert themselves properly in the work and become overly involved with paperwork to the detriment of vital organizational work at the locations. Party organizations of the directorates and the sections react acutely and from a

standpoint of principle to attempts by certain CPSU members to attribute poor results in the work to so-called "objective difficulties." Public opinion is directed against those who are deaf to anything new brought out by experience in the forces. It was precisely because of this that Colonels G. Savin, A. Kuritsyn, A. Filippov and A. Shepelev, communists-and-leaders, presented reports in the political section. The attention of these comrades was directed to a lessening of effectiveness in the work of training and indoctrination of subordinates and to poor monitoring and verification of performance. This kind of demanding approach to the productiveness of the work of the communists is helping to indoctrinate them in a spirit of great personal responsibility for the exemplary fulfillment of party and service duties and to achieve real results in the performance of specific tasks.

The summing up of the work of the communists with respect to conducting tactical and command and staff exercises with the troops and the staffs, the conducting of inspections of the combat and political training and the monitoring of steps taken to strengthen military discipline and prevent negative developments which influence combat readiness, which are practiced by the political section and the party bureau, deserve approval. The main stress is on the critical analysis of the state of affairs, the work of directorate and section communists in the forces, enhancement of the quality and effectiveness of the field and night training, commander's training and methodological preparation for the officer cadres, and bringing all of the training into conformity with that which is essential in a war.

And so, the political section and party organizations of the staff and directorates of the Leningrad Military District are using various forms and methods of party influence to enhance the militancy and responsibility of the cadres with respect to accomplishing the tasks involved in improving the combat readiness of the troops.

There are many other examples of active and purposeful work by the political sections and party organizations of the staffs and directorates to develop a high level of ideological-political maturity and staff refinement in the communists. The experience of the political section and party organizations of the staff and the directorates in the Belorussian Military District in this area, for example, deserves attention. Workers of the political section and party activists thoroughly examine the Marxist-Leninist training for the officers and strive to see that it is closely linked to the practical resolution of questions pertaining to combat readiness, the combat training, organization and discipline. The communists are regularly briefed on the CPSU's foreign and domestic policy, lectures and reports are presented on problems of political and military indoctrination. The practice of conducting talks and seminars with the chiefs of directorates and sections and the secretaries of party organizations has developed and is being strengthened there. They discuss ways to improve the workstyle and methods of generals and officers and of the party aktiv from the standpoint of the party's heightened demands of administrative work. This is helping to improve their work in subordinate units and subunits.

But is this the situation universally? Unfortunately, it is not. Some staff and directorate political organs and party organizations accept serious shortcomings in the work of the communists, in their ideological-political and moral indoctrination, and deficiencies in the indoctrinational work with the personnel right in the subunits. Far from all of the political sections of the district staffs and directorates and staff party organizations look for unutilized possibilities and reserves for improving the work. This is true of the work performed by the staff political section and the directorates of the Siberian Military District, for example.

Although representatives of this political organ frequently visit the party organizations, they sometimes examine the work of the latter only superficially and exert little influence with respect to improving the professional training of the communists and the workstyle and methods they use in the forces. This was demonstrated during the last field exercise. The political section was unable to arrange things so that there was a constant influence upon the work of the communists in the collectives headed by Colonels O. Pomazkov, V. Sokolov and V. Dubnyuk. Because of this, the organizational work of those officers contained serious shortcomings, and their adherence to the paper-work style of leadership made itself felt. Unfortunately, this defect is sometimes eliminated too slowly. All of this is a result of shortcomings in the indoctrination and a low level of demandingness and exactingness of communists on the district staff and in the directorates. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev stresses the following: "A communist is assessed by his actions and deeds. There are no other criteria, nor can there be."

The communists in charge are expected to be constantly guided by the requirements set at the April and July 1985 Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee for the work of the apparatus of party and state organs, of all people in positions of leadership. This involves enhancing efficiency and flexibility, reducing the flow of paper-work, overcoming the armchair style of work and the tendency to hold numerous meetings and conferences.

The facts show that some political organs and staff party organizations continue to commit abuses by holding numerous and lengthy meetings and conferences, adopting various resolutions and working out measures which are far from specific. With respect to the organization of the work and the monitoring of its performance, precisely this is perhaps the weakest link.

This is the situation in the party organization in which Lieutenant Colonel A. Abysov is on the roster, for example. The party bureau does not thoroughly examine the practical work performed by the communists to accomplish the combat training tasks and does not always react to serious breakdowns in the training and indoctrination of the men, to conditionalities and simplifications in the training or to unobjective ratings of the personnel's training. The work performed by directorate officers at the sites is in need of fundamental improvement. Lieutenant Colonel L. Sobetskiy, deputy formation commander, and Colonel I. Gudymenko have visited the tank regiment which initiated the competition in the district more than once, for example. The objective of the trips was to help the officers improve the fire and tactical

training. What kind of help was it, however, if the result was that some subunits in the unit gave a poor performance in those areas in an inspection? The communists-and-leaders were unable to correct serious shortcomings in the field training of the tankmen, and the party bureau did not look into the effectiveness of the work performed by those officers in the forces in good time.

In the situation of rapid scientific and technological progress and of qualitative changes in the weapons, the organization, the training methods and the combat activities of the troops, one cannot work productively or direct things without science, without its conclusions and recommendations. This is why we strive to see that our cadres and the communists thoroughly comprehend all of this. Each of them is expected to set an example of the creative, persistent mastery of modern scientific achievements in their work, contribute to the development of science, thoroughly support and adopt that which science recommends.

I would like to particularly stress the role of the primary staff party organizations in this matter. They are expected to develop in the communists in the organs of control a great sense of responsibility for further developing scientific research in military affairs and for the efficient and timely application of its results, as well as innovations in equipment and weaponry and the best methods for applying them in combat at the practical level.

The political section and party organizations of the staff and directorates of the Moscow Military District demonstrate constant concern for this. Scientific and practical conferences, talks with the communists and the analysis of their independent work to improve their military and specialized knowledge, which are conducted there, have a positive effect with respect to improving the scientific approach to the direction of the troops. They take into full consideration experience in directing troops and organizing party-political work during the Great Patriotic War. Communists Yu. Shumilikhin, N. Lebed, S. Lotoskiy and others approach the improvement of their work with thorough understanding and a great sense of responsibility.

The matter of strengthening order and discipline is especially urgent today. This was called a pressing demand of the time at the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. And we need to apply all our efforts to universally strengthen order and discipline. First of all, it was stated at the plenum, we must hold those leaders who bear personal responsibility for discipline more strictly accountable. We must therefore be particularly demanding of the staff and directorate communists.

It should be mentioned that most of the administrative party organizations have stepped up their efforts to strengthen military discipline, establish regulation order and improve the service of the troops. For the sake of objectivity, however, we need to admit that this work has not yet produced significant results. Communists on the staff where Officer V. Zubar serves, for example, perform their work superficially in subordinate units and do not do what is required even in those subunits for which they bear direct responsibility. There were breakdowns in the political classes and other activities in one of the companies, for example. The party bureau did not look into the work performed with the servicemen, however.

Who is not aware of the importance of the personal example set by the communist-and-leader in discipline, in his conduct and his attitude toward the job? His ideological maturity, his party tempering and his moral makeup are manifested in these things. Unfortunately, certain administrative party organizations do not devote proper attention to the development of these qualities. They reconcile themselves to deviations from communist moral and ethical standards and from the law by individual CPSU members and to manifestations of conceit, arrogance and disrespectful treatment of the men, and tolerate lack of principle in the struggle against drunkenness and alcoholism.

The formation staff party organization headed by Lieutenant Colonel V. Podgurskiy, for example, assesses the work of the communists, their personal professional training, the state of affairs in subordinate units and the morality of their conduct from a standpoint of principle. This year alone the party organization has brought a number of communists, including Colonel S. Kobakhidza and Lieutenant Colonels S. Minkov and V. Semichev, to strict accountability for deficiencies in the work. They presented reports in the party bureau, and deadlines for correcting the deficiencies were set for them. They are now markedly improving the state of affairs.

Unfortunately, however, such cases are not so very frequent. And what is our orientation from the party today? We must increase our demandingness of every party member for his attitude toward his public duty, for the fulfillment of party decisions and for maintaining the honorable and pure image of the party member. The communist is judged by his actions and deeds. There are no other criteria, nor can there be.

Party work is working with people. It is truly the science of humanity. We still encounter certain leaders of staff party organizations, however, who cite figures on the fulfillment of combat training plans and talk about technical problems without referring to papers. This is good, of course. They frequently judge the personal qualities of the communists-and-leaders in the units and subunits, in directorates and sections directly subordinate to them, and their political and moral makeup on the basis of questionnaires, however. And a poor knowledge of the men has negative consequences, as we know. A knowledge of the cadres, their skillful selection and constant indoctrinational work with them have therefore been and continue to be a task of great importance for us.

The staff is rightly referred to as a gatherer of progressive ideas and the propagandist of everything new, a fact which has insistently established itself in life. The ability to spot those new things, however, depends to a crucial degree upon the professional training and the skills of the workers. Competence and the staff communist's inherent, thorough knowledge of his speciality and of military affairs in general, a broad operational perspective, the ability to think dialectically, pedagogical and methodological skills, which are characteristic of the staff communists, are at the fore in this matter. In short, he must be on top of modern developments in military affairs in all respects. And naturally, questions pertaining to this must receive the attention of party organizations and their directing organs.

It is very important, as we see it, to create a climate in the staffs, directorates and sections, which motivates the generals and officers, all of the communists, to engage in self-education, develops creativity and initiative in them and promotes their precise and competent fulfillment of their service duties. Once again, it has to be stated that this sort of climate has not been created universally.

The party organization in which Colonel A. Tretyakov is on the roster has not once considered problems having to do with improving the tactical, fire and special training of the communists in a long time. And there was a need for this. In the last field exercise, many of the officers lacked those qualities which are needed most of all by military leaders today. These include, among other things, activeness, initiative, competence on the job and the ability to make well-based decisions, to accept responsibility and to strive for the accomplishment of the assigned mission. The party bureau there discussed the avant-garde role of staff officers in forthcoming field exercises four times there this year. Judging from the specific, practical performance of individual comrades, however, those discussions have had very little result. And this is all because the decisions were not backed up with organizational work.

And how important it is for the staff political organs and party organizations to develop responsibility and initiative in the communists in the socialist competition in honor of the forthcoming party congress. Many of them are now working actively in this direction and are achieving good results. A good example of this is the party organization in which Lieutenant Colonel N. Sinitsyn, a CPSU member, is on the roster. The communists are setting the tone in the competition and setting a personal example in the combat training. More than half of the CPSU members in that party organization are striving for the title of outstanding soldier in the training, and more than 90 percent of them have accepted a commitment to raise or reaffirm their skills rating. Furthermore, and this is very important, Lieutenant Colonels B. Zalepukhin, R. Iksanov and A. Koval, Major A. Arkhipov and many others are not only setting an example themselves in the fulfillment of commitments, but are earnestly helping the officers in subordinate subunits to mobilize the fightingmen to achieve good end results in the combat and political training. Naturally, considerable credit also goes to them for the fact that the collective in which they serve achieved good results in the training during the winter training period.

When we assess the work of staff and directorate party organizations, we arrive at the conclusion that all of the successes achieved by the communists and their sense of responsibility for the assigned job are based on ideological tempering and a thorough understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory, decisions of party congresses and plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, other guiding documents and the requirements set by the USSR minister of defense with respect to the training of the Armed Forces and the strengthening of discipline, law and order. Such methods of work as talks and theoretical conferences of communists on general party documents and individual talks with CPSU members have justified themselves. We shall continue to devote unweakened attention to them.

Reports and elections of party organs are approaching. As stated in decisions coming out of the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, there must be no place in the meetings for eulogies and compliments or for attempts to cover up the actual state of affairs with generalized statements or to place the blame for shortcomings on objective circumstances. Everything necessary will have to be done to see that the pre-congress, collective council of army communists is conducted on a highly constructive and businesslike level and contributes to the further improvement of the work of staff party organizations.

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11499

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ARMED FORCES

MAJ GEN GLAZUNOV RECALLS CREATION OF RANK OF MSU

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Sep 85 p 4

[Article by Maj Gen Glazunov, candidate of historical sciences: "Faithful Sons of the People"]

[Text] Fifty years ago on 22 September 1935, the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) and the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR adopted a decree: "To establish the rank of 'Marshal of the Soviet Union' to be conferred personally by the Government of the USSR on outstanding and especially distinguished individuals of higher command personnel."

This significant event in the life of the Army occurred in the eighteenth years of the Soviet state's existence. It was noted in the decree of the TsIK and SNK of the USSR that "the during the years of the gigantic victories of socialist construction in the USSR the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army had come a long way in organizational and technical reconstruction and was transformed into a leading, first-class army equipped with a wealth of military equipment."

On 20 November 1935, V. K. Blyukher, S. M. Budenny, K. Ye. Voroshilov, A. I. Yegorov, M. N. Tukhachevskiy--military leaders known to the entire country and prominent commanders of the civil war--became the first Soviet marshals. Thus, the Motherland made note of the services of her sons who, guided by Lenin's party and struggling with enemies, had created a new type of army--an army of the working people, the army of the first socialist state in the world.

But the dark clouds of the impending fierce skirmish with fascism were already on the horizon. War was flaring up in the expanses of Europe. The Soviet Union and its Red Army were preparing to repel the aggression. Its military leadership was reinforced: in the year before the Great Patriotic War started, the rank of marshal was conferred on S. K. Timoshenko, B. M. Shaposhnikov and G. I. Kulik, who held high military posts.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union raised a brilliant galaxy of marshals during the years of the great battle with German fascism. The talented



military leaders of the people matured on the battlefields. "Millions took part in the war," noted CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev. "But they were not a faceless mass in this battle unprecedented in scope. The lofty personal qualities of the soldiers of the Great Patriotic war became vividly apparent in their heroism--from Pvt Aleksandr Matrosov to Marshal Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov... The entire country knows the famous names of the outstanding military leaders of the Great Patriotic War."

Names of Soviet military leaders such as G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevskiy, L. A. Govorov, I. S. Konev, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, K. A. Meretskov, K. K. Rokossovskiy and F. I. Tolbukhin are well known in our country and throughout the world. They all became marshals during the war years. They coordinated the combat operations of the groups of fronts, commanded fronts, and some of them were members of the HQ Supreme High Command.

In the fire of these battles and in the skirmish with the powerful, more experienced enemy, outstanding military leadership talent was also shown by V. D. Sokolovskiy, I. Kh. Bagramyan, S. S. Biryuzov, A. A. Grechko, A. I. Yeremenko, K. S. Moskalenko, V. I. Chuykov and M. V. Zakharov commanding fronts and armies during the war and supervising large staffs. After the war, the rank of marshal was conferred on them and a number of other prominent military leaders of the Soviet Army for outstanding services to the country.

The Soviet marshals, coming from the midst of the people and educated by the Communist Party, prove themselves to be deserving heirs and continuers of the best traditions of domestic military art.

12567

CSO: 1801/26

## ARMED FORCES

### THRIFT IN TRAINING EXERCISES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by Maj S. Kochetkov, unit staff officer, under the rubric "For Economy and Thrift": "In the Optimum Mode"]

[Text] These surface-to-air missile subunits (podrazdeleniya) operated under roughly the same conditions at tactical live-fire exercises. The soldiers had to repel an "enemy" air attack, tune out interference and resolve unexpected hypothetical situations... In short, the situation was identical for both. But the missilemen stood the test differently.

Officer V. Kirichenko's subordinates acted confidently and resourcefully and skillfully operated the radar equipment in their charge. When, for example, the target changed its flight route and did not go, as they say, according to schedule, they did not become flustered. Making the maximum use of the radar's technical capabilities, they obtained its best "vision," and the target did not pass.

But in a similar situation certain specialists of the battalion where Maj V. Domnin is the officer in charge of armament demonstrated timidity and, above all, an insufficient knowledge and application of equipment's high combat capabilities, especially the intercept controller Lt S. Belotskiy.

What is the reason for such contrasts in the missilemen's work? The soldiers of both subunits worked for the same amount of time. What is more, the equipment in Maj Domnin's subunit was operated for more hours in preparing for departure for the range, as evidenced by the electrical power consumption.

It turned out to be a matter of being able to use training time carefully and efficiently operate and service the radar equipment entrusted to them. Thus, when asked what prevented them from preparing for the test in a qualitative manner, many of Maj Domnin's subordinates replied: the lack of time. Where did the time go? After all, they were given as much as the others. Poor organization of the training process resulted in its inefficient use.

Thus, periodic technical servicing was conducted without regard for the level of training of the young officers who had poorly mastered the skills of working with measuring equipment. Lt Belotskiy, for example, trained on

eliminating malfunctions on "hot" equipment, although many of the operations could have been done on "cold" equipment. In the process of conducting periodic technical servicing, there was not "link-up" of the time limits between individual operations. It turned out that some specialists could not carry out their amount of work and waited while others did theirs. All this created a time shortage and led to an excessive consumption of the equipment's service life.

It also turns out that there is a direct relationship between soldiers' skills and their attitude toward operating armament and the thrifty consumption of material resources. Unfortunately, we do not always think of this.

It must be recognized that certain officers are of the opinion that there is, they say, no reason to economize in combat training. If a few extra kilograms of fuel or kilowatt-hours of electricity are used up, the high rating for live firings will make up for it. I think this is an utterly incorrect opinion. If one approaches resolution of the problem zealously, it is possible to create a complex situation at training sessions as well with hypothetical input, interference and raids and, at the same time, economize on material resources. This is confirmed by the combat training experience of the leading subunits.

Take the battalion which until recently was commanded by Capt N. Gorokhov. Here, for example, one day they noticed that the soldiers were spending a lot of time changing from one training point to another and that they were not always exert themselves fully on certain training sessions. They found a way out by combining the exercises. They started to practice en route training exercises more often and increased the number of hypothetical situations input. In summing up the results of competition in the battalion, much attention is always given to questions of economy and thrift. It is not surprising that the subunit soon ranked at the top according to training results and economy of material resources. Now, in the concluding phase of the training year, the battalion's successes in fulfilling the pre-congress commitments are especially noticeable.

12567

CSO: 1801/26

ARMED FORCES

EXPLAINING UNDERUSE OF TRAINERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Sep 85 p 2

[Letter to editors from unit staff officer Gds Capt Yu. Vdovtsev, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "And the Trainers Stand Idle..."]

[Text] It is common knowledge that today's trainers not only allow a reduction in specialist training times, but also provide a perceptible economic effect. This is of course on one condition: if they are used actively.

We have many trainers. They are accommodated in bright, spacious, warm buildings. It is a pure pleasure to work here, but tankers, motorized riflemen and air defense personnel train rather rarely. Why?

The trainers often malfunction, primarily because they are used incorrectly and clumsily. For example, in order to adjust the TTV-155 film trainer intended for teaching driver-mechanics, we assemble everyone who understands mechanics and electronics to one extent or another, summon experts from the repair company and arrange "consultations." All this is because there is no specialist who has studied the trainer as a whole and has a detailed knowledge of it.

I recently had a chat with Gds Sr Lt A. Tkachuk, the non-T/O chief of one of the trainer complexes. We arrived at the conclusion that there has to be an authorized group of specialists in such a large garrison as ours and with the developed training facility which would work on servicing the trainer inventory and keeping it in constant readiness for action.

Here is one other aspect of the matter. Each year we receive new models of training equipment, but we have no instructors capable of quickly adjusting their operation and enlightening everyone as to class methodology. It possibly makes sense to teach this to cadets at some warrant officer [praporshchik] school.

In conclusion I also wish to say that we have an acute need for spare parts for the trainer complexes. The trainer manufacturing plants do not supply spare parts for them. When the warranty period is up, repair them as you can. Many trainers stand idle because of this. For example, our weapon training trainers and some others have not been operating for a considerable time now. In short, the problem of effective use of modern trainers bears a complex nature and has to be resolved comprehensively.

ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, RESPONSES

Defective Housing Construction

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Sept 85 p 2

[Letter and Commentary: "Again, Only Promises..."]

[Text] Dear editor: The time recently arrived for us to move into new housing. Instead of joy, however, it brought us nothing but bitter disappointment. The building, which was built by the military construction organization of which Lieutenant Colonel V. Astakhov is chief, was hardly fit to live in. It is surprising that the state commission accepted it: the barriers around the balconies are poorly attached, the walls in the apartments are unfinished, the electrical wiring is damaged, the windows are broken, the ventilation panes open against each other....

One would expect the military construction workers to correct the deficiencies in their work as rapidly as possible. The summer months are passing, however, and nothing is being accomplished. In addition, we are still without water--now there is no hot water, now no cold.

We have repeatedly appealed to Lieutenant Colonel Astakhov to take some kind of steps to speed up the elimination of the defects. Winter is not far away, after all, with its severe Siberian cold. He puts us off with empty promises, however, and responds to our indignation by telling us that we can appeal to whomever we like, but the complaint will still end up with him.

Help us obtain satisfaction against the negligent builders!

N. Putova, N. Bykanova, V. Kalinina and  
other residents (a total of 46 signatures)

From the editor: In April 1985 the USSR People's Control Committee inspected a number of construction organizations in the Siberian Military District. This included the one which constructed the building whose residents complained to the editor. The inspection showed that 12 of 70 apartments were absolutely unfit for occupancy. Lieutenant Colonel V. Astakhov, chief of the military construction organization, established a schedule for eliminating the deficiencies and assured us that everything would be finished by 19 April.

Judging from the letter to the editor, however, the builders are in no hurry to rectify their negligence. It appears that the district construction directorate has not taken effective steps to improve the quality of housing construction or to prepare it for winter in good time. We expect the command element and the political directorate of the Siberian Military District to respond properly to the published letter from our readers.

#### Survey of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Mail

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Sept 85 p 2

[Text] The editors received 8,662 letters in August 1985, 561 of which were published in the newspaper. There were 440 responses to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA articles.

In August, as in the preceeding months, we continued to receive letters in which the readers expressed their approval of the course worked out at the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee toward acceleration of the nation's social and economic development, and engaged in an interested and focused discussion of the purity of the leader's moral image, his demandingness of himself and his sense of responsibility for the assigned area of the work. Many of the letters contained thoughts about how important it is for the leader to measure up to the demands of the time and about what changes he could make to be more effective in the service, in the work and in his conduct. Captain N. Ustyakin of the Ural Military District, Lieutenant Colonel M. Pugachev of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and Captain 2nd Rank M. Tyagneryadnov of Leningrad, among others, wrote about this.

The readers have been reporting about the work underway in the units and on the ships to prepare for the 27th party congress and about the socialist competition in honor of the forum for communists.

Captain 3rd Rank I. Chilingarov reported from the Pacific Fleet, for example, that the ASW cruiser Novorossiysk recently returned from a long cruise and that its crew had begun an active campaign for effective use of the modern combat equipment. The words and deeds of the Novorossiysk personnel are one. While on the cruise, the seamen, ship-based airmen, missilemen, signalmen and other specialists took advantage of every mile of the cruise to train and improve techniques for making skillful use of the weapons and combat equipment. Captain Lieutenant Yu. Gerus, commander of the excellent electronics divizion, and Captain Lieutenant N. Ivanov, commander of the navigation subunit, are ahead in the competition. They have conserved training time, spare parts and supplies by making efficient use of the equipment.

Captain G. Mikalenov of the Turkestan Military District wrote to the editors to report that every point in the pre-congress socialist competition has been fulfilled. Personnel of the antiaircraft missile divizion commanded by Captain A. Kharitonov successfully conducted live firing exercises. The missilemen shot down a maneuvering target with radio-controlled altitude and course in a complex situation. They shot it down in the first attack, with one missile. Captain Yu. Dodulad, Major N. Korneyev and others wrote

about intensification of the training and indoctrination, the improvement of combat skills and enhancement of the field, air and naval training.

The mailbag for the last summer month contained numerous letters in which readers told about the selfless participation of army and navy fightingmen in the harvest. "Four years ago," Major S. Pozhidayev wrote from Nikolayev Oblast, "Captain N. Kuznetsov, commander of a motor vehicle subunit, died while saving a grain field from fire on the Gigant Sovkhoz. A memorial board was erected at the edge of the field in honor of the feat performed by the officer-and-communist. Since then the best teams of military drivers have stood labor watch there in his memory. This year the honor went to fightingmen of the motor vehicle company commanded by Major D. Makhnakov. They are honorably coping with the assigned job. The plan for hauling out the grain has been fulfilled by 160 percent, for example."

Major A. Goncharov of the North Caucasus Military District wrote about a courageous act performed during the harvest on the Put Lenina Kolkhoz in Rostov Oblast. He reported that Private A. Sudakov, a Komsomol member and one of the leaders in the socialist competition in the subunit commanded by Major Ye. Myndra, saved a combine which caught on fire in the night. The kolkhoz board rewarded him with a valuable gift.

Summer is not just a time of intense combat training and work. It is also a time of leaves. And the editors' mailbag has contained numerous letters in which the authors request that workers of sanatoria, vacation centers and tourist bases be thanked for precisely organizing the rest and treatment and for their sensitive and concerned handling of the patients. Unfortunately, there are also isolated cases of a different, negligent attitude of workers at these establishments toward the performance of their professional duty. Specifically, three complaints came from the Feodosiya Military Sanitarium. The editors sent them to the Central Military Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense to be reviewed and for action to be taken.

#### Action Taken Against Officers

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sept 85 p 2

[Follow up on KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article: "Arrogance"]

[Text] The above was the title of a critical report from Captain 3rd Rank A. Tkachev, which was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 20 July 1985.

Captain 1st Rank A. Kulik reported to the editors that the article has been carefully studied at headquarters and in the unit political section, that the criticism contained in it was found to be valid. The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article was discussed at a meeting of officers on the vessel and was the subject of earnest discussion at assemblies of unit commanders and political workers. Captain 3rd Rank N. Sivushkin, deputy commander for political affairs, has been discharged into the reserve; the assignment of Captain 3rd Rank Yu. Lagno, first mate, to a post involving less work is being considered; and Captain Lieutenant A. Larin's name has been placed onto a list for transfer to a different station.

### Complaints Voiced, Some Improvements Cited

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sept 85 p 2

[Responses to the article by Gds Col I. Denisov, commander of the Guards Tank Kantemir Division imeni Yu.V. Andropov, (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 August) under the rubric "The Newspaper Has Spoken Out--The Reader Continues the Critique": "Conserve in Matters Large and Small"]

[Text] A Thrifty Approach

Captain V. Strupovets, chief of the fuel and lubricants service, presented a report at one of the service conferences at the beginning of the training year.

"Excessive gasoline consumption continues to grow in our unit," he said. "It now amounts to dozens of tons. This is enough for our motor vehicle specialists to service a flight shift for an air regiment...."

It is clear that steps must be taken immediately. Exactly what steps, however?

"Let us work out and apply a number of rationalization improvements," someone boldly proposed.

"In my opinion," Captain S. Maksimov, secretary of the party organization, said, "this is just another excuse for doing nothing. We simply need to establish order in the battalion management. We need to demand that every specialist fulfill his duties conscientiously."

Most of the officers and warrant officers supported Maksimov. There were also those who continued to work in a slipshod manner after the conference, however. Major V. Mukha, chief of the motor vehicle service, for example, did little to see that the motor vehicles were repaired promptly or serviced well. Furthermore, he knew that there was a squandering of scarce parts and fuel, but he closed his eyes to this. The men watched their chief and conducted themselves in the same manner. Steps were taken, although belatedly, and Major Mukha was relieved of his position.

Senior Lieutenant A. Gorelov, newly appointed chief of the motor vehicle service, set about the job with enthusiasm. He began by strengthening discipline.

We know that the vehicle repair specialists are the first assistants to the chief of a motor vehicle service. The combat readiness of the motor vehicle equipment, conservation and the service life of the engines depend in great part upon the quality of their work. Senior Lieutenant A. Starikov provided the chief of the motor vehicle service with specific assistance.

Demonstrating efficiency and enterprise, the young chief repaired the building and machine tools and replenished the equipment with the assistance of



Warrant Officer E. Shmyrev and other specialists. When the equipment went to the work area, the fightingmen gave special attention to the motor vehicle engines. When an engine leaves the repair shop now, it requires the minimal amount of fuel.

Senior Lieutenant Gorelov once placed a sheet of paper with columns of figures on my desk. These were calculations for reducing the consumption of motor-hours on the special vehicles per hour of aircraft flight time.

"We are now bettering the standard by almost 1.5-fold," Gorelov said. He proposed setting up a unit at the airfield for the centralized start-up of the aircraft. He also proposed replacing the fuel tankers with stationary columns. This was not a new idea, but we were not actually using it.

One had the feeling that the officer's proposals were carefully thought out and substantiated. The airmen had more than a single day's work to do at the airfield. The end result surpassed our expectations. When we summed up the actual conservation of fuel and lubricants, we saw that we had saved more than 70 tons of gasoline alone during the summer combat training. And this was accomplished entirely by improving organization and establishing order in the various unit services. And how many unutilized reserves still exist! One of them lies in vitalizing the work of the party and Komsomol organizations. Strict demandingness based on principle of everyone guilty of mismanagement and negligence, everyone who violates discipline, will permit us to resolve problems of conservation more effectively.

Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Turovtsev,  
commander of a separate airfield  
technical support battalion, Red  
Banner Turkestan Military District

### The Price of One Drill

This is what made me decide to write. Each year in our commitments we indicate precise figures for conserving electric energy, fuel and lubricants. As a rule, however, we determine by visual estimate how they are fulfilled, guided by last year's results. Even less frequently do we ask ourselves, for example, what can an ordinary drill produce with respect to conservation.

I once observed an exercise conducted by Senior Lieutenant V. Rychnev, a crew chief. I can frankly say that he was very generous in the use of training time for explaining material which the fightingmen were perfectly capable of grasping on their own. And there was absolutely no point in having radar equipment operating at full power but not being used.

How much time do such minutes add up to for a battalion in a day, a week, a month, a year.... Good methodological training, it appears, also has something to do with conservation and thrift.

A battery uses up more than a single kilowatt-hour of electric energy during 1 hour of drill. I am not even considering the wear on expensive parts,

assemblies and units. And how much does this cost the state for all the Armed Forces? It is obviously a considerable amount. The tons and kilowatts are made up of the grams and watts saved by each of us. We should always bear this in mind.

After observing the drill conducted by Senior Lieutenant Rychnev, we members of the people's control post held our meeting together with the battalion's command element. We made estimates as to where and in what exercises specifically we could save on the consumption of materiel. We found that there are considerable reserves. Captain V. Buryan, a deputy battery commander, for example, has long taught the fightingmen practical skills with the equipment turned off in drills where this is justified. During the tracking of and simulated firing at targets, the equipment is used at full power only after the targets have completed the free-flight phase.

Unfortunately, we are still developing thrift and conservation in the personnel on an occasional basis. This matter of state importance should be put onto a planned basis. And it is not just the commanders and political workers who should engage in it, but also the party and Komsomol activists, the entire army community. I believe that it would be worthwhile to include classes on conservation in company management and on material support for the drills in the training plans. Every individual should know the cost of a drill or exercise.

Captain Ye. Dolotov

#### Concussions Were Not Drawn

The barracks and heat lines were poorly prepared for winter in garrison "X" last year. This resulted in a significant overconsumption of coal in the battalion commanded by Major O. Mendelevich and the battery commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Dudchik.

Recently, we members of a people's control committee in the Northern Group of Forces checked to see how preparations were being made for the coming winter in that same garrison. It turned out that they had not learned a lesson from the past there. Once again, the biggest deficiencies were in the subunits commanded by Officers Mendelevich and Dudchik. The means allocated for preparing for the winter were not fully utilized. Will this not result in the overconsumption of fuel and electric energy during the cold season?

Major O. Belomestnov

#### Concerns for Every Day

I recently had a discussion with Private A. Lapin. This was the reason: it was still not nearly time for his boots to be replaced, but the soldier's boots were a sad sight, to put it mildly. I asked him why.

"I got some bad ones." I could not restrain myself:

"Could it be that you haven't taken care of them"?

I am telling about this incident for a reason. From time to time one encounters among the young colleagues individuals with no concern for the state ruble. I believe that this is a result of inadequate indoctrination on the way to the army formation. Speaking self-critically, however, we Komsomol members also sometimes do not do enough with respect to conservation and thrift. To erect reliable barriers to the slightest losses, to teach every young fightingmen to value and conserve the people's money--this is a pressing demand of the time, and half-measures are not enough.

Captain K. Panshev, subunit political worker, helps us to organize the work with advice and action. We persistently teach the youth to be thrifty. We keep careful Komsomol account of conservation, for example, in which all of the results are clearly visible. When young replenishments arrive, we talk with them about the quantity of resources allocated for organizing a smooth-running combat and political training process. This subject is being discussed with increasing urgency at Komsomol meetings.

Private 1st Class V. Kantaravichus,  
member of the Komsomol committee

#### Officer Shuffled From Position to Position

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sept 85 p 2

[Letter to editor from Lt A. Sonko and commentary: "Leap-Frog With Appointments, or Why the Incredible Thing Which Happened to a Reserve Officer Drafted Into a Military Construction Unit for 2 Years?"]

[Text] Respected editor: I completed the Construction Technology School at the Dnepropetrovsk Construction Engineering Institute in 1984 and was immediately drafted into a military construction unit for a 2-year service term.

I arrived at Severomorsk on 9 August 1984, where I received orders in the personnel section of the Northern Fleet's Construction Directorate to proceed to the UNR [work supervisor's section] directed at that time by Lieutenant Colonel A. Leontev (Major A. Andreyev has been chief since April 1985). I was sent from there to the detachment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Rodygin. It turned out that there were no vacancies there. I went back to the fleet construction directorate. I was told in the personnel section: "Your commander is not being frank. The position of deputy commander of the second company will soon be vacant." I returned to the detachment and was placed on the unit roster as of 10 August by order of the commander. Lieutenant Colonel Rodygin explained that I would not have any official duties for 2 months but would receive full pay and allowances.

I was appointed deputy company commander on 1 September, but I performed the duties of assistant chief of staff until mid-October. I then began performing my direct duties, but before a month had passed I was sent on a temporary

duty assignment as head of a team of construction workers. I returned on 16 December and learned to my surprise that I was being made assistant chief of staff again.

Immediately after New Year's Day I was again serving as deputy commander of a company, but a different one. In the middle of February the detachment received a telephoned message from the fleet's Political Directorate, which reported that I was being appointed foreman. Once again, I lost my position as deputy company commander and became... assistant chief of staff.

At the end of February I was sent to Severomorsk to an assembly for two-year officers. I studied for an entire month, gaining theoretical and practical skills, without any knowledge of the fact that I had been taken off the detachment roster as of 5 March. On 1 April (and quite seriously) I was informed that I would not be paid TDY pay for the assembly, since I was listed in the documents as a foreman. I was told to go to the work supervisor's section. I was not told what I would be doing, what position I would hold. In order to give me at least something to do during my workday, the detachment commander gave me an assignment to carry out several administrative investigations.

Right now I do not even have that work to do. Furthermore, an audit revealed that I was improperly paid for the first 2 months of service because the papers were not filled out properly. I had to return 300 rubles to the finance office. It is annoying, of course, that someone bungled things, and I have to pay. I could live with that, of course. What is disappointing and hard to take is the fact that my knowledge and my desire to serve and work conscientiously were actually in vain. I have the impression that they simply do not know how to get rid of me here. During an entire year of service, after all, I have not had any real opportunity to prove myself on the job because of the leap-frogging in positions.

From the editors: When we received this letter, we have to admit, we did not believe at first that such a thing was possible. We contacted Lieutenant Colonel R. Lutsak, chief of the personnel section of the Northern Fleet's Construction Directorate, by phone and acquainted him with Lieutenant A. Sonko's letter. Roman Vasilyevich told us that the facts cited in the letter were perfectly authentic. Furthermore, he said that A. Sonko was not the only one in that situation.

We hope that the command element and the Political Directorate of the Northern Fleet will give proper attention to such abnormal handling of the introduction of officers drafted from the reserve into the formation.

Son Becomes New Man in Army

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 85 p 2

[Letter to editor: "Thanks for my son!"]

[Text] Dear editors, greetings! This is a soldier's mother writing to you.

When parents see their children off into the army, they believe in their children, count on them. Painful though it is, however, I have to admit that I did not believe in my son. I had nothing to hope for. He had caused us too much trouble during the last few years before entering the army....

His first months of service in a military construction detachment were anxious ones for us, months filled with oppressive anticipation. A year passed in this manner. And then, absolutely unexpectedly, we received a letter cordially thanking us, the parents, for the upbringing of our son, a worthy defender of our homeland....

I do not believe it is we who should be thanked. The credit goes to our son's commanders and his comrades in the service for the fact that he served in a worthy manner, became a section commander, joined the Komsomol and was elected a member of the Komsomol bureau.

Sergey has now returned home. One would not recognize him. He has grown up and matured, become independent. I believe that a new life has begun for him.

A. Pavlova,  
Gorodishche, Volgograd Oblast

#### Officers Punished for Misconduct

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sept 85 p 2

[Text] "In the Role of 'Supplier'"

The above was the title of a report published in the newspaper on 24 July of this year. It criticized the conduct of Major V. Nesterov, who had disgraced the title of officer, and revealed instances of unjustified appointment of the individual to new positions.

The editors received a response from the superior political organ, which states that the newspaper article was accepted as correct and timely. The article was discussed at conferences of leading personnel and in the political organs. Major V. Nesterov was demoted one level in military rank and expelled from the CPSU for drunkenness and negligence in the service. Lieutenant Colonel V. Khmyz was relieved of his position and appointed to a lower position in a different unit for serious deficiencies in his work.

#### Officer Improperly Arrested

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Sept 85 p 2

[Letter from Sn Lt A. Rybitskiy, Red Banner Belorussian Military District:  
"An Incident at the Guardhouse"]

[Text] I was standing guard duty at the unit guardhouse that day with the personnel of a platoon. When I was asked to accept one of the officers to

be held in the guardhouse, I was in a difficult situation. The officer had been brought to me without an arrest report. There was no temporary detention room at the guardhouse. Furthermore, individuals violating military discipline in an intoxicated state are held temporarily. But the officer was sober. In short, I refused to place the arrested into a cell in accordance with Article 156 of the Garrison and Guard Duty Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

The unit commander saw this as a gross violation of the regulations governing guard duty. He removed me from the detail and placed me under arrest for 5 days in the guardhouse. I would point out that his service position did not give him the authority to arrest officers for such a period. But even this was not the problem.

I did not go to the guardhouse on my own, as prescribed by the regulations, but was accompanied by the subunit commander. I found myself in a locked cell there, guarded by sentries, again in violation of the regulations. Incidentally, these were my own subordinates.

Ours is not a garrison but a unit guardhouse, and it is not equipped for holding arrested officers. More than once I encountered arrested soldiers whom I had previously watched over as a member of the guard, and listened to their expressions of "sympathy."

I was freed under amnesty, as someone put it: because it was my birthday.

I have analyzed what happened over and over again. It is possible that I was wrong when I hesitated to accept the arrested officer. I do not rule out the possibility that I deserved such a harsh penalty as being arrested. Someone should have been with me, an officer, however, talked to me on the subject and explained what I had done wrong. And is it acceptable to treat the precise and unequivocal requirements contained in the regulations with the kind of disregard demonstrated in this case?

I have had many failures in the service, even though I graduated from the school with distinction. I will honestly say that I am not one of the exemplary officers. My problems stem not from a personal lack of discipline, however, but are due to deficiencies in the indoctrinational work performed with the personnel. I was recently starting to make progress. And then this incident....

From the editors: The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA mailbag has contained other letters about certain commanders and chiefs who apply the regulations as they see fit.

We hope that the senior chiefs will assess the incident reported by Senior Lieutenant A. Rybitskiy from a standpoint of principle.

## Physical Training Achievements Exaggerated

JPRS-UMA-85-066  
10 December 1985

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Sept 85 p 2

[Text] "For the Sake of Good Intentions..."

The above was the title of a report from Lieutenant Colonel A. Kudryavtsev published in our newspaper on 22 May 1985. Guards Major Bilyk, political worker, reported to the editors that the things reported in the report actually occurred. Lieutenant S. Latanyuk, a platoon commander, attempted to "improve" the platoon's physical training performance by falsifying documents. The unit command assessed the officer's dishonest actions from a standpoint of principle. S. Latanyuk was issued a stern reprimand. The battalion party organization issued a reprimand to Communist Latanyuk. Demonstration classes in physical training were organized and conducted for the platoon commanders. Officers in the unit directorate have begun monitoring the classes conducted by recently graduated officers. An enlarged meeting of the party committee was held to discuss the commanders' and methodological training of the officers.

## Bickering Deprives Servicemen of Heat

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Sept 85 p 2

[Article by Col A. Andryushkov and Maj S. Kalinayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents: "Coolness Toward Heat: What Lies Behind the Official Replies; Instead of Taking Steps--Bureaucratic Wrangling"]

[Text] The 20 February 1985 issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA contained a critical report titled "Cold Indifference." It was about a bad situation with respect to the heating of officer housing in air regiment "X" of the Air Defense Forces. The editors soon received an official reply from Major General N. Vetelkin, deputy commander for construction and billeting of the Leningrad Military District. Among other things, it stated that Major A. Yelizarov, chief of the regional KECh [billeting unit], had compiled a specific plan for repairing the central heat boiler system and laying in a 3-month supply of coal, that the garrison would be provided with assistance in the form(!) of engineering and technical personnel, the allocation of additional transportation.... In conclusion, this official reply reported: "The performance of the work at the air garrison is being monitored by the district KEU [billeting directorate]."

The editors took similar action--that is, they began checking on the newspaper article and this official reply to it. At that time, when fall had officially begun, we contacted the airmen by telephone. We asked what had changed. Lieutenant Colonel A. Markin, deputy regimental commander, replied:

"Nothing...."

This sad "nothing," particularly at the threshold of winter, is what forced us to make something like an unannounced inspection by telephone. It was

because the newspaper article brought responses in which the readers reported that it was cold in the apartments at their military posts. We brought these reports to the attention of those in charge in the hope that steps would be taken.

One of the letters was from the Central Asian Military District. It stated that all of the pipes in the heating system burst in one of the garrisons last winter. It stated that there was no hope of any changes by next winter. Unfortunately, such changes do not depend even upon the garrison KECh, which is headed by Major A. Miroshnichenko. He told us when we met that Colonel N. Belyanskiy, chief of the district KEU, practically refuses to provide any help at all.

Another letter came from the Baltic Military District: "We read your article 'Cold Indifference,' and we had the feeling that it was written about our post. We have lived under the same sort of conditions for 7 years now. We have written and appealed to so many different places! We get only formal replies. We now have a whole collection of them...."

An impressive file of formal responses with respect to this problem has also accumulated in the editorial office. The official documents in this "collection" were signed by Colonel O. Guzhov, Colonel N. Laguteyev and other officials. We do not believe that there is any point in citing all of the replies. We absolutely must quote one sentence from a document addressed to the residents of this military post and signed by Major General Aviation R. Yakhin, however: "At the present time it is impossible to go into the information presented by you in detail...." The "present time" mentioned in the document is officially recorded as 6 March 1984. The seasons have changed more than once since then. Judging from the letters which continue to arrive in the editorial office from that garrison, however, they have still not managed to "go into" the situation "in detail."

Armed with all of these facts, we telephoned Colonel O. Guzhov, chief of the KEU of the Baltic Military District:

"On 13 February of this year you assured residents of the air garrison that the situation with respect to utilities and services would be corrected during the summer. What is the situation today?"

"A qualified commission will be leaving for there any day now (it would be interesting to know how many this makes). A plan(!) will be compiled for eliminating the shortcomings. We shall report it to the district military council and then...."

There is no point in tiring the reader with more of Colonel Guzhov's explanations. We can only assume that the coming winter will once again be a difficult one for the residents on the military post.

But perhaps a different approach was taken to matters pertaining to living conditions for servicemen living in the Central Asian Military District? We contacted Colonel N. Belyanskiy. This was his answer:



"Major Miroshnichenko, chief of the regional KECh, is in a difficult situation. We would be glad to help him as much as we can, but we do not have the necessary materials and equipment in the district."

"Who is to blame for that"?

"Our repeated orders to the GlavKEU [Main Billeting Directorate] for low-pressure boilers, pipe of various sizes and other funded and scarce materials have not been filled. We are trying with the personnel and possibilities we have to get out of this situation, to do something...."

At our request, Colonel Belyanskiy was more specific about the "something." Quite recently, for example, the district KEU allocated a certain amount for hooking up the heat system on the garrison where Major Miroshnichenko serves to the city's central heat and power plant. It would be difficult to say when this will be accomplished, however....

And now let us return to the garrison discussed in the report "Cold Indifference." More precisely, not to the garrison--we already know that nothing has changed there--but to the KEU of the Leningrad Military District.

"Yuriy Vasilyevich," we asked Colonel Andreyev, deputy chief of the KEU, "what has been done at the garrison since the newspaper article came out"?

"We have been allocated materials and money to make routine repairs on the boiler room and the heat line at the air garrison. We are surprised at the attitude taken by those commanders and chiefs to whom the unit is directly subordinate, however. They have truly demonstrated absolute indifference!"

We asked Lieutenant General M. Bobkov, Deputy Commander in Chief for Rear Services of the Air Defense Forces and Chief of Rear Services for the Air Defense Forces, to explain the situation. This is what we were told:

"Major General Vetelkin, Deputy Commander for Billeting of the Leningrad Military District, pays no attention to our needs. This is the kind of 'assistance' they gave us: they shut down coal depots in the area. An extremely serious situation has developed in some of the garrisons!"

"We were forced to do this," Colonel Andreyev said, defending the honor of his tunic. He explained that the former chief of the garrison on whose territory the fuel depots were located had taken no steps to build-up fuel stocks and that the district had had to pay large fines for demurrage of the transport equipment....

"All the same, there is still no way to explain this action!" Lieutenant General M. Bobkov said.

That is probably true. But that is not the point. Will the heated dispute between officials of the two departments make it any warmer?

It is fall. There is still some time left before winter, but very little. Perhaps there is enough, however, for the cool attitude toward the heat (which means also toward the people) to be replaced with a warmer one. Perhaps command and the political organs of these districts will put an end to the empty promises and the bureaucratic wrangling.

### Fuel Wasted, Disappears

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Sept 85 p 2

[Letter from Capt M. Lisovskiy, specialist 1st class: "It is a Matter of a Barrel: A Letter to the Editors Against Mismanagement and Wastefulness"]

[Text] We airmen have many possibilities for conserving fuel and lubricants. One of them, as an example, is to plan the flight shift so that the engines on the missile-carriers operate a minimal amount of time on the ground. Another is to make more efficient use of the pilot's comprehensive simulator. A 'flight' in the cockpit of a simulator makes it possible to save tons of fuel.

But these are large-scale possibilities, so to speak. There are also "small forms" of conservation. Frequently, however, the attitude toward them is one of disdain.

Take the following situation: kerosene constantly drips from the aircraft's fuel lines. This is called for by the design of many aircraft. From 3 to 5 liters are collected each day in special containers beneath each aircraft.

This would appear to be a trifle compared to the amount of fuel poured into the tanks for just one flight. In a week, however, counting the flight shifts, when the aircraft is not in a shelter, 16-20 liters run out. This is 65-80 in a month. Up to a ton for each aircraft or helicopter in a year. And for the entire regiment? For a district, a group of forces? An ocean of kerosene!

In accordance with regulations, the leaking fuel, which is referred to as "skim," is collected and poured into containers located on the flight line. It then goes into settling tanks. The fuel loses some of its quality in the process of collecting it, of course. However, it is still perfectly suitable for fueling heaters which operate on the ground.

Everyone has known about what I have said for a long time, and everyone approves. What sometimes actually happens, though? Many aircraft technicians do not pour the "skim" into the special containers. They cannot be accused of being lazy. There are simply not enough barrels for collecting the fuel in the aircraft dispersal areas. There are only two for a squadron.

Captain V. Lyubchak, chief of the fuel and lubricants service in the separate airfield maintenance battalion, is little concerned about this. He calmly watches the kerosene flow from the aircraft into carts on the side. They are heavy and can be moved easily over the concrete on the airfield, but it is

very difficult to move them over the ground to the sites where the barrels are located. And so some of the specialists pour the kerosene onto the ground near the shelters.

Some people in the regiment still try to avoid wasting the expensive liters, however. The barrels fill up, albeit slowly. A vehicle drives up to them from time to time and pumps out the kerosene into a tank. It is practically impossible to learn what becomes of it after that, however. No one anywhere keeps a record of how much fuel has been collected or where it goes.

#### Physical Training Deficiencies

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Sept 85 p 2

[Responses to Col O. Vikhrev's article in the 3 August 1985 issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, under the rubric "The Newspaper Has Spoken Out--The Reader Continues the Critique"]

[Text] Both Stand Fast and Win

I am well acquainted with everything the author of the article wrote about. At one time I myself had to elaborately paint both the "fence" and other parts of the obstacle course on an athletic field. Even then, all of that decoration which no one needed evoked protest in my heart. I did not understand until I was fulfilling my international duty in Afghanistan, however, that we sometimes spend too much energy, time and effort on secondary matters. The main thing, preparing the fightingman to perform in actual combat, is sometimes lost sight of, and in some places it takes a back seat entirely.

During a given period the commander of the reconnaissance company had to struggle to bring the soldiers' physical conditioning up to the required level, to correct someone's deficiencies and omissions. We trained subordinates and learned at the same time, finding the most effective ways and means in the specific conditions of Afghanistan. We did not have model athletic grounds, but we had real canyons, mountains, obstructions and areas of terrain broken up by explosions.

These became the sites for exercises for the physical and psychological conditioning of the fightingmen. And the soldiers did not grumble about the commanders when we led them at rapid march into the mountains not along a trodden path but far away from it, not through a canyon but over cliffs.... We all became convinced very rapidly that this was how we needed to train in order not just to stand fast in an encounter with the dushmans, but absolutely to win.

Major V. Libar, student at the Military  
Academy imeni M.V. Frunze

Prepare Skilled Fightingmen

Unfortunately, even some of the officers in our formation are of the opinion that rapid marches of many miles, militarized cross-country running, rushing

and crawling, and the ability to fight one to one in ruins and trenches are a thing of the past, as the article states. Strength, endurance and adroitness, they say, are not so essential to the soldier in this age of electronics. This opinion is a result either of an erroneous, oversimplified concept of modern combat or the absence of such a concept altogether. And the combat training experience has completely refuted such views. The following is just one example.

The tank company commanded by Guards Captain Yu. Tsurkan was recently assigned the mission of taking up a defense and preventing infantry and tanks from breaking through. The tankmen had barely begun the engineer equipment of the strongpoint, however, when they were attacked by an "enemy" sabotage group. A skirmish broke out right at the position. The outcome was determined not by the tank weapons or even the small arms, but by skill in hand-to-hand combat. And so Guards Captain Tsurkan's men proved themselves to be skilled fighters and emerged the victors.

A tankmen, a motorized rifleman, a missileman, even a cook absolutely must have good physical conditioning and applied skills. Take this situation, for example: hot food has to be delivered to trenches at the forward edge, but the "enemy" is covering the open area with fire. It can only be done by crawling. And at the commander's order, soldiers carrying thermoses move forward in a leopard crawl. One of them flags and cannot move for several minutes. The other, trained in crawling with a load, delivers the food to his comrades.

And there will be far more rigorous tests in combat. Shells will be exploding and bullets whistling over. So can there be any doubt that the tankmen, the missilemen, the signalmen and any other specialists need to know how to use weapons and engage in hand-to-hand combat? Be able to run 10-15 kilometers with full field gear and to crawl as far as necessary?

I believe that the overly simple approach of certain officers to the physical training is encouraged in great part by the fact that the athletic centers and the obstacles in their subunits are mainly for show. The freshly painted equipment shines, because no one works out on it. The athletic grounds are trimmed and pampered in order to show them off to inspectors: this is how things are here.... And there are inspectors for whom ostentation is most important. And if the obstacle course is functional, if people train there everyday and it is naturally not too attractive, they consider this bad.

The same is true of the sizes of the obstacles and the materials of which they are made. God forbid that there should be even the slightest deviation from the standard. The parts of the obstacle course remain unchanged for years, and any sort of creativity, any improvement is considered "unprofessional." Naturally, with all the consequences....

Guards Major A. Bolonov, formation chief  
of physical training and sports

## The Standards Should Beckon Us Forward

I served more than 27 years in the Soviet Army, and almost all of those years were spent as chief of physical training and sports in a regiment and a division and at a school. I continue to work in a military organization. I would like to point out that recently the mastery of the Military Sports Complex and Military Sports Rating standards have been substituted for physical training as a training discipline promoting combat readiness. This year, for example, the level of physical training of the personnel was rated from an inspection of the sports work. What results, one asks, can be provided by exercises and inspections on a unified obstacle course, when the fightingmen negotiate it carrying light gear? We hardly need rated sportsmen in this applied military exercise (and a large number of others) if the skills acquired in them have no application in actual combat.

In my opinion, the author of the article should have carried his discussion further and brought up the easily attainable, simplified standards for the Military Sports Rating, which the fightingmen can meet without even trying. The soldier who cannot stay afloat in the water, for example, can become rated in applied swimming within 6 months--with weapons and in uniform--and the young man who has lived in hot Ashkhabad prior to entering the army and has never laid eyes on snow can meet the skiing standards in the same amount of time.... And so we have entire companies of first-class sportsmen. And this, in my opinion, not only does not benefit our cause but is even harmful because it causes the physical training exercises not to be taken seriously.

Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) B. Ivanov

### Excerpts From Letters

The level of physical conditioning of the fightingmen cannot be defined just in terms of meters, seconds or numbers of exercises performed to demonstrate strength. In my opinion, after the fightingmen have achieved a certain level, we should then begin evaluating group actions in a situation approaching actual combat.

Colonel (Reserve) F. Bazarnyy

We should consider not just the extreme factors in combat, but also environmental conditions. In the polar regions this would include overcoming obstacles and executing marches in freezing weather and gale-force winds and 24-hour darkness; in the mountains it would involve moving through deep snow, firn and ice fields, crossing glaciers, turbulent streams and rocky areas where there is an oxygen deficiency....

Colonel Yu. Podryadchikov, candidate of technical sciences

I suggest that we discuss the physical conditioning of the predraft and draft-age youth. I say with complete responsibility that we do not have nor

can we have 100-percent meeting of the GTO [ready for work and defense] standards in most of the secondary schools.

K. Davydov, military instructor at  
Secondary School No. 521 in Moscow

Draft Notice Problem

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Sept 85 p 2

[Text] "And the Notifications Go Out..."

The editors received two responses to the letter from our reader S. Ivanovskaya, which was published with the above title on 4 August. Lieutenant General P. Gusev, chief of staff of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District, responded. He stated that the case of repeated draft notices being sent to O. Ivanovskiy, who registered as a cadet at the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni Marshall of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev, had actually occurred. Workers in the Leninskiy Rayon Military Commissariat in the city of Lvov who were negligent in keeping records have been severely punished.

Major General Yu. Shirokikh, Lvov Oblast Military Commissar, reported to the editors that the newspaper article has been studied by all workers in the oblast military commissariates and discussed in the primary party organizations. Officers with the political sections and other sections of the oblast military commissariat and people's control groups are presently making an inspection of the keeping of draft records in all the oblast military commissariates.

Only one question remains to be answered: Why was a copy of the order under which O. Ivanovskiy was registered at the school not sent to the military commissariat in good time. We await the answer from Alma-Ata.

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CSO: 1801/22

## GROUND FORCES

### RPO, RPO-A FLAMETHROWERS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 85 pp 12-13

[Article by retired Colonel M. Prokhorov in the "For The Young Soldier -- Information About Military Equipment" section: "The Rocket-Propelled Infantry Flamethrower"]

[Text] Portable and static flamethrowers found extensive use along with other types of weapons on Great Patriotic War battlefields. They assisted in knocking military equipment out of action, neutralizing bunkers and pill-boxes and destroying other enemy fortifications.

Flamethrower operators were most effective in cities and large populated areas. They proved to be daring and brave soldiers in skirmishes with the enemy. On 1 December 1941 for example, the independent static flamethrower company commanded by Lieutenant M. Sobetskiy was located in the village of Akulovo on the Naro-Fominsk to Kubinka highway (near Moscow). Using salvo fire tactics, the company repelled an attack by enemy tank supported by armored infantry. The company was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for this battle and 17 soldiers received state awards. Many flamethrower units received awards during the Soviet offensive and took on the honored names of cities for which they fought.

Of course the flow-stream type portable, static and tank flamethrowers that were used during the war had a number of deficiencies that limited their use. The primary deficiency was the limited range that the fire could be thrown. This range was 25-30 meters for portable flamethrowers and 80 meters for static flamethrowers. In addition, the bulk of the burning mixture never reached the target, but instead burned up on the flight path.

Modern flamethrowers are very effective weapons, able to resolve the more serious combat missions. The need to equip forces with them is dictated by their operational features. For example, as a rule it is difficult to use artillery and aviation to attack along forward positions in a close battle because our own forces may be destroyed by the rounds and bombs. It is safe to fire flamethrowers in all situations and they are as effective as a 120-mm bomb or a 122-mm round. Soldiers and officers have good reason to call the flamethrower the "soldier's artillery".

While improving our weapons during the post-war period, Soviet designers developed stream-cannister and cannister action flamethrowers and, for example, the RPO and RPO-A have turned out well. The combat characteristics of the burning mixture in these weapons have been improved, as have their technical capabilities. For example, the burning mixture in the RPO ignites at the initial stage of the flight path, but its burning pieces are scattered only when the mixture hits the target. The burning mixture in the RPO-A ignites and scatters only when it hits the target. This is triggered by the igniting and exploding charge located at the center of the casing. Contemporary flamethrowers are more compact and suited for transportation and employment.

The rocket-propelled infantry flamethrower (RPO) is designed to destroy enemy personnel located in fortified firing positions, structures, installations and vehicles. It is also used to start fires in all types of objectives and terrain. All of this weapon's characteristics significantly exceed those of its predecessors from the Great Patriotic War period. For example, it can throw flames to a maximum range of 400 meters and has a maximum effective range of 190 meters. It fires one round per minute and both the time to convert it from traveling position to firing position and to recharge it are less than one minute.

The RPO (see diagram) consists of a launcher and a flame-thrower round. The weapon is of simple construction. It has a tube, firing mechanism, sight clamp, sling clamp, bipod and sling. The weapon weighs 3.5 kilograms and has a 100-round tube life.

The flamethrower round is designed to destroy a target and consists of a container, a cannister with the burning mixture, a propulsion unit, a casing and elements that make up the pack. The round has a volume of four liters and is designed to be used once.


Squeezing the trigger creates an electrical current in the generator which triggers the propulsion unit. Part of the propellant gas goes into the container and accelerates the cannister. At the same time it kindles the igniter which in turn ignites the burning mixture. The cannister then carries the burning mixture toward the target.

When it hits the target, the body of the cannister is destroyed. Burning fragments of the burning mixture are scattered up to 30-40 meters in the direction of the shot and the spray width reaches three to four meters.

For ease of carrying, the two rounds and launcher that make up an RPO set are combined into a pack which weighs 22 kilograms. The flamethrower in firing configuration is 1440 mm long.


The RPO-A rocket-propelled infantry flamethrower is a further improved variation of this weapon. It is used to destroy all types of enemy fortifications, knock lightly armored and vehicular equipment out of action and of course defeat personnel.






RPO

1 - Front sight; 2 - launcher; 3 - rear sight leaf; 4 - flamethrower round; 5 - firing mechanism; 6 - bipod; 7 - casing; 8 - guide; 9 - propulsion motor.




Firing Schematic

1 - trigger; 2 - generator; 3 - membrane; 4 - igniter; 5 - cannister; 6 - propulsion motor; 7 - tube.



RPO-A

1 - container; 2 - lever; 3 - sling; 4 - optical sight; 5 - front sight; 6 - front grip; 7 - firing mechanism; 8 - motor; 9 - support sleeve; 10 - guide.



The RPO-A (see diagram) is significantly different from the RPO in construction, overall dimensions and combat characteristics. First of all, it is designed for one-time use. Its length has been reduced and is now 920 mm. The weight of the burning mixture in the RPO-A is slightly over half of that in the RPO, but this does not reduce the weapon's effectiveness. On the contrary, thanks to the improved burning mixture quality and an altered effect principle, flamethrower combat characteristics have been improved. For example RPO-A accuracy and range are two to three times that of the RPO. Also the entire burning mixture reaches the target. The time for converting it from travel to firing configuration has been reduced and is now 30 seconds. The flamethrower weighs 11 kilograms and the entire pack weighs 22 kilograms.

An RPO-A is prepared for firing by assuming the necessary position, mounting the forward grip in the firing position and cocking the firing mechanism. It is possible to fire the flamethrower either as an independent unit or from the pack. After it is fired, the expended container is discarded.

One significant feature of contemporary RPO and RPO-A jet-propelled infantry flamethrowers is that they can be used by more than just specially trained flamethrower operators. Any soldier can fire them after only brief training. Flamethrowers are reliable in battle and are quickly put into firing configuration. This is a powerful weapon for close-in battle, one that is able to effectively carry out combat missions both in offensive and defensive operations.

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CSO: 1801/28

GROUND FORCES

MAJOR GENERAL TISHCHENKO ON TANK NIGHT-FIRE TRAINING

MOSCOW ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 85 pp 8-9

/Article by Maj Gen V. Tishchenko, "Tank Fire: Deficiencies and Problems"

/Text/ Missing the target when using the night sight

Six crews participated simultaneously in a check firing exercise at night. Some of them shot better than others. Their common shortcoming was the inability to use the night vision instruments effectively. And while firing at an illuminated target using the daytime sight went well for the majority of tankers, they often missed the target when firing the machine gun using the night sight.

The range officer continually reminded each shift: "Do not forget to keep track of the engine speed and correct the fire when shooting." And although the officer talked about things that the crew members should have down pat, errors occurred again. For this reason the tank commanders, Sergeant A. Garbuzov and Junior Sergeants V. Zakshevskiy and V. Kovalchuk, and the gunners, Privates V. Grin and A. Zakatov, received low marks. Some of the tank drivers also proved disappointing. Because of poor skills in driving combat vehicles several of the crews exceeded the total time for firing provided in the conditions for the exercise.

Similar mistakes were repeated at the battalion tactical exercise with combat firing at night. Again poor skills in the use of night instruments by the soldiers were revealed. This was manifested in the inability to control fire and movement, in the loss of orientation and in the fact that several targets designated by the infra-red searchlight simulators remained undamaged. To sum up briefly the reasons for all the shortcomings cited--they are oversimplification and indulgence in the training process.

Let us try to analyze the deficiencies in the firing training of the tankers of the 9th unit of the Red Banner Odessa Military District and investigate the problems of teaching night firing.

## Conditions and Conventionality

The level of firing competence of personnel depends to a large part on the systematic and methodologically correct conduct of training and combat tank firing exercises of various kinds. According to the plan the tankers regularly go out to the tank artillery range and the moving target gunnery range at night. It must be admitted, however, that a high level of performance in training assignments is not always ensured by a long shot.

Some commanders do not give the personnel anything to do but shoot during firing and do not strive to create a situation close to combat conditions during the training exercise. In the company commanded by Captain V. Prokopishin, for example, the following picture may be seen during night firing: only one training site where the exercise is being carried out directly is operating. In addition the sum total of the work of the non-firing shifts consists of the rote memorization of the sequence for carrying out the exercise. The director usually excuses himself with the argument that conditions do not permit the deployment of several training sites and, according to him, there is no great need for this. The thing is that the same tasks and norms are mastered through practice in the daytime. If a usual night training exercise is going on, the company does not consider it necessary to refine all the procedures that precede the opening of fire to achieve the maximum precision, speed and automatic response.

The neglect of night norms had a negative effect on the operation of the tankers. It is sufficient to note that when loading the conveyor of the magazine filler with artillery rounds the squads did not achieve a rating of "satisfactory" with regard to time.

In the same unit there are subunits that, in contrast to the company cited above, were able to achieve an intensification of night training. For comparison let us refer to the experience of the subunit commanded by Captain A. Taratunin. His subordinates carried out the training exercise with standard ammunition that was mentioned at the head of the article with an overall rating of "good." Here they do not forget that firing, in addition to everything else, is a training exercise at which the tankers always practice solving firing problems, reconnoitering targets, designating targets, operating the tank's weapons, etc. In tank firing exercises everything is done to eliminate conventionality, indulgence and oversimplification and to create a situation demanding independent decisions and actions. Loading ammunition is practiced with the aim of preparing for firing with standard artillery rounds.

At night tank firing exercises training sites are established at which the procedures for firing in conditions of limited visibility are perfected. A great deal of attention is given to skills in the preparation for the operation of the night sight and in the effective use of sighting and observation instruments for seeking targets that reveal themselves through muzzle flashes and those that are designated by the infra-red searchlight simulators.

The notion still survives that officers should take care of the adjustment of sights and zeroing in of weapons. In Captain Taratunin's subunit all these operations are carried out by the tank commanders. We were able to satisfy ourselves that the crews headed by Sergeant S. Kulichevskiy and Junior Sergeants V. Shalopak and V. Antonets carried out the whole set of measures for preparing the weapons for night firing very effectively.

They adjusted the night sights for a distant point before nightfall. They also verified the alignment of the direction of the searchlight beam with the direction of the optical axes of the instruments. The tankers independently zeroed in the machine guns, which completed the compilation of the position check-off charts.

You appreciate the value of such self-sufficiency of the non-commissioned officers and enlisted men particularly when you run into instances of another kind. Thus in the course of a tactical exercise in the subunit where the tank commander, Junior Sergeant V. Gurash, serves, operations in preparing the weapons and the aiming and vision devices for night operations were delayed significantly. Several of the tanks had machine guns that were not registered and night sights that were not adjusted. The handling of these matters was not taken up fully in the subunit, and the non-commissioned officers were not able to zero in the machine guns and adjust the sights without the aid of the officers.

Another important aspect is the provision of graphic demonstrations in training. In the company commanded by Captain Prokopishin they complain about the lack of training aids. The truth of the matter is that they should take a note from their neighbors, who find a way out of the situation by showing initiative in making the necessary training aids. The subordinates of Captain Taratunin themselves make posters explaining the firing rules in conditions of limited visibility and pointing out the special features of operations with night sights. All this helped to raise the quality of the exercises.

#### A Sergeant Does the Teaching

What is special about training tank crews is that the director, who is located outside the tank, cannot personally follow the actions of each trainee. For example, the correctness of the setting for the stabilizer and other firing instruments can be determined only by the final result--whether the crew opened fire on time or whether the weapon does not operate as a consequence of a mistake made when turning it on. This places a special responsibility on the sergeant for training subordinates.

During tank firing exercises conducted in Captain V. Prokopishin's company the non-commissioned officers are only occasionally involved in instructing subordinates. This, in our view, is a large minus. Relying on the officers, the tank commanders do not maintain a detailed

record of the accomplishments and shortcomings in the training state of the crew. And the platoon commander, as we see, is simply not in a position to supervise the actions of the trainees carefully by himself. This is how it happens that the critique of exercises is done very superficially, without a thorough investigation of the reasons for low results. Consequently the same mistakes are repeated in one exercise after another. In addition, trainees who have not carried out an exercise are permitted to participate in regular firing without being required to go through supplemental training exercises. This is a violation of the gunnery course rules.

The situation is entirely different in the unit headed by Captain Taratunin, where the tank commanders personally instruct the crews at the training sites. This raises the effectiveness of training exercises and ensures an individual approach in the instruction. The tank commanders make notes on specially developed forms during the training exercises, which permits them to point out and eliminate errors committed by the crew members in a timely fashion.

As an example, the tank gunner, Private I. Kompanichenko, at one time could not seem to get the hang of firing a machine gun at a moving target with the night sight. Sergeant S. Kulichevskiy began to give the soldier additional instruction. At first he explained the rules of firing in accordance with the posters. Then, having learned the reasons for the misses, he taught the gunner to correct fire properly with regard to direction and range by various methods.

The lesson paid off, and the completion of the exercise gave the gunner confidence in the weapon and in his own abilities. For better retention the tank commander urged Kompanichenko to explain one more time how he aimed and fired.

The high degree of coordination of the crew members' actions that is required during night firing is well known. In conditions in which the objects viewed in the night vision devices have no coloration and are recognized not by color but by variations in brightness, the tankers must have especially solid skills in observing the battlefield and picking out targets. Any inadvertance can affect the accomplishment of the assignment. Let us say the gunner does not give a warning before firing the cannon--the tank driver does not close the shutter, and the night vision device is blinded. To achieve the maximum coordination of the tank crew's actions in such conditions, the tank commander together with the officer must exert a great deal of effort. Unfortunately not all sergeants have a mastery of firing and methodology like Kulichevskiy. However, this is not always taken into account in organizing and conducting exercises with tank commanders.

A battalion tactical exercise with combat firing at night showed that certain non-commissioned officers were not able to arrange properly for observation and target designation by the crew and did not know the

procedures for using night vision devices and illumination equipment for fire control. Practice indicates that for developing solid fire control skills it is necessary to conduct such training exercises regularly using the time set aside for officer training and for tank firing exercises. In Captain Prokopishin's subunit, however, for example, it was considered adequate to conduct only one training exercise on fire control.

It should also be noted that in certain subunits there is not always a painstaking approach to the development of preparatory exercises, and they are not always saturated with the kind of firing tasks that contribute to the growth in the mastery of the specialists and the coordination of the crews in firing at night. The content of all firing assignments must be tied more closely to tactics.

Often reports are not required from the trainees after firing. If this is done in an informal manner, however, such reports develop a habit of self supervision in the tankers, and they also permit the non-commissioned officers to conduct a more thorough critique in the crews. The tank commanders should teach their subordinates to justify their decisions and actions during firing (calculation of the initial settings, aiming off, etc.).

In a word, it is necessary to mobilize many more reserves and to increase people's activeness as was emphasized at the April plenary session of the party Central Committee, "Everyone worked conscientiously and with all his might in his place."

The experience of the leaders in socialist competition for a worthy celebration of the 27th Congress of the CPSU, including the subunit commanded by Captain Taratunin, have showed convincingly that only if there is a creative attitude towards the matter, using new forms and methods of instruction and persistently including the young commanders in the training process, is it possible to improve substantially the training of tankers for carrying out the complex tasks of modern warfare.

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## GROUND FORCES

### FIRE CONTROL VIA SOUND

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt V. Lavrenyuk, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "According to the Sound Ranging Surveyors' Data"]

[Text] There was a din of tank and armored personnel carrier engines at the range; gun rounds and the rattle of machine gun and automatic weapon bursts could be heard. A reinforced motorized rifle battalion was attacking an "enemy" defended post.

At one line, the path of the attacking forces was blocked by mortar fire. The attached artillery battalion commanded by Lt Col V. Khapchuk was tasked to destroy the mortars.

The battalion commander glanced over the training battlefield: hillocks, ravines, thickets of small trees... Everything was covered by a solid smoke screen which the "enemy" was using to camouflage his actions. Visually it was hard to make out the fire position of his mortar battery. Lt Col Khapchuk communicated with the commander of the sound ranging subunit operating in this sector, Lt A. Orel.

Soon the sound ranging surveyors had taken up their positions and oriented their sound receiving equipment towards the "enemy." The platoon leader began to receive a variety of information. The forward observation post reported the approximate location of the battery fire position. The crew commanders of the sound ranging stations reported on conducting topographical surveying and readiness for sound ranging. Orel glanced at his watch--they had done better than the standard.

It is not easy in the many sounds of the range to sort out the needed sound--mortar rounds somewhere deep in the opposing side's battle formations. Sensitive instruments and perfect techniques help the soldiers.

For about 100 years sound has been helping artillerymen to determine the precise location of guns being fired. Methods of ranging batteries firing from indirect fire positions were used back in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). During the Great Patriotic War years, in certain major operations



conducted by our troops from 1943 through 1945 it was precisely sound ranging that was used to plot the majority of enemy batteries.

The quality of target coordinate computation by sound ranging surveyors depends largely on the accuracy of surveying the acoustical bases, made up of sound receivers deployed a certain distance apart from each other. It was namely surveying accuracy that the sound ranging surveyors lacked earlier. Now, with modern topographical survey vehicles equipped with electronic computer equipment at their disposal, the accuracy of surveying at halts and on the move has increased many times over.

...The sensitive microphones picked up the sound of the firing mortars. The central recording post quickly gave out their coordinates. The data obtained was reported immediately to Lt Col Khapchuk. Then Lt Orel is given a new task--handle the ranging of the artillerymen.

At first one gun fires. The sound ranging surveyors fix the location of the shell burst. The battalion commander makes an adjustment, and the next shell straddles the target. Now all the guns can fire. The command is given and the battalion plasters the enemy mortars with the fire of its batteries.

Later on at the exercise the attacking forces had to operate under limited visibility conditions. But no matter how camouflaged the defending forces were, the sound ranging surveyors reported precise position coordinates at the first request of the senior commander. Lt Orel and his subordinates did not let the "enemy" get out of their audibility range for a second.

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GROUND FORCES

BRIEFS

IMPROVED BMP TRAINER--The training material base at the Far East Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni MSU K. K. Rokossovskiy improves with each year. By renovating the lecture-halls and filling them with equipment, the department instructors are striving to intensify the training process and make it more visual. The navigation equipment simulator has been improved in the BMP electrical equipment classroom. Now, in addition to studying the operating principles of instruments, by connecting an electrified stand up to it, the students can survey the terrain without leaving the classroom. The benefit from the innovative suggestion of combat vehicle instructors Lt Cols N. Romanenko and A. Trigub is two-fold. The students master the curriculum material more quickly while saving a large amount of motor transport resources. A novelty in the laboratory of the combat vehicle operation and repair department is also helping the students--a stand for starting an engine preheater boiler. [By Col I. Ovchinnikov, Far East Military District] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Sep 85 p 2] 12567

1801/26

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

APPLYING COMPUTER MATHEMATICAL MODELING TO MILITARY AVIATION

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 14, Jul 85 (Signed to press 4 Jul 85) pp 9-16

[Article by Lt Gen Avn S. Belotserkovskiy, doctor of technical sciences, professor, and Maj Gen Avn V. Khalipov, doctor of philosophy, professor, under the rubric "Toward the 27th CPSU Congress": "A Powerful Accelerator of Progress"]

[Text] Rapid scientific and technological progress is leaving its stamp on the character of the entire contemporary world. One of the main tasks being carried out by our party today is that of making maximum use of the achievements for economic development, for improving the workers' welfare and for strengthening the nation's defense capability.

A recent conference in the CPSU Central Committee on the acceleration of scientific and technological progress defined ways to further advance the Soviet society in strategically important directions, to effect the structural reorganization of production and to switch our national economy onto intensive rails, and indicated effective forms of control of the economy and the tasks involved in resolving social problems more thoroughly. The most important thing today is that the nation must rapidly reach the most advanced scientific and technological position and the highest world level of labor productivity.

The conference in the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade M.S. Gorbachev stressed at a meeting with the collective of the Dnepropetrovsk Plant imeni G.I. Petrovskiy, outlined measures to improve the structure of capital investments in order to give the "green light" to the development of strategically important sectors of the national economy, those determining scientific and technological progress, primarily machine building, electronics, biotechnology and others. Particular attention is being given to the adoption of scientific and technological achievements in production, and resource-conserving technology. The task of effecting the technical reconstruction of existing enterprises as rapidly as possible has been set, and practical efforts are being made to achieve this.

Microelectronics, computer equipment and instrument making, the entire information-related industry, are now the catalyst for scientific and

technological progress. They require accelerated development. Much depends not just on building up the output of electronic computers, of course, but also upon making skillful use of them in the national economy. The quantity and quality of electronic computers produced in the nation, the degree to which the most diverse sectors are saturated with electronic equipment and the speed of development of robotics are one of the main indicators of the economic and defense capability of our socialist state.

At the same time, it is important to stress the fact that robotics perform a special social role. They are not only the means by which man performs socially useful work, but are also a sort of product of his labor, one which contains the objective of the subsequent labor process and a program of future functions and operations. From the Marxist-Leninist standpoint, technology is a phenomenon which is an organic part of purposeful human activity. Consequently, a real scientific analysis of the nature of technology, including electronic computer equipment (EVT), is only possible when its inseparable unity with man's creative capabilities is taken into account.

Electronic computer equipment appeared at the end of the 40's, and important events have occurred in the still relatively brief period of its development, which have significantly influenced economic and social progress, including military affairs. The appearance of electronic computers helped to put man into space, to create modern nuclear reactors and develop automation of production processes, and contributed to many other achievements. The development of a third generation of electronic computers at the end of the 60's made it possible to depict information on a television screen, accelerated the miniaturization of all the components and considerably reduced the cost of the devices involved. It was accompanied by the development of magnetic discs, which increased the memory capacity many times over and simplified access to the information stored therein, and led to the achievement of "man-machine" dialogue. The appearance of personal computers was an important event which occurred at the beginning of the 80's. Relatively inexpensive, small and adequately powerful electronic computers, which are simple to use and can be kept on a desk, are now altering the nature and the substance of the work of many specialists.

The extensive changes occurring today in the development of productive forces are based on the appearance and the practical application of microelectronic logical devices, or microprocessors. These are miniaturized electronic computers using integrated microcircuits applied onto silicon or germanic chips several square millimeters in size. Each of them contains hundreds of thousands of components replacing transistors and diodes. And the miniaturization continues.

A great deal has been done in our nation toward the development and use of electronic computers. A total of 6,400 automatic control systems (ASU) have been created for various purposes. Work is underway to place territorial (republics, oblasts, rayon and city) automatic control systems into operation. More than 3,100 computer centers have been placed into operation in various branches of material production.

Since it attaches particular social importance to scientific and technological progress, at one of its meetings at the beginning of 1985 the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee discussed and basically approved a national program extending to the year 2000 for setting up and developing the production of computer equipment and automatic systems and for making effective use of them. It calls for accelerating rates of production of electronic computer equipment, improving its quality and acquiring new electronic computers for scientific research, for performing practical tasks in machine-building, metallurgy and power engineering, in exploring for minerals and in other branches for purposes of intensifying the national economy.

The use of electronic computers has now become truly all-embracing. Calculating the movement of spacecraft and assessing conditions for combatting flooding, creating large automatic control systems and diagnosing diseases, forecasting harvests and the use of electronic computers by criminologists--this is far from a complete list of those fields in which electronic computer equipment is serving man.

A large number of directions has been identified by a comprehensive assessment of prospects for the use of electronic computer equipment and related robotics and their influence upon social and economic development. These include raising the level of control by adopting automatic systems; the efficient distribution and redistribution of manpower and materials in industry, agriculture and transport and in the service sphere by making extensive use of microprocessors and "intellectual robots"; enhancing the scientific research capability of scientists and specialists with the adoption of personal computers in their work; the extensive spread of computer literacy among the population, particularly the student youth, and certain others.

Computerization of the training process is highly important for improving education at all levels. It opens up large possibilities for thoroughly studying the basics of sciences, for developing a desire to learn in the students and for intensifying the training. The fundamentals of information theory and electronic computer equipment are now beginning to be studied in general education schools, vocational and technical schools and secondary specialized educational institutions in order to provide the students with skills in using computers and to equip them with a knowledge of the extensive use of this equipment in the national economy.

Electronic computer equipment and corresponding scientific methods are being put to increasingly extensive use in military affairs. The development and use of new types of weapons and combat equipment, military robotics, automatic control systems, information processing, mathematical modeling of combat operations and many other matters have moved to the fore in this area. A knowledge of electronic computer equipment and the understanding and use of new scientific concepts are therefore becoming a pressing need. Because of this, the orientation of military VUZ's toward modern achievements in electronic computer equipment and its adoption in the training process is important and entirely natural.

Experience has shown that an ever increasing return can be obtained in the most diverse fields of activity, including the military, by making effective use of electronic computer equipment and actively adopting new and more progressive concepts and methods. We are talking first of all about significantly increasing labor effectiveness by means of electronic computers and further developing production and enhancing the nation's defense capability on this basis. The indicators must be assessed from the end results, as they are in other fields--that is, from data on growth of production volumes, improvement of quality and corresponding conservation of finances, materials, time and human labor itself.

Electronic computers, which perform millions and tens of millions of operations per second, have made it possible to increase the productivity of computing work many times over. Not all of the social and technical consequences of this phenomenon are fully understood yet. Precisely therein, however, lies the nature of the fundamental restructuring of modern science and its linkage with life, and a crucial prerequisite for the emergence of advanced scientific concepts and their application at the practical level, and this includes military affairs.

We know that starting from the correct position has a great deal to do with the achievement of success in science and technology. The following are the basic, initial theoretical and methodological elements in the set of problems we are discussing. The mathematical models of types of equipment, processes, combat operations and the like which are in use represent mathematical structures in which real subjects and the specific connections between them are replaced with abstract subjects (symbols) and corresponding mathematical relationships. These models, which replace the original, can be used not only in place of the actual subject, but even instead of one which does not yet exist, a subject which has not been created or a process which has not yet been carried out. They are also used when the parameters of these possible subjects or processes have not yet been completely determined and the specifications are still in the process of being specifically defined. This is the point of departure for the concept of advance functioning of the mathematical models, literally ahead of the given phenomena, events or processes. The number of types of equipment for which we can have mathematical models, actually substitutes or duplicates, is unlimited. Also important is the fact that such mathematical duplicates can be used in parallel, for studying any type of equipment, including combat equipment, throughout its entire service life.

At the contemporary stage of scientific and technological progress, science is becoming a direct productive force. One of the main manifestations of this is the rapidly growing role of the reliable quantitative description of phenomena or subjects. Its material form, for example, is a bundle (that is, a set) of programs for electronic computers or a mathematical model of the subject, which makes it possible to correctly describe its functioning. Such mathematical duplicates make it possible to obtain valuable scientific information inexpensively, rapidly and safely. They make it possible to have essential data on a subject (a piece of combat equipment, for example, even before it has been built or tested and used, and to reliably forecast its features. Precisely this is the essence of the concept of advance functioning of mathematical models.

Let us turn to some examples of the development and operation of aviation equipment. The modern plane is a complex aircraft, a multifunctional complex saturated with diverse equipment. Therein lies its general similarity to other complex technical systems, which makes it possible to reveal common, typical trends and patterns. Control of the modern aircraft, its power units, navigational systems, the onboard energy system and facilities for meeting the vital needs of the passengers and crew is accomplished not by people alone, but also by onboard electronic computers.

Work in the field of developing and operating modern aviation equipment can have the most diverse objectives. It can focus on the designing and refining of an aircraft, the study of its flight characteristics, the assurance of flight safety, the study of the precision characteristics of various types of equipment, and so forth. As the aviation develops and aviation systems are perfected and made more complex, increased requirements are made with respect to the volume and completeness of information on them. And the modern computer can accumulate, systematize and issue that information.

The process of creating and testing a specific aircraft and refining it to the point of series production is long and expensive. Furthermore, the flight tests and experiments themselves are far from always safe. The same can be said not just of aircraft construction, but also of shipbuilding, motor vehicle manufacture and many other branches of machine building, as well as the development of new models of military equipment. This is why the problems of finding and making extensive use of effective concepts and adequately precise methods of studying models of specific products or models and the functioning of their components are becoming particularly pressing. Right in this area it is possible to achieve an important time gain in comparison with the necessary numerous and lengthy actual flight tests--that is, a gain in the performance of production tasks, in the time required to carry them out and in reduced financial outlays and consumption of materials.

One of the main problems today is that of improving the organization of specific studies in which separate approaches could easily be combined into general ones. This can be accomplished in various ways. Beginning with the stage of substantiation of the specifications for an aircraft and its design, for example, mathematical models of various degrees of complexity have to be built. They are used both for the automated designing of the aircraft and its systems and for subsequent use. At all stages in the development and operation of an aircraft (and other types of equipment as well), corresponding mathematical models can exist along with the subject during the development, testing, flying and modernization, which help to resolve unexpected problems and also serve as the basis for the designing, the use and improvement of matching trainers.

The development and rapid improvement of various types of electronic computers is making it possible to reorganize and accelerate research on the equipment at all stages of its existence and development.

A new and effective research method, numerical (sometimes called computer or machine) experimentation, has developed over the past 10-15 years. It uses

electronic computers to rapidly and effectively calculate the parameters of the subject and its behavior under given conditions and makes it possible at the stage of calculation, before testing, to determine the laws governing the development and use of a specific model of equipment.

A new and improved scientific research methodology is being developed, in which a correct understanding of the physical nature of phenomena, their mathematical description and the numerical method of performing the corresponding tasks with electronic computers are being linked more closely and organically. The main objective is to obtain the result by the most economical and rapid method, using all the advantages of various scientific approaches and simultaneously eliminating their bottlenecks.

Experience with the use of mathematical models at the Military Air Engineering Academy imeni Professor N.Ye. Zhukovskiy has shown that in order to use them it is expedient to divide them up into two levels--central and system models. The main purpose of the former is to study the subjects themselves, while that of the latter is to examine the combined operation of the components and the total set of subjects.

The entire structure of mathematical models of a subject is based on a complete, central mathematical model. It consists of the total set of bundles of standard programs for electronic computers, as well as experimental data which make it possible to reproduce the functioning of the items with the necessary precision. This model is the most complete and detailed description of the item being studied and is the standard.

Simplified models are used along with the complete model for studying the items. They are obtained by various methods--the ignoring of a number of secondary factors, the discarding of certain controls, simplification of the controls and so forth. Such models are also used in the system analysis, when the specific model is being studied. This analysis must also take into account the effect of other subjects which cannot be ignored upon the subject being studied, however. Data on it are inserted through the system mathematical models.

The most important criterion of the value of a certain concept is the conformity of the mathematical model to the subject being studied. It demonstrates the force, the power and the creative possibilities of human cognition. It is therefore very important not to discredit mathematical modeling with superficial, incompetent or simply erroneous actions or calculations. At the same time, we should see also the limits to the possibilities for mathematical modeling, not permit it to be turned into an absolute and see the need to use other research methods as well.

In some cases it is necessary to use the subject itself and not mathematical models of it. Fundamental difficulties are encountered in modeling a pilot's



control of an aircraft, for example. It is best to use semi-real modeling for determining an aircraft's landing characteristics. The mathematical model then makes it possible to avoid repeated, expensive and time-consuming real flights, while the operation of the airborne equipment and the functioning of the crew are actually reproduced. It is therefore expedient to consider a semi-real model along with the mathematical model of a subject.

System analysis is inconceivable today without mathematical models of the technical subjects and their equipment. It is impossible to create future products or machines or to work out their operating conditions and methods without electronic computers. The purposeful use of mathematical models, semi-real and mathematical modeling makes it possible to resolve problems involved in the development, testing and functioning of various types of equipment in a completely new way.

For testing aircraft equipment, especially when dangerous flight modes are being studied, it is very important to obtain preliminary information on them by means of mathematical models. Furthermore, it is important to be able to model the consequences which will result from changes in the test conditions (flying at different altitudes, switching to new load variations and so forth). There may be a need for the operational modeling of difficult situations occurring on a flight in order to determine the correct way to get out of them. The efficient use of aviation equipment has always been based on certain preliminary calculations. Mathematical and semi-real modeling has opened up totally new possibilities in this area.

The concept of mathematical and semi-real duplicates appears to be important and promising as an essential condition and as the basis for developing, testing and employing various kinds of equipment.

The mathematical duplicates are the aggregate of all the mathematical models, which makes it possible to reproduce the functioning of the corresponding subjects. Semi-real duplicates also contain a part of the actual subjects. Their functioning is produced by means of numerical and semi-real experiments. The main purpose of duplicates--to realize the concept of advance functioning of the mathematical models and to eliminate the need for many dangerous tests--is becoming increasingly clear. Duplicates are created along with the subject and its parts and are refined in stages. They are turned over for use together with the equipment, and they exist and are utilized together with the equipment as long as the equipment is in use.

The concept of active control and adaptability of the technical subjects to specific operating conditions is becoming increasingly important. For example, the weight-and-flexibility and aerodynamic features of the same plane are altered markedly with different loads, at different altitudes and flight speeds, when the angle of sweep of the wings is changed. Essentially, it is as though we are working with different subjects in such cases. One must also consider the fact that an aircraft must meet various specifications in all phases of take-off, cruising, maneuvering and landing. The task of providing both the aircraft and its systems with adaptability is therefore an extremely complex and urgent one. The research methods we have discussed are designed to accomplish it.

We can name another large group of specific problems for which we could not expect important results from efforts to resolve them without the active use of mathematical models and electronic computers. These include analyzing the survivability of aircraft which have been damaged and ascertaining what kinds of damage make flight impossible. The difficulty and danger involved in performing this kind of flight experiments makes it impractical to use them as the main research method. The responsible and important function of verifying the main effects established with mathematical modeling should therefore be left to experiments.

On the methodological level, everything we have said goes far beyond the boundaries of aviation and pertains to the most diverse fields of production, including the production of combat equipment. Every branch, you see, is a subject with a large number of closely interrelated and at the same time, rapidly changing, components, ratios and so forth. Controlling the branch and predicting trends in its development must now be increasingly based on mathematical modeling.

The understanding and application of modern ideas, methods and concepts certainly do not guarantee easy successes by themselves. They require intense creative labor and a search for the most effective methods, and are bringing more and more new theoretical-cognitive and practical problems to the fore. There is a continuous process of ascension from the complex to the even more complex. Even with all the advantages of numerical experiments and mathematical modeling, you see, important questions of a general philosophical nature arise: the conformity of specific numerical experiments to the actual processes and of the mathematical duplicates to the physical subjects; the limits to the applicability of new concepts; and possibilities for using them in related technical, natural and even social sciences. To state it in an even more generalized way, there is a question about the place and role of advanced scientific concepts and methods in the development of new generations of equipment and in the overall structure of scientific knowledge.

The increasingly extensive use of electronic computers is invaluable. It expands man's cognitive capabilities and considerably reduces the distance between theoretical achievements and their practical realization. Experience has shown that the use of electronic computers opens up new strata of science, expanding the area of application of those classical schemas and theoretical achievements which have been waiting for their time to come, as it were, for a new birth. In the theories of motion of aircraft, missiles and hydrofoils, for example, highly efficient calculations performed with electronic computers are opening up new stages in the understanding of possibilities for the use of these types of equipment.

A completely new area of scientific concepts pertaining to so-called space data which confirm the validity of phenomena, processes and calculations is developing. While in the past data directly confirmed by facts and calculations were considered reliable, today reality is forcing us more and more frequently to seek the truth and recognize validity also by indirect data in the case of very complex calculations. In practice, direct measurements are

now increasingly becoming impossible or difficult, and it is increasingly necessary to arrive at conclusions on phenomena based on indirect indications. In the past, specific astronomical data were recognized as correct and non-contradictory by this method, for example. Today, given our extremely complex equipment, it is possible to obtain completely reliable results from entire series of calculations with electronic computers. It is actually a matter of improving the methods used for these calculations and the methods and methodology used for assessing their reliability and correctness. It is becoming important to thoroughly consider the possibilities for using mathematical models and electronic computer programs for studying diverse phenomena and developing a sort of "certification" for specific areas of use for the research methods and programs which have been worked out.

The concepts we have discussed are a part of the process of fulfilling the party's most important demands. In many important ways, it is quicker, less expensive and safer to use electronic computers, numerical experiments and mathematical duplicates for developing and testing equipment. There is also a benefit with respect to operation of the equipment. And these are those extremely important criteria of effectiveness and economy which are paramount in scientific and technological progress.

We should mention the fact that the chain of events from the birth of an idea to series production of the article still lasts 8-9 years in the typical case in industry, and even longer in metallurgy. This involves the wasting of effort and the tying up of investment and circulating capital. This is why every step and every measure which improves this situation is especially valuable, a fact pointed out at a conference in the CPSU Central Committee on the acceleration of scientific and technological progress.

In conclusion, we would like to stress the fact that success in the realization of the concepts we have discussed depends to a crucial degree upon the level of skill of the people involved and upon their attitude toward them, and this includes scientists at military academies and scientific research institutions, upon their involvement in science and quest, upon the organization of the work and the climate in the scientific collectives.

The role of scientific and technological progress is growing and will continue to grow in the future. The task of making full use of its achievements to further improve the developed socialist society is one of prime importance. Its accomplishment is an extremely important factor for increasing our homeland's economic strength and defense capability.

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CSO: 1801/13

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

PVO RADAR SYSTEM OPERATES SUCCESSFULLY AGAINST JAMMING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Aug 85 p 1

[Article by Senior Lieutenant S. Korneev, Decorated with the Red Banner, Kiev Military District, "Forestall the Enemy"]

[Text] This exercise in the radio-engineering subunit commanded by Major A. Ponomarev was special. To be decided: which of the officers would be the victor in airborne target detection at a distance exceeding the radar station's (RLS) logged performance graph.

From the very beginning the RLS screens were found to be completely "lost" in strong interference. And the mistake of certain officers was that they tried, so to speak, to ideally tune out the interference, which was in this case impossible. Senior Lieutenant A. Seleznev understood this more quickly than others. Having achieved a reduction in the interference to such a degree that, albeit with difficulty, it was nonetheless possible to see traces of the target on the screen, the officer carried out a search.

"Target!" he soon reported that he had fixed upon it.

Later, means of objective control confirmed: yes, Seleznev was the first to locate the "enemy" airplane which had tried to break through to a defended objective. Moreover--this was done with apparatus of lesser power than others had. This circumstance is of no small importance. In the first place, the enemy was left with a smaller chance to locate the station by its radio emission. Second, less energy was expended.

Seleznev later said to his colleagues, "much depends on the tuning of the equipment" and explained: "Each unit and station as a whole should be tuned not only within its recorded tolerances, but to the optimal mode of operation. Needless to say, all types of periodic technical servicing, as well as skilled use of the apparatus, have great significance in this regard. It is essential that this be taught to everyone who is permitted to service the station. Besides this, it is important to know contemporary means of airborne attack, the types of interference, and to study the contour of the land in the region of the RLS."

Yes, this advice is correct. And this was noted by the director of the exercise, Major Ponomarev, in summing up its results. Having commended Senior

Lieutenant Seleznev and others who excelled, he gave a severe evaluation of a break which occurred in the work of Captain A. Gavrilenko, and explained that this did not occur by chance. Before the exercise, Major Ponomarev had more than once told Gavrilenko:

"Punctually check how the specialists service the equipment."

Gavrilenko, in particular, did not always control the work of his subordinate, Lieutenant I. Antonovich. And the result: a hitch in the exercise occurred because Antonovich poorly fastened the universal joint of an antenna-mast assembly.

The exercise provided a considerable occasion for reflection for both the director and its participants. The goal, of course, was not only to bring out a winner, although this too was important. Such practical exercises are fraught with competition, and this means that their participants are induced to work with maximum commitment to seek out and find advanced, rational means of servicing equipment, as well as employing it in battle.

Work at a radar screen effectively raises the special, systematic, training of officers. Can an officer really, let us say, successfully teach the operators subordinate to him, if he himself does not know and feel all the subtleties of an operator's work? The confirmation of this is the practical work of Senior Lieutenant A. Shobukhov. At one time, the young specialists under him took a long time in making the grade. He was informed that he himself had not systematically trained in the location and tracking of airborne targets, and had a weak conception of the actual capabilities of the equipment assigned to him. Needless to say, he thus could teach little in this regard to the soldiers. The exactingness and help of his commanders and colleagues prompted the Senior Lieutenant to strive to perfect his work habits in the station with greater persistence. But, as this exercise demonstrated, he still needs to do a significant amount of work in order to reach the level of a first-class specialist.

Competent use of the RLS and, in particular, the ability to locate airborne targets at maximum range with its help--is a highly important factor in successful military work. One does not come by this opinion by accident: he who locates the enemy early, has won half the battle. The significance of these words is particularly great in contemporary battle with an airborne enemy, which is exceptionally dynamic and complex, and demands from officers, besides other things, the ability to precisely and quickly evaluate the tactical situation, and make competent operational decisions

It also seems worthwhile to repeat the well-known truth about the consequences that can result from hitches in the work of even one specialist servicing collectively used equipment. Such consequences are even further aggravated if they are permitted by an officer--the organizer and director of battle. This is why I deliberately concentrate on the work of those who did not do as well as one would like in competition. On the whole, the majority of officers have gotten high marks. And let the reader not form the opinion that in the sub-unit they do little to look after the special training of officers. This

question is worked out in a system of command studies, and independent study lessons. But, as experience has shown, the periodic exercises under discussion raise the effectiveness of training, and allow "weak" spots to be uncovered and essential corrections to be made. In the detachment, the experience of Senior Lieutenant Seleznev and other outstanding performers in the exercise for officers is currently being studied and taking root.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

AIR DEFENSE TROOPS AID IN HARVEST

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Sep 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col P. Studenikin, Special Correspondent: "The Soldier's Corn Field: Warriors Are Harvesting Crops"]

[Text] Over at their N-th anti-aircraft missile unit of the Air Defense Forces, soldier drivers of the subunit commanded by Officer A. Cheporov were receiving the military order to defend the air space of the Motherland. Here, in the Kustana Steppe, early in the morning when the work day begins, they are receiving the order to harvest crops, and the flag is raised on the high mast in honor of the winner in the competition to transport grain.

The soldier's corn field is vast. Motor vehicles with red stars on the cabin, with boys in military uniforms behind the wheel, could be recently seen on the corn routes of the Ukraine, the Kuban, the Northern Caucasus, and the Volga region, around the Don and in the BeSSR; today, they are in Alta, Siberia, and the KaSSR, where the battle lines of Harvest 1985 have moved.

The steppe covered with cut corn resembled a polished yellow marble slab with green veins, and harvesting combines and trucks on it looked like ants gathering the crops, a grain at a time, into the corn abundance of the nation.

The motor made a monotonous, sleep-inducing sound. I was riding with one of the "thousand-ton" drivers (the title is awarded by a special order of the commanding officer to those soldiers who have transported over a thousand tons of corn), Senior Sergeant Valeriy Drannikov, drafted from Volgograd. He was making his twelfth trip to the elevator in one day on his Ural truck. His eyes were inflamed from a chronic lack of sleep: every day Valeriy volunteers for overtime shifts.

At the exit from the main estate of the Stantsionniy sovkhoz, the truck was stopped by young pioneers. With a businesslike air they checked the trunk to see if there were any leaks and whether the cover fit snugly, lest the corn be blown out at high speed.

"The pioneers' control station... they probably are the most meticulous inspectors there are," said Valeriy respectfully. "You know, it is only here that I started to understand how hard it is to harvest corn."

He was silent for a moment, and then took a leaflet out of his notebook, "The Arithmetic of the Harvest," and showed it to me. Each soldier driver, as I later saw, had such a leaflet either on the windshield or in a notebook. In every subunit, pinned in the most conspicuous places, they eloquently served as a reminder that the fate of the harvest depends on every one of them.

"Look," explained Valeriy, "if you lose one grain from the ear, you will fall short by two quintals a hectare; a simple canvas cover saves 30 to 40 kilos of grain on each trip; 1 day lost during the harvest season may cost 3 to 4 percent of the harvest. You see how easy it is to lose grain! Soldiers make friends with the young pioneers. I am now convinced that a true soldier must be a farmer deep down. And the pioneers are future soldiers...."

As I listened to Valeriy I recalled a meeting with another soldier driver. Private Nikolay Kartashov.

"I can't say that my family is far removed from the land," he had told me. "True, Mom and Dad are workers, but my uncle is chairman of a kolkhoz. I remember when I was still in school, we went to Leningrad. He took me to the Museum of the Defense of the City, right to where a siege-time bread ration was displayed: 125 grams. Have you ever seen it? I looked up and saw tears in my uncle's eyes. 'What's wrong?' I asked him. He didn't answer. Later, outside, he told me. 'Did you realize what spirit one must have, to be dying, probably, of starvation, and yet to preserve that bread ration to show to posterity.' And he told me a story from his partisan past.

At the time, they fighting back the fascists somewhere on the Berezina. The situation was desperate: ammunition was running out, food even worse. They sent the remaining flour to some reliable people in a forest hamlet to bake some bread for the group. Time passed, but there was no bread. My uncle went to check what happened, and saw the cart smashed, the horses and the driver dead, and bread loaves strewn about, covered with blood. And above them, hungry children. Greedily, they were looking at the bread, ready to pounce on it at any moment. An old exhausted woman was keeping them off, saying, "Children, this bread is for the partisans..." Of course, they fed the children, and my uncle swore that when the war was over he would move to the countryside to grow corn for the people. I, too, have decided that when I am discharged I will move to a kolkhoz and will grow corn. The farmer's work is honorable, in peactime he feeds the country, and during enemy invasions he defends it.

Yes, the hands of a soldier know not only how to use an automatic weapon, to drive a tank, to fly a plane, or to target a rocket or a gun. They also know how to build, to construct, and how to work for the good of the society.

In Kustanay, at the airport, I ran into Lt Gen I. Arkhipov, whom I had not had a chance to talk with in Moscow. Ivan Fedorovich, in addition to his military responsibilities, has also had to address himself to the problem of harvesting crops.



"Harvesting in which the Army and Navy personnel take part," he said, "means a massive maneuver of manpower and equipment, long distance movements, strict timetables, tension--everything just as in a real battle. And as in battle the soldiers work there as if they were at the front. Reports of the glorious deeds of the soldiers come from all sides.

"Here, for instance, a fresh report from Alma Ata: 'Soldier drivers under Officer K. Kolesov's command distinguished themselves putting out a fire on the fields of the Bolshevitskaya Iskra kolkhoz. When a corn field was hit by a fiery tornado, Private Yu. Marin leaped into the cabin of a heavy truck and drove it straight into the fire. Junior Sergeant A. Zaiselskii also acted bravely. He suffered severe burns, but did not leave the site of the fire until the last flame had been extinguished. The leadership of the kolkhoz commended the soldiers twice that day: once for saving the corn and another time for posting good numbers transporting it....'

"It has been reported from KrasnodarKrai that a leader in the harvesting competition, Private Evgenii Lazarev, saved a drowning 10-year-old child; in the imeni Lenin kolkhoz soldier drivers under Major G. Novokhatskii's command saved a corn field from fire; in the imeni M.I. Kalinin kolkhoz, they saved a silo....

"People honor the sacred memory of those soldiers who have done glorious deeds in the name of the harvest.

"We know that outside Volgograd there is a Soldier's Field, named so after a sapper who, having cleared the mines left over from the war, got into a tractor and plowed the field. In the Salsk steppes outside Rostov there is a gold inscription: 'Here on 21 July 1981, saving the grain from fire, perished a Soviet Army officer Captain N.M. Kuznetsov.' Corn growers from the Gigant kolkhoz to which the field belongs wrote to the officer's widow, Ledgena Pavlovna: 'To protect grain, this principal national asset, is what Captain Kuznetsov risked his life for. He died a hero's death, having devotedly carried out his duty as a commanding officer and a citizen of the USSR....'

"Now, there go newly weds on the day of the wedding, there village schoolchildren are admitted into the ranks of young pioneers and into the Komsomol, and there draftees take leave of the fields for 2 years before going off to the service. But some succeed in returning there earlier: in a dogged competition they exercise the right to harvest crops on this legendary field...."

The administrative office of the Stantsionniy sovkhoz was deserted despite the early hour. Political officer A. Kuzmin and I decided to go to the fields. The corn field struck us with its boundless size, and the combines looking like battleships on a mine-sweeping mission, were crossing it with a nautical precision, tack after tack.

"The people of Kustanay have grown an excellent crop this year, for this area." Anatoliy Petrovich asked for the car to stop and we walked to the corn field. "look, every ear is perfect, and the grains are like birdshot. They are harvesting more than 20 quintals per hectare on the average."

The leader of the first harvesting team, Ya. Frizen, whom we met at the team's field headquarters--a hereditary corn grower (there are 10 Frizen siblings working at Stantsionniy and until recently a soldier in the Rocket Forces--and Officer A. Kuzmin have common concerns: to harvest the rich crop to the last grain.

"Our thanks to the soldiers," the team leader warmly characterized the work of the soldier drivers. "They transport corn from the combines working as we do, 15 and 17 hour days. But for us this is a peak season, whereas they have a strict military regimen. They can work overtime only on a volunteer basis. Reliable fellows. Write it down: Combines have not been idle once through the soldiers' fault...."

The field encampment of soldier drivers greets us with the usual military strictness: the pathways are cleanly swept and sanded, the guard looks sharp, and the duty officer's report is precise: "...No incidents. the personnel are carrying out the order of the government!" The beds are made as though by a ruler.... Everything is just like in any other garrison: firm and solid, but on closer observation you begin to see signs of the main reason why the soldiers have pitched camp in the steppe.

At the morning count by the flag mast, there was an announcement: "Today, the flag is being raised in honor of Senior Sergeant Aleksey Kozyulchin (he transported 80 tons of corn in 1 day) and Junior Sergeant Sergey Oglochin (79.5 tons)." In the Lenin Room, in the most conspicuous places, there are stands entitled "The Leaders of the Corn Routes" and "Our Thousand-Ton Men," as well as warnings to the soldiers how corn can be lost and reminders how to protect it....

From here Junior Sergeant Valeriy Drannikov and I went to the soldier's corn route and returned late at night. Before my eyes, as my head hit the pillow, the steppe rushed beneath the wheels and a golden stream of corn was flowing on a never-ending conveyor ribbon.

Early in the morning I was awoken by the aroma of freshly baked bread. The same smell used to be at home when on the day of my departure my mother, out of an old peasant habit, used to get up at dawn to get her son ready for a long trip. She would perform the sacred rights by the stove, baking bread from the first grain of the season. It was as though the whole long peasant year was compressed into that first bread: the skylark's song and the bitter smell of a layer of soil turned over the the plow, the rustle of the maturing corn ears and the rattle of trucks and combines.

Later, on the outskirts of the village, she would hand me a still warm loaf wrapped in a white piece of cloth and say:

"Take it, son, there is a long road ahead of you..."

The soldier's cook, Private Viktor Lipatov, also gave a hot, aromatic loaf with a darkened crust for the road. This soldier's bread was just like that of my mother.

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

FLIGHT SAFETY VS. COMBAT READINESS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Sep 85 p 2

[Article by Col V. Dudin, Air Forces flight safety inspector, candidate of military sciences, under the rubric "For Flight Safety": "Both Comprehensively and Competently"]

[Text] The lengthy flight along the route was coming to an end. Col A. Shutov, a flight controller (RP) at the landing airfield, established radio communications with the group leader and queried him about the crews' fuel remainder. On receiving a report that the tanks held the described minimum of fuel, the flight controller authorized the group to break up for making an airfield approach according to the prescribed arrangement.

The wingman of the first pair turned his aircraft to the calculated angle and began a descent. The crew understood from the flight controller's radio exchange with the other aircraft that weather conditions were worsening, and now the young aircraft commander's only desire was to emerge beneath the clouds and catch sight of the landing strip as quickly as possible. He paid no attention to the unstable operation of the navigation equipment, which was later learned to have been due to poor adjustments.

The crew arrived at the landing airfield nondirectional beacon with a heading error and so had to climb in order to make another pass.

The air situation in the area became more complicated. New groups of aircraft were approaching and the duty navigator lost the first target--the crew which had left for another pass and was moving away from the airfield--among their blips on the plotting board.

No one of the flight control group, and especially the duty navigator, reported this to Col Shutov. He continued to believe that the aircraft was in the vicinity of the airfield and would show up at any moment on the glide path. Having no direct radio contact with the crew because of the great distance, the flight controller gave it commands via the other aircraft for the execution of turns and for what he believed to be the descent on the runway heading. Having lost its bearings, the crew was getting further and further away from the airfield and the fuel remainder in the tanks was inexorably

decreasing... It must be said that this is an exceptional instance (I will return to it again), but it was by virtue of this that it required a most thorough, comprehensive investigation, generalization and study by all aviators. The fact is that every precondition for a flying incident often receives the most varied appraisals on the part of crew members, specialists of the aviation engineering service, combat control and support officers, physicians and so on during its study.

As an inspector, I constantly have occasion to handle problems involving flight safety in my line of duty. The obvious principles both of reliable support to flight safety as well as of its breakdowns are clearly identified. An absolute majority of specific preconditions for flying incidents which some concerned officials try to explain as being random or allegedly as external objective reasons have a subjective basis above all and are the result of someone's personal deficiencies in the organization and conduct of flight operations.

It seems unlikely, but one sometimes has occasion to run across comrades who do not understand the truisms and who place the interests of improving combat readiness in opposition to the demands of accidentfree flight operations. They declare that the latter are almost an obstacle hampering the rapid achievement of the heights of combat proficiency. Only when they themselves have encountered serious failures in supporting flight safety which disrupt the rhythm of flight operations and the active mood of personnel for a long while do they become convinced that the attainment of the cherished goals is put off when the demands of accidentfree operation are not observed.

If a pilot is incapable of confidently flying a training route, bombing accurately under range conditions or, finally, simply taking off and landing reliably, what can be expected of him in an actual combat situation with a significant complication in flight dynamics and active opposition by a strong enemy?

Unfortunately, some leaders who support in words the demands for accidentfree flying try again and again to raise what appears to them to be a "tricky" question: Can one really fully exclude pilot error and aircraft equipment malfunctions through the fault of personnel?

I am sure that such a question is raised exclusively to justify their own specific error in organizing and conducting flights and in preventing flying incidents.

The experience in studying preconditions for flying incidents shows that when they are examined in the units, consideration is not always given to the complex, comprehensive nature of causality and the dynamics of their development. This is very urgent for effective prevention.

In connection with the significant complications in the technology of flight assignments in contemporary aviation, violations of safety measures very rarely occur for some single isolated reason, such as through the fault of one specialist. To the contrary, the actions of certain appointed persons are interrelated with the work of other aviators who often have quite different

functional duties. Here the error of one person can be corrected or aggravated by other specialists. This showed up graphically in the instance with which I began the discussion.

The crew's poor navigation training was named as the principal reason for the precondition in its investigation. The method of determining the culprit which was used here has a very accurate expression: "Find the switchman." The crew commander and navigator were named as such with ease, but a more detailed investigation showed that the crew's error was aggravated by improper actions of the flight control group and other appointed persons who displayed enviable activeness in searching for others' errors, forgetting about their own in the process.

Of course the crew made errors, but it is not just a matter of those errors. First of all, Col Shutov did not give an order to the crew through another aircraft to climb and turn on the distress signal, which would have immediately singled them out among other targets on the ground station scopes. He did not report the complicated air situation to the higher command post and took no steps to turn on additional radar resources. In short, he displayed a lack of execution and violated requirements of flight safety documents.

Then other weak areas were clarified which contributed to the development of the flying incident. For example, a check of the airfield's readiness to receive aircraft was made formally, some radar crews were poorly trained, they had not practiced their actions in such a situation in advance, and stereotypes and oversimplifications in the methodology of training many appointed persons were overlooked.

The following approach to studying reasons for preconditions for flying incidents also does not contribute to an improvement in flight safety, which means in the combat readiness of air units. Comrades who have been given great authority but, frankly speaking, who are insufficiently competent in a particular area of aviation such as aviation engineering, navigation, meteorology or medicine sometimes set the tone in commissions for investigating flying incidents. They organize their work based on purely academic conditions, abstracting the situation which existed in the actual flight. I will show what this leads to in the following example.

Several years ago a dangerous precondition for a flying incident happened aboard a heavy aircraft commanded by Maj I. Golovanov. A simultaneous failure of all four engines occurred at high altitude. The crew did not lose its head from the very first. The aircraft commander and the flight engineer began a startup procedure while descending. Attempts followed one after the other without result while the altimeter was twisting off thousand meters after thousand meters and interruptions and lack of coordination began to appear in the crew's actions. Finally they succeeded in starting two engines and landing safely.

On the ground officers from higher headquarters arranged a thorough training for the record for the crew. The method of the check of the aviators' knowledge and skills was not new and was generally justified, but not one of the

inspectors had personal flight experience in the given type of aircraft, i.e., not one was sufficiently competent in this matter. It is natural that the commission's conclusions were unable to be distinguished by depth and comprehensiveness. As a result the aircraft commander had to leave flight work and the crew broke up. When a similar situation was repeated at another location a peculiarity not reflected in the instructions was found in the operation of one of the engine systems at a certain power setting. A slight modification was made promptly, a clarification was made to the operating manual and since then this type of aircraft has been operating with high reliability. The fact is, however, that the truth could have been established after the very first incident!

Preventive work must be directed specifically against the recurrence of similar incidents. The basis of such work is not the bitter experience of each pilot, but use of identified patterns, methods and techniques for assuring flight safety. It includes flight safety classes, special training sessions, commanders' flights, and the development and conduct of necessary methodological, organizational, technical and indoctrinational measures. All this is especially effective in the presence of constant supervision on the part of party organizations and party committees. Their concern for aviators' moral and mental preparation for actions under complicated conditions is inestimable, and this has a positive effect on an improvement in flight safety.

Deficiencies in preventive work are introduced at times back in its planning stage. Measures sometimes are taken without any connections with the actual status of flight safety and not even in full conformity with requirements of guidance documents for the current year or with recommendations of a higher service. In a number of instances these plans are excessively loaded down with formal paragraphs. The effectiveness of measures taken under the plan--whether or not it influenced an improvement in flight safety--is assessed extremely rarely.

Of course, it is impossible to present in one article all possible specific ways to further improve flight safety, one of the main criteria of combat readiness. A systematic order in the work and not crash work; competent, professional resolution of problems of preventing flying incidents based on a generalization of experience in preventing the most typical flying incidents; the ability to draw practical conclusions from individual failures; and the profound conviction of each pilot and air commander as to the possibility of lengthy flight work without accidents and disasters through the fault of personnel are the basic directions for building up efforts in accomplishing a task of state importance: assuring accidentfree flight operations.

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CSO: 1801/29

NAVAL FORCES

BRIEFS

PORT VISIT TO IRELAND--At the invitation of the authorities of the city of Cork, the large anti-submarine ship "Soobrazitelnyy" will pay an official visit from 26-30 September to the Republic of Ireland (the port of Cork) in connection with the 800th anniversary of its founding. Rear Adm F. N. Gromov, First Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet, will head the visit. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Sep 85 p 3] 12567

CSO: 1801/26

REAR SERVICES/DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

INTERVIEW WITH MSU KURKOTKIN, CHIEF OF REAR SERVICES

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 14, Jul 85 pp 2-3

[Interview with USSR Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief Of Rear Services for the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Kurkotkin, conducted by a SOVETSKIY VOIN correspondent: "For The Sake Of Combat Readiness"]

[Text] [Question] More than seven years have passed since the last All-Army Conference on improving the quality of life for the forces. Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, what new things have appeared in the rear services plan for the Army and Navy during that time?

[Answer] As always, our Communist Party and the Soviet government continue to show great concern for the well-being and happiness of the people and for the creation of the most wide-ranging opportunities for their creative labor, training and spiritual and physical development.

During the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade M. S. Gorbachev stressed that in the future our party will steadfastly follow the economic policy it has developed, a policy that is directed at improving all aspects of the life of Soviet citizens and creating favorable conditions for the harmonic development of the people.

This is the position from which the party and the Armed Forces are carrying out the organization of military life. Concern for the Motherland's defenders is an objective law of our military construction.

Military life has its own specific character. It is entirely subordinated to the mission of further increasing the combat readiness and fighting capacity of the Army and Navy. During the last All-Army Conference on improving the quality of life for the forces, the attention of commanders and political workers was on the fact that guaranteeing a high degree of combat readiness for units and ships, a high level of military discipline and also self-discipline is all directly tied to satisfying the material and domestic needs of personnel.

Meetings, conferences and inspections-and-competition on material, medical and trade and domestic support are regularly held in districts and groups of forces. The patriotic movement "An exemplary Mode Of Life For Every Garrison"



was developed in these meetings and this movement has really become massive. Soldiers in large and small garrisons are transplanting trees, planting shrubs and trees along streets, painting the streets with visual propaganda and are making their barracks and dwelling houses comfortable. Wives councils, Armed Forces employees and family members of servicemen are taking an active part in organizing military towns and their mode of life. But this is only one aspect of the business. The center of attention for district, groups of forces, and navy military councils, commanders, political workers and experts of all rear services continues to be focused on one important task -- attaining the total autonomy of garrisons.

For example the unit where officer B. Murugov is serving has everything it needs to train personnel and meet their needs in rest and commercial services. There are training classrooms, soldiers' clubs, tea rooms, stores, a sports complex and a nursery school. There are often seminars based on this military town which include objective discussions on how to make the military economy exemplary.

All the conditions for satisfying the needs of servicemen and the members of their families have been developed as much as possible in many Strategic Rocket Force garrisons. Commanders and rear service officers focus a lot of attention on the organization of the garrison's living area and on the commercial and medical support for the families of servicemen. They have groups of domestic service that are operating, integrated subsidiary economies have been developed and the barracks, which could rightly be called soldiers' hostel, have been looked after.

[Question] There is an expression "The barracks are a soldier's home". A home has army and as well as specific requirements. Does that mean that there is a connecting link?

[Answer] Yes, certainly. The majority of young people who have entered the ranks of the Motherland's defenders lived at home under good conditions. And everything is being done in the army so that after they complete training exercises, standing guard duty, long marches and training, soldiers can take a shower, put their uniforms in order, read a newspaper or magazine or watch television. Commanders and the military comrades with whom one can share one's inner most secret are nearby in the barracks with them, just like one big happy family.

Everything is also being done for this in the Navy as well. I will give an example. The tanker Boris Bytoma has been inscribed in the Armed Forces Rear Services Book of Honor. This tanker is a right-flanker in the socialist competition in honor of the 27th CPSU Congress and it carries out its military missions only at the "outstanding" level. And in many ways the exemplary order which proves the high culture of the sailors is facilitating this. Visual propaganda has been placed in conspicuous locations. Stands, models, placards and panels remind every crew member what he must know and be able to do. Sailors gather together in their free time and hold different quizzes and in the evening they listen to open letters. And this brings the warmth of home closer, although they serve in the waters of the Pacific Ocean.

To sum it all up, life shows that soldiers go out to military duty, to the tank training range and field exercises rested and in a stimulated mood in those units where living conditions have been well developed. This to a large degree promotes the quality of training and in the final account further increases the combat readiness of Armed Forces.

[Question] Military life has a broad meaning. But there is a starting point in organizing it -- the commanders, political workers and rear service officers whose efforts and whose concerns have a specific focal point, soldiers and sailors, in short, their subordinates. What is their role in the issues of rear service support and domestic life and in such necessary and important issues as Army and Navy life?

[Answer] Military life certainly has a broad meaning, but at the same time it is quite specific and definite. Unfortunately some commanders interpret this definition in a superficial way. They bring about relative order in the town and assume that their worries are over.

It is the duty of every commander, political worker and rear services officer to show paternal concern for the needs of subordinates. Always remember that a man's health, his mood and thus his ability to work to a large degree depend on the conditions in which he lives and how he eats. And thus we must not forget about the main ingredient -- the man himself. Even during the war thoughtful commanders and rear services officers always thought first about people. It was difficult, but after battle they always found the opportunity to move soldiers into a warm area, let them get cleaned up and eat on time. One must regard the military mode of life with party responsibility and not allow excessive difficulties to develop because of someone's inability to organize, someone's lack of responsibility or callousness. Our people are providing everything that is needed for the material support of our forces and food is a good example.

The rations that are available at the present time have an assortment and quality of food that permits the energy that soldiers expend to be fully replaced. This is especially important during training, on maneuvers and during extended cruises. Canned meat and vegetables, fish and milk products, bread with an extended shelf-life, frozen dinner meals and many others are getting to the troops now. This permits us to furnish soldiers and Naval forces with food that is high in calories and that keeps well under any conditions.

Auxiliary and ship's galley economies play an important role in improving food for soldiers. They produce more meat, milk and vegetables every year and these show up on soldier's tables. There are units that annually receive more than 20 kilograms of additional meat per soldier. Auxiliary economies have become integrated and more powerful than before. Many have land under cultivation, combines, tractors, slaughter houses and curing factories. And things have been set up so that military collectives provide themselves with meat, milk, eggs and other products throughout the year. This is a worthy contribution toward resolving the Food Program for the entire country.

I want to turn your attention to the fact that the very concept of "auxiliary economy" has become filled with new meaning. Besides the material advantages, it plays an important role in the educational process. I will give some specific examples. A number of Strategic Rocket Force units hold annual spring agricultural exhibits at central farmsteads and soldiers from units and subunits display their products. Commanders and political workers prepare for the exhibit and wives' councils, schools and independent collectives take part. These days become real labor holidays. If a young soldier is exposed to corn growing in the army and, for example, learns to care for livestock and mow and has helped gather crops, I think that this will be in his favor. And also practice shows that labor education has great significance in strengthening discipline. And if you want to talk about the material advantages, they are certainly present. In the majority of units it is not unusual for there to be fresh vegetable salads, tomatoes and cucumbers on the soldier's table, even in the off-season. And it is really no problem that gardens and fruit orchards are growing in rest zones and other areas and people in the northern areas are organizing the collection of nature's donations to go to the soldier's table throughout the year!

We only welcome such initiatives.

[Question] In addition to other important issues, the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum discussed increasing production organization, sequence and planning discipline. Please tell us how this issue is being resolved in units, institutions and Armed Forces Rear Services enterprises.

[Answer] A lot of work is being done in rear enterprises in light of party requirements and orders and these enterprises play an important role in supplying the forces with everything they need for normal life and activities. Party, komsomol and professional union organizations have begun a movement toward qualitative production, clear-cut completion of planned tasks and the effective use of equipment and techniques. And what does this depend on? Primarily on the leaders of those rear units and institutions which must constantly strive to obtain more end results from every unit of raw material and power and to more decisively reduce the expenditure of labor. We must not allow ourselves to become flush with successes, silent about shortcomings and must not reduce our demand on ourselves and our comrades.

Popular wisdom says, "Discipline is the mother of victory". This is correct. And I will note that this relates to more than just front-line battles. This popular wisdom is also supported by our life. Those locations with the best order and organization, where high exactingness is combined with the daily concern for subordinates, also have excellent marks in combat, political training and in socialist competition. One of the primary trends for the activities of commanders, political organizations and headquarters, as well as the communists in the units and rear area institutions, is toward further strengthening discipline.

Every collective must develop a atmosphere of moral cleanliness, comradeship and a mutual demand for the effect and quality of military labor. It is also necessary to educate personnel with the spirit of loyalty to the revolution, to the party and people's military and labor traditions and to the military

oath. We must decisively stop the appearance of crudeness, boasting and non-regulation relationships among soldiers.

I am speaking about this in detail because modern battle, with the employment of a great amount of diverse equipment and weapons, is noted for its significant expenditure of ammunition, fuel and other materials. For example, the weight of fuel for a modern fighter aviation regiment is approximately equal to the weight of fuel for a combined arms army in the entire last war. The weight of a fired salvo in a motorized rifle division has increased by a factor of dozens during that period. Based on this, the role that mobility and operationally supplying forces with materials under any conditions and in any time of the year becomes clear.

And when we talk about initiative, organization and labor efficiency, to rear service specialists this means attaining the highest indicators in organizing the transport and storage of material reserves in a minimum amount of time and with a minimum of time expended. And this means a high degree of knowledge about equipment, the general use of automation and mechanization, the introduction of automated command and control systems and in the end, a high degree of organization in all echelons of rear services units and subunits.

[Question] Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, what are the goals of the All-Army Conference on improving the military mode of life?

[Answer] The primary goal is to analyze what has been attained and to outline clear-cut perspectives for the immediate future. Even now districts, groups of forces and fleets are actively preparing for the All-Army Inspection and Competition for the best garrison in terms of material and domestic conditions. Commanders and political workers, rear service specialists and various services are taking part in this. We must see how military towns are set up and how medical and veterinary services are organized, how domestic enterprises, military supplies stores and soldiers' tea rooms are operating and whether energy and water supplies are reliable and stable. A lot of attention will be on the economical and economic use of national resources.

I already said that the Soviet people are giving the Army and Navy everything they need to qualitatively support the training process and the service of soldiers. However, one still runs into the cases there officials are careless in protecting military and public property and are permitting waste and squandering. We must wage an uncompromising, steady battle against such negative phenomena. People's control groups and internal verifying commissions can be a major help to commanders and political workers, and the soldiers themselves must not be kept out of this major state affair. We must not forget that it is the duty of everyone, be he a driver, electrician, construction worker, metal worker, or storekeeper, to regard state riches carefully and economically. And this is where we must focus attention in many units and subunits.

It is especially important to talk about warrant officers and sergeants. Dozens of soldiers work under their direct control and the final results depend on whether the commander sets the example of thrift or not.

For example, in the unit where communist M. Yachinovskiy is serving, a monthly campaign of fuel savings was introduced and people's controllers were brought in to do some organizational work. As a result of these measures fuel consumption was reduced by ten percent.

There are many such cases in the Army and Navy. And undoubtedly such positive experiences will be discussed at the All-Army Conference on improving the mode of life in the military. Therefore even now its participants should be thinking about what problems to introduce into general discussion and how to share the experience of their work.. We must use the patriotic upswing that was caused by the national preparations for our party's 27th Congress.

The struggle for exemplary military life must be combined with educating personnel with a feeling of pride and love for the Motherland, a high degree of responsibility for its security, the development of a high degree of culture, discipline and loyalty to their military duty.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA CRITIQUE OF 'JAPANESE MILITARISM'

Military Expenditures Examined

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Press Service: "An Ambitious Program"]

[Text] Japan's cabinet of ministers has approved a new program of the country's militaristic preparations developed by the national defense agency. Intended for a 5-year period (1986-1990), it is estimated at 18.4 trillion yen.

Within the framework of this program there are plans to purchase nearly 5-trillion yen worth of modern arms and combat equipment for the Japanese "self-defense" forces. Thus, for example, 63 F-15 Eagle fighter-interceptors will be acquired for the Air Force, which will bring the total number of these aircraft in the Japanese Army to 187. These aircraft will be formed into seven squadrons. In addition, three squadrons of F-4 Phantom interceptors must be formed in the Air Force. There are also plans to purchase 5 E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft (there will be 13 in all). The Air Force also plans to re-equip its missile forces. Five battalions equipped with Patriot missiles will be set up over a period of 5 years. They will replace five of the six battalions presently in service with Nike missiles. There are also plans to buy Hawk missiles.

Nine Aegis-class destroyers, larger compared to the ships now in its inventory, will be acquired for Japan's navy. It will also receive five submarines. The largest part of the naval program is the purchase of 50 P-3C Orion anti-submarine (ASW) aircraft, making a total of 94, including those already in service. There are also plans to purchase helicopters for the navy: 66 ASW, including a new type designed for basing on ships, and 12 anti-mine helicopters.

The ground forces will be supplemented with 246 tanks (including 30 new models), 277 artillery pieces, 43 anti-tank helicopters and also 54 ground launchers for anti-shipping missiles.

The new program calls for increasing the military might on the northernmost Japanese island of Hokkaido. There are plans to move 140 tanks there.

Review: Japanese Armed Forces

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by Col (Ret) L. Vnotchenko, doctor of historical sciences, professor]

[Text] The monograph "The Japanese Armed Forces. Past and Present"\* published by "Nauka" Publishing House undoubtedly will attract the attention of many readers. The topicality of and urgent need for preparing and publishing this work was predetermined by a number of circumstances of domestic and international importance.

With the sharp increase in the aggressiveness of imperialism, headed by the US, the Soviet Union is doing everything necessary to prevent a nuclear catastrophe and establish the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations and to ensure the security of our country and of our friends and allies. That is why there is a growing need for a thorough and comprehensive study of the nature and trend of the military policy and strategy of imperialist states in terms of history, today and in the future. From this standpoint, Japan, as a country whose ruling circles have from the earliest stages of historical development preferred to resolve political problems with weapons, warrants great attention.

Despite the crushing defeat in World War II and ignoring the lessons of history, Japan's military-political leadership, with the help of the US, began an intensive build-up of its military-economic potential and armed forces already in the initial postwar years. As the authors point out, by the early 1970s the numerical strength of the Japanese armed forces had reached the magnitude at which in the early 1930s the Japanese militarists began carrying out their aggressive plans in Asia, and the might of the Japanese army surpassed the military might of the imperial ground forces on the eve of World War II many times over. Today, the armed forces of Japan are one of the most powerful armies of the capitalist world. This, undoubtedly, cannot help but attract the attention of military history experts.

The increasing militarization of the country, the strengthening of its military-political ties with the US and other NATO countries, its preparation for nuclear war in alliance with the US--all this represents a growing danger not only for the Soviet Union, but also for the cause of peace throughout the Asian and Pacific region and beyond it. Nevertheless, the authors point out, in Japan itself and in many other countries as well, they are underestimating this danger, largely due to the fact that the ruling circles of Japan are carefully camouflaging their military preparations. One should add that the sharp intensification of bourgeois propaganda falsifying the history of World War II, including the war in the Asian-Pacific region, and its justification of the new military preparations urgently require scientifically sound criticism of the false concepts of bourgeois historians.

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\*"Vooruzhennyye sily Yaponii. Istoriya i sovremennost" (Edited by A. I. Ivanov), Izdatelstvo "Nauka", 1985, 326 pages, cost 1 ruble 90 kopecks.

Taking all these factors into account, the authors of the monograph comprehensively studied the process of the origin and development of the armed forces of Imperial Japan. Based on a large amount of factual material, a considerable amount of which is being made public for the first time, the authors examine the place and role of the imperial armies and fleet in the aggressive policy of the country's ruling circles on the eve and during the years of the two world wars, the basic directions and stages of postwar construction of the armed forces, their current status, technical equipment, mobilization capabilities, the nature and scale of combat and ideological training and indoctrination of personnel, and the military doctrine views of the Japanese command.

The research conducted by the group of authors makes it possible to ascertain the true military-political aspirations of the country's ruling circles at various stages of its historical development and to assess the current level of Japan's militarization. At the same time, the book shows the destructiveness and hopelessness of the current adventurist military policy of Japan's ruling circles.

It should be noted that both the research itself and the conclusions and recommendations stemming from it are of not only theoretical, but also great practical interest. The book may be used in our political studies and in counter-propaganda work. The language and style of presentation, the presence of a considerable number of diagrams, tables, colored charts and photographically illustrated material makes the monograph intelligible to a wide range of readers.

12567

CSO: 1801/26



FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

S. AFRICA'S MILITARY INDUSTRY, TIES TO WEST

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by M. Belyayev and O. Trofimova: "Tool of Aggression and Terror: The Armed Forces are the Principal Support of the Republic of South Africa's Racist Regime"]

[Text] The people's demonstrations against apartheid in the Republic of South Africa are not abating. The African ghettos of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth are seething. The Pretoria regime, which relies on support from ruling circles of the United States and other imperialist states, has unleashed bloody terror and is attempting to crush the national liberation movement by force. We are publishing an article which reveals the West's criminal role in creating the South African military machine, which is the principal support of the bloody regime.

The roar of motors, barking of sheepdogs, and tramp of leather boots aroused inhabitants of the Deepkloof district in Soweto, the largest African suburb of Johannesburg. Under cover of 80 army armored vehicles, which sealed off residential blocks, soldiers and the police methodically searched house after house, detaining anyone who seemed "suspicious." It was another large-scale military-police action being carried out within the framework of the course set by the Pretoria regime toward suppressing the movement against apartheid.

It is not just the populace of the racists' own country that is under their yoke. The Republic of South Africa illegally occupies the territory of neighboring Namibia. Pretoria's rulers organize armed raids against neighboring states. For example, last week the South African Air Force subjected civilian settlements in the southern part of Angola to fierce bombing and missile strikes. Armed provocations against Mozambique are not ending. The Republic of South Africa is creating dangerous tension in the southern part of Africa by its subversive actions. The selfish interests of international imperialism headed by the United States can be clearly perceived in all this.

Economic and military assistance is going to the Republic of South Africa in an unending stream for the sake of these interests. It is no secret to anyone that the generosity of the United States, England and other protectors of Pretoria already has played its ominous role. A military industrial complex was established here serving the racists as a reliable support in their bloody deeds.

By the early 1970's the Republic of South Africa already had provided itself fully with small arms and ammunition. In particular, the full-scale raid against Angola in 1981 was supported 95 percent with weapons of its own manufacture. The manufacture of sophisticated military equipment--aircraft, missiles, and the Eland and Panhard armored personnel carriers--has been adjusted under western licensing. The Republic of South Africa also has come close to the development of nuclear weapons.

The Bonaero Investment Company and Atlas Aircraft Corporation of South Africa, which built two aircraft assembly enterprises in Johannesburg and Cape Town, are the leading South African weapon forges. The Impala jet aircraft and the Mirage F1 and M3 supersonic fighters are produced there under licensing. The Anglo-American Corporation is directly involved in filling military orders and projects. The Armscor state arsenal has been in operation since 1968. By the beginning of the current decade it had 12 daughter companies where some 20,000 persons were working.

The Pretoria regime is not skimping on expenses to build up the militarist potential. In a total of two decades the country's military budget increased by more than 50 times and expenses for arms in fiscal 1984/1985 reached almost two billion dollars. Practically all scientific establishments performing research in the military field as well as the Atlas Aircraft company are in government hands.

The Republic of South Africa is given a prominent place in the West's militaristic plans. The Advocaat Plan is noteworthy from this standpoint. According to this plan, tracking and communications systems are being set up primarily with the participation of West German firms. According to South African sources, they make it possible to conduct surveillance from the coast line of ships and aircraft across the South Atlantic to the shores of America and across the Indian Ocean to Australia and New Zealand. A control center located in a mine shaft not far from Cape Town has direct communication lines with the Royal Navy Headquarters in London and the American naval base in San Juan, Puerto Rico.

A relationship of "constructive cooperation" between the United States and the Republic of South Africa essentially has developed into a military-political alliance. The South African government declared a readiness to place its ports at the disposal of the American Navy and the Pentagon intends to deploy cruise missiles in the southern part of Africa. The Republic of South Africa already has begun to build pads for testing American-made medium range missiles and long-range howitzers capable of firing nuclear projectiles.

It should be noted that Israel plays one of the leading roles among the partners of the Republic of South Africa. In spite of the existing embargo Tel Aviv continues to ship electronic equipment, air-launched missiles and self-propelled howitzers for Pretoria and it is modernizing the Centurion tanks which have become operational in the Republic of South Africa. The construction of enterprises for producing electronics, particularly radio receivers, field telephones and observation systems, has begun with Israel's help. The production of military helicopters was adjusted through the joint efforts of Rotoflight Helicopters of Cape Town and the Israeli (Chemavir-Masok) companies. The Gabriel missiles being installed on Israeli patrol boats are being produced in the Republic of South Africa under Israeli license. Bringing together Pretoria's financial capabilities and Tel Aviv's technology permitted the two aggressors to develop a new type of guided missile patrol ship. The London journal EIGHT DAYS announced the beginning of construction of a nuclear powered submarine by the Republic of South Africa and Israel at a naval base not far from Cape Town.

Pretoria's military-political regime has developed modern armed forces with the help of its western protectors. This unique militarist fist is intended for performing two functions--foreign and domestic--which, however, are indivisible from each other. They pursue one and the same goal--to turn the southern part of Africa into a private domain of international imperialism.

Even in peacetime the Republic of South Africa racists keep over 83,000 persons under arms and there are another 90,000 in commands of a semimilitary type. In addition, there are 35,000 police on active duty, with another 20,000 ready to come to their assistance from the reserve. A contingent of many thousands of cut-throats has dug in in Namibia. The Republic of South Africa is capable of mobilizing 1.2 million persons.

According to data of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the South African Army had 250 tanks, 1,400 armored cars, 1,200 infantry fighting vehicles and 500 armored personnel carriers in the inventory during 1983-1984. The Navy has three submarines, an antisubmarine frigate, as well as 11 fast guided missile boats, six large patrol ships and 30 patrol boats. In 1984 the Air Force had 313 aircraft in its order of battle--four fighter squadrons and three transport squadrons. In addition to these, there also are four helicopter squadrons.

Pretoria's militarist fist has fallen today on those driven to desperation by a policy of very cruel racial discrimination and exploitation. The apartheid regime resorts to the most barbaric methods in an attempt to suppress mass demonstrations of people in the Republic of South Africa. As emphasized in the statement of the African National Congress, "the unlimited powers granted the armed forces and these murderers give them the right to act as they like."

But the bloody terror unleashed by the racists against the African population does not trouble the ruling circles of the United States, Great Britain, the FRG and other countries of the West. They continue to be accomplices to the murderers and promote the development of the South African economy and a build-up of military muscles for the Pretoria racists.

6904

CSO: 1801/29

AFGHANISTAN

REBEL AMMUNITION CAPTURED

LD151012 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 14 Oct 85

[From the Vremya newscast; video report from Kabul by correspondent Mikhail Leshchinskiy]

[Text] Afghan Armed Forces' units and groups of people's militia have carried out a successful military operation against major bandit formations in Kabul Province. The Regular Army's servicemen and the fighters of Kabul (?Sarandoy) are in the same ranks in this victorious hour. The weapons of the enemy they crushed were placed nearby. Modern weaponry and ammunition with English, German, and Chinese writing on them. It is clear even for a nonspecialist that all these missiles, mines, bombs, and grenades, large-caliber machineguns, tons of explosives have nothing to do with defense that Western propaganda is talking about, and that mercenaries have delivered these arms to the outskirts of Kabul from Pakistan not to defend their homes, which by the way they have not had on Afghan soil for a long time. They were trying to use ground-to-ground missiles before to fire upon the most heavily populated areas of the city, the mines were intended for Kabul streets and roads, and they quite recently shot down an Afghan passenger plane using a U.S. missile, killing 52 peaceful people.

There were other exhibits among the mountains of these weapons as well. They point to the psychological war conducted against the people of Afghanistan. Here are these bombs with English words and next to them a textbook, apparently a normal textbook in English with something for pupils. But have a look: I randomly opened a page and what are the first words suggested for Afghan children to learn--weapons, so-called Afghan partisans, bombs, rifles one should shoot upon, allegedly, enemies of Islam. This is a war, too, a war for the minds of the new generation and is conducted by the same hands and on the same money from across the ocean, Western dollars, marks, pounds.

And, here, are those who were bought with these millions. His name is (Abdul Akhmad). His gang has penetrated from Pakistan where they underwent a course of training with U.S., Pakistani, and Chinese instructors. The bandit says that their task is to terrorize the population of Kabul.

(Yadaldzhan) from Kholes gang is only 16. He says he was forced into the gang like many other boys under the threat of death and the destruction of his entire family. I did not want to fight against my people he says. [Video shows a group of several hundred soldiers linked up around an exhibition of weapons and ammunition. Leshchinskiy showing a schoolbook, a group of captured partisans, close-up of two of them.]

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CSO: 1801/48

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

MILITARY DELEGATION FROM DRA--KazTAG--A delegation of the DRA National Armed Forces visited Alma-Ata from 26 through 30 September. It visited the Friendship Club and familiarized itself with the training facility and experience of military-patriotic indoctrination at the DOSAAF Alma-Ata Joint Technical School. There was a meeting with workers, engineers and employees of a cotton combine. Members of the delegation also became acquainted with the organization of the training process, life and routine of officer cadets at the Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Mar SU I. S. Konev, and they visited the district officers' club. The guests laid wreaths at the Glory Memorial in the Park imeni 28 Panfilov Guardsmen. They inspected the Medeo high-mountain athletic complex and the VDNKh [Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy] and visited the State Academic Opera and Ballet Theater imeni Abay and the circus. [Text] [Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Oct 85 p 3] 6940

CSO: 1801/29

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